Problems of Communism

JULY–AUGUST 1977



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

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Cover: Hua Kuo-feng, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, at T'ienanmen Square on October 24, 1976. Directly behind Hua is Minister of Defense Yeh Chien-ying. Photo by Camera Press.

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Trends in China

EDITORS' NOTE—The death of Mao Tse-tung has brought renewed attention to the theme of continuity and change in the People's Republic of China. We present four articles which deal with various dimensions of this subject. Mr. Ting looks at the changes that have taken place in the Chinese leadership in the wake of the purge of the "gang of four" in October 1976 and assesses the emerging configuration of power. Mr. Choudhury compares current policy toward Asia with that pursued prior to Mao's passage from the scene, finding considerably more elements of continuity than of change. Mr. Brown explores the impact of transfers of Western technology on the economic development of the PRC in recent years and evaluates that country's capacity to absorb foreign technology in the future. Mr. Whyte, drawing upon data from interviews of émigrés, explores the character of long-range social transformation in China through a study of trends in rural marriage customs.

Leadership Realignments

By Ting Wang

On October 6, 1976, Chiang Ch'ing, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Wang Hung-wen, and Yao Wen-yüan were arrested and removed from their responsibilities as members of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. This "October Incident" signaled a major shift in the uneasy balance of political forces which had existed in the People's Republic in the weeks following the death of Mao Tse-tung the previous month. The Incident resulted in the wholesale elimination from the political scene of Mao's widow Chiang Ch'ing and her followers. These events demonstrated that the competing political cliques within the CCP leadership had been unable to temper their conflicts over the issues of the proper political line and distribution of power in post-Mao China. (Moreover, they showed that under a dictatorship the question of succession cannot be resolved peaceably. In this sense, they fulfilled the predictions that this author made in these pages four years ago regarding the succession to Mao.[1])

Although more than half a year has elapsed since the Incident, there are many aspects of the political situation in the PRC that remain murky. Despite the incompleteness of the information available,[2] it is still possible to carry out a summary examination of

Mr. Ting is Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Ming Pao *(Hong Kong) and Editor-in-Chief of its book section. A long-time observer of Chinese Communist politics, he is author of forthcoming biographies of Hua Kuo-feng and of the four principal figures of the Chiang Ch'ing clique which was purged last October.*

[1] See the author's "Looking Inside China: The Succession Problem," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1973, pp. 13-24.

[2] Scholars, it should be underscored, have often bemoaned such difficulties in conducting research on the political state of affairs in Communist China. See, for example, Lucian W. Pye, *The Authority Crisis in Chinese Politics*, Chicago, IL, Center for Policy Study, The University of Chicago, 1967, p. 10, and Michel Oksenberg, "The Political Scramble in Mao's China," *Saturday Review* (New York, NY), May 18, 1974, p. 14.

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developments within the political leadership since that event.

This article will first look briefly at the competing political cliques existing within the CCP leadership on the eve of Mao's death. It will next explore in some detail the important changes in the Chinese Communist power structure which resulted from the October Incident. Finally, it will attempt to assess the stability of the resulting configuration of political forces.

CCP Cliques and Their Origins

Before going into political developments since Mao's death, we need to delineate the several cliques which had formed within the party leadership over the preceding five or six years.

By the term "clique" we mean something different than the "factions" (*shan-t'ou* or "mountaintops," as they are known in China) which have long existed within the CCP. As Mao once observed,

Our party had many mountaintops in the past. There were two mountaintops in the First Front Army, and two mountaintops in the Second Front Army. . . . In the Yenan Party School, they organized mountaintops even while out taking a stroll at sunset or going to a meal at a restaurant. Within a mountaintop, everything was said, but nothing could be disclosed to another mountaintop.[3]

But the formation of cliques has not been based simply on historical associations—for example, on common prior service in the First, Second, Third, or Fourth Field Armies. Indeed, as Jürgen Domes, the noted European scholar of Asian politics, has observed, political cliques within the CCP have taken shape on the basis of both "factions" and "opinion groups."[4] Clashes over the last decade about political lines and the wielding of actual power have inevitably resulted in the formation of opposing cliques.[5] In addition to historical associations and differing political perspectives, personal self-interest has also played an important role in the formation of CCP cliques.

That career background has greatly influenced the formation of cliques is unquestioned. For example, the overwhelming majority of the backbone elements in the discredited Lin Piao clique were Lin's former colleagues in the Fourth Field Army,[6] or even earlier in the Red First Corps, 115th Division, Eighth Route Army.[7]

At the same time, there is ample evidence that historical factions are not the sole factor leading to clique adherence. The cases of Liang Pi-yeh and of Ch'en Hsi-lien are instructive on this point. As a cadre of the Red First Corps, 115th Division, Eighth Route Army and then of the Fourth Field Army, Liang Pi-yeh had long been associated with Lin Piao.[8] Yet in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960's, Liang was purged by Lin, and only after Lin's fall in 1971 did Liang resume his position as deputy director of the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army. It was not his historical associations (which would seem to have tied him to Lin) but his association with an "opinion group" (led by Lo Jui-ch'ing and opposed to Lin) which caused Liang's temporary eclipse.[9]

Ch'en Hsi-lien was an old subordinate and protégé of Liu Po-ch'eng and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. From 1937 to 1951 he held important military positions in the 129th Division, Eighth Route Army, and then in the

[3] See Mao Tse-tung, "Talk at Chengchow Conference," February-March 1959, in *Mao Tse-tung szu-hsiang wan-sui* (Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought), Peking, n.p., 1967, p. 46.

[4] See his paper, "The Relationship Between Party, Army, and Government in Communist China," presented at the Fifth Sino-American Conference on Mainland China, held at Taipei in June 1976, and his article, "China in 1976: Tremors of Transition," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), January 1977, pp. 1-17.

[5] Due to limited space, the author has not been able to comment in detail here on the differences in lines and opinions. He has analyzed this problem in another article, "On Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius," *Ming Pao Monthly* (Hong Kong), October 1974, pp. 27-31.

[6] *E.g.,* Chou Ch'ih-p'ing, Wen Yü-ch'eng, Wu Fa-hsien, and Wu Jui-lin.

[7] *E.g.,* Ch'iu Hui-tso, Huang Yung-sheng, Jen Szu-chung, Li Tso-p'eng, Liang Hsing-ch'u, Liu Hsien-ch'üan, Lung Shu-chin, Ting Sheng, Wei Tsu-chen, and Yen Chung-ch'uan. On the historical background of Lin Piao's former subordinates, see the memoirs of Lung Shu-chin, Liang Hsing-ch'u, and Tseng Yung-ya, *Hsing-huo liao-yüan* (Spark Burning Plain), Peking, People's Literature Publishing House, 1963, Vol. 10, pp. 21-109; the memoirs of Chou Ch'ih-p'ing, Liang Hsing-ch'u, and Li Tso-p'eng, in *Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao* (Red Flag Fluttering), Peking, China Youth Publishing House, 1960, Vol. 14, pp. 133-97; and *Chung-kung wu-chuang pu-tui shih-liao hui pien* (Compilation of Historical Materials on Chinese Communist Armed Forces), Vols. 1 and 2, Hong Kong, Historical Materials Publishing House, 1971 and 1972.

[8] On the early connectings between Liang and Lin, see Liang Pi-yeh, "First Spring," in *Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao,* Vol. 15, 1961, pp. 3-22, and Huang Chen-hsia, *Chung-kung chün-jen chih* (Mao's Generals), Hong Kong, Institute of Contemporary History, 1968, pp. 313-14.

[9] On the difference of opinion between Lin and Lo, see Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Special Case Group, "Report on the Errors of Lo Jui-ch'ing," *Chung-kung nien-pao* (Communist China Yearbook), Taipei, Research Society on Communist China, 1970, Part 7, pp. 14-21.

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Members of the new "Third Force" political clique, photographed at the 10th Chinese Communist Party Congress (from the left): Wu Te, Wang Tung-hsing, Chi Teng-k'uei, and Hua Kuo-feng.

—Eastfoto.

Second Field Army.[10] Yet during the Cultural Revolution he chose to renounce his historical associates to side with Mao Tse-tung and move close to the Chiang Ch'ing clique. This decision was related to Ch'en's opinions concerning policy and perhaps also to considerations of political self-promotion.

One can also identify individuals who became members of one or another clique out of pure self-interest. For example, figures such as Ch'iao Kuan-hua and Ma T'ien-shui appear to have joined or been close to the Chiang Ch'ing clique neither because of historical associations nor because they particularly agreed with the radical political line of Chiang Ch'ing. Instead, they allied themselves in order to gain power and position. In a society in turmoil, there are always many such opportunists.

As all the above suggests, the composition of political cliques in the CCP has been complex and constantly changing as a result of many intertwined factors. Hence, it requires exceptional care and attention to detail to delineate such groupings. Nevertheless, one can discern three major political groups which coalesced in the aftermath of the flight and death of Lin Piao in 1971: the *bureaucractic clique* (including the professional military), the *Chiang Ch'ing clique,* and the *Third Force.*

Such a delineation is at slight variance with the "division into three" of the CCP leadership widely accepted by the community of China specialists in the West. The latter categorization has defined the cliques as the civilian cadres (or moderates), the military, and the radical leftists.[11] While this classification has been generally useful in depicting groupings within the CCP, the author would suggest that there were considerable changes in the relative strength of the political groupings in the PRC after the Lin Piao Incident and that these developments actually altered the configuration of the Chinese political cliques.

The bureaucratic clique. Many have observed, and rightly, that the demise of Lin Piao enabled the civilian bureaucrats to stage a recovery by restoring to power those professional administrators who had been denounced as members of the "black gang" by Lin and others during the Cultural Revolution.[12] However, another important process was going on simultaneously. As the civilian professionals enhanced their strength, they also increased their cooperation with the professional military to the point that a new, combined clique was formed.

[10] On Ch'en's relations with Liu and Teng, see Ting Ling, *I-erh-chiu shih yü Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu pien-ch'ü* (The 129th Division and the Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Border Region), Peking, Hsin-hua Bookstore, 1950.

[11] See, for example, Parris H. Chang, "The Chinese Leadership Crisis," *Asian Affairs* (New York, NY), November-December 1974, pp. 100-07.

[12] See, for example, Parris H. Chang, "Mao's Unfinished Revolution," *Current Scene* (Hong Kong), August 1976, pp. 1-12.

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The grounds for this cooperation are easily discerned. As was true of the civilian bureaucrats, very few military men had joined or had been close to the radical clique around Chiang Ch'ing. Rather like the civilian cadres, the military viewed this clique as political enemies who had assaulted military as well as civilian professionals during the Cultural Revolution and after.[13] In addition to resisting the interference of the Chiang Ch'ing clique and its efforts to grab power, both bureaucracies were apprehensive over the detrimental effect a new power struggle would have on national security, economic progress, and social modernization.[14]

Consequently, in the period after the 10th CCP Congress (in August 1973), this mixed bureaucratic clique found itself collaborating in opposing the power aspirations and political line of the Chiang Ch'ing clique—a struggle which was the major theme of political activity right up to the death of Chairman Mao.[15] The bureaucrats opposed what they regarded as Mao's plan to groom the Chiang Ch'ing clique to take over upon his death. In matters of policy, the bureaucratic clique sought to "rectify" (or eradicate) what they perceived as the deviations that Mao and the radicals had introduced during the Cultural Revolution. In particular, its members sought to streamline the management of economic enterprises, the educational establishment, and scientific and technological institutions, and to effect the economic rehabilitation of the economy and expansion of foreign trade. To achieve these ends, they launched programs for "four modernizations." These proposals were embodied in three major documents drafted under the sponsorship of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who resurfaced as a major veteran official in the 1973-76 period after having been attacked and dropped from power during the Cultural Revolution.[16]

The Chiang Ch'ing clique. The Chiang Ch'ing clique opposing the bureaucrats consisted of a group of radical leftists (plus some opportunists) which had its principal support in the "Shanghai Gang," the elements associated with Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Wang Hung-wen, and Yao Wen-yüan. Their main force consisted of "worker-peasant rebels," among which "worker" rebels constituted the majority. The latter played important roles in directing some trade unions, in developing the workers' militia, in instigating worker disputes and armed struggle against established authority, and in keeping in check opposing elements on local party committees and in the leadership of certain military regions. The clique gathered a limited group of new and old state and party cadres in various areas, and within the military it was able to recruit a few remnants of the supporters of Lin Piao—*e.g.*, Ting Sheng, Hsiao Chin-kuang, Li Po-ch'iu (of the Shenyang Military Region), and Ch'en Shao-kun.

After the 10th Congress, the Chiang Ch'ing clique (directed, I would propose, by Mao Tse-tung) initiated a series of campaigns such as "Going Against the Tide," the campaign "to criticize Confucius" and the campaign "to criticize [the classical novel] *The Water Margin,*" which were indirect "shadow" attacks on Prime Minister Chou En-lai and on other leading party, government, and military figures of the bureaucratic clique.[17] They continued to promote the "Cultural Revolution" line and to defend the "new-born things" introduced during the Cul-

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[13] After the 10th CCP Congress in August 1973, not only did the radicals attack Chou En-lai and the civilian cadres, but they also clashed with Yeh Chien-ying and other professionals in the military. See *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), May 26, 1977.

[14] This commonality of interests has been noted by Alan Ned Sabrosky in his article, "Foreign Policy Implications of the Chinese Political Succession," *Asian Affairs,* September-October 1974, pp. 29-37.

[15] On this wrangling between the bureaucratic and Chiang Ch'ing cliques, see Li Shu, "Damage Done by the Gang of Four to Historical Study in China," *Li-shih Yen-chiu* (Peking), April 1977, pp. 14-20, and Fan Shu-chih, "Expose the Gang of Four's [Use of a] Smoke Screen in Prime Minister Criticism," *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* (Peking), Jan. 14, 1977.

[16] The term "four modernizations" was based on Chou En-lai's call for modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology, by the end of the century. See Chou's "Report on the Work of the Government," delivered to the National People's Congress on Jan. 13, 1975, in *Peking Review,* Jan. 24, 1975. (*continued in next column*)

The first of the three documents reportedly prepared under Teng's guidance was "On the General Program for All Work of the Party and Nation," the contents of which were revealed in a critical article by Tso Ch'ing, "Read an Unpublished Document," published in *Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an* (Shanghai), April 14, 1976, pp. 11-19. The second, "Concerning Certain Problems in the Speed-up of Industrial Development" (a 20-point plan for industry), was discussed by a Workers' Theory Study Group in *ibid.*, pp. 28-35. The third document, "Report Outline for the Academy of Sciences," was attacked by Kang Li and Yen Feng in their article, "Before and After the Appearance of the 'Report Outline'," in *ibid.*, pp. 20-27.

[17] This interpretation of the objectives of the campaigns is contained in various bills of particulars set forth against the "gang of four" in the months since their fall. See, for example, Hupeh Provincial Communist Party Committee's Great Criticism Group, "Gang of Four and the Confucius-Mencius Way," *Kuang-ming Jih-pao,* April 14, 1977, and Kiangsu Writers' Union Great Criticism Group, "A Counterrevolutionary Black Gambit of the 'Gang of Four' to Seize Power," *ibid.*, March 24, 1977.

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tural Revolution—all in an attempt to improve their prospects for succeeding Mao in power.[18]

The Third Force. Between these two major opposing camps there arose a new clique, a "Third Force." With the late K'ang Sheng's public security system as a nucleus, it embraced Politburo members Hua Kuo-feng (then Minister of Public Security and now Chairman of the CCP and PRC Premier), Wang Tung-hsing (Director of the General Office of the Central Committee and formerly Mao's personal bodyguard), and Chi Teng-k'uei (Vice Premier and First Political Commissar of the Peking Military Region).[19] It also seems to have included a number of figures from a new generation who came to political prominence at the time of the Cultural Revolution. On the Politburo, there were PLA figures Ch'en Hsi-lien and Li Te-sheng, civilian administrator Wu Te, and "worker-peasant" types Ch'en Yung-kuei, Wu Kuei-hsien, and Ni Chih-fu. Among the individuals of lesser stature were Li Su-wen and Yao Lien-wei (deputy chairmen of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress), and Sun Chien (vice premier of the PRC). All the last group had "worker-peasant" backgrounds.

With the exception of the "worker-peasant" elements, most of this clique either had been cadres in provincial party and government organizations or had exercised responsibility in various military regions. Ranging in age from 55 to 65 today, they joined the Politburo after the Cultural Revolution. It is conceivable that Mao had coopted these strong rising leaders because he saw the Third Force and the secret police (the 8341st Troop Unit) under their control as a power which could help the "gang of four" to succeed to power after he left the scene.

A 1975 photo of Ch'en Hsi-lien (left), Commander of the Peking Military Region, and Hua Kuo-feng, then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Security.

—Katherine Young.

Certainly, in the early stage of the Cultural Revolution individuals in this grouping had provided considerable support to Mao's line and also had given some assistance to the Chiang Ch'ing clique. However, in terms of political background and experience, they differed from Chiang Ch'ing, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Wang Hung-wen, and Yao Wen-yüan. More experienced in the exercise of power and linked by that experience to party, government, and military hierarchies, they tended to disagree with the radical excesses of the Chiang Ch'ing clique.[20]

As a result of these differing perspectives, the

[18] For examples of the Chiang Ch'ing clique's defense of "new-born things" see Hsiao K'o, "Chairman Mao's 'July 21' Directive Shines Forever," *Liaoning Ta-hsüeh Hsüeh-pao* (Shenyang), No. 3, 1975, pp. 53-57; Ch'in Hua, "Victorious Achievements of the Great Cultural Revolution Are Undeniable," *Peiching Ta-hsüeh Hsüeh-pao* (Peking), No. 6, December 1975, pp. 11-16; and an article by the Editorial Departments of *Jen-min Jih-pao, Hung Ch'i, Chieh-fang-chün Pao,* "The Great Cultural Revolution Shines Forever," published in *Jen-min Jih-pao,* May 16, 1976.

[19] Chi Teng-k'uei and Wang Tung-hsing, as well as Li Te-sheng and Ch'en Hsi-lien (both to be discussed subsequently), were members of the Group to Investigate the Lin Piao Case. Chi's involvement in matters of internal security was suggested by the fact that he presided over a conference on railway public security work held in Peking, March 1-13, 1977. See New China News Agency domestic broadcast of March 16, 1977, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC), March 17, 1977.

[20] In July 1967, Chiang Ch'ing had raised the slogan, "Words for Attack, Arms for Defense" (*Wen Kung Wu Wei*), which had the effect of inciting Red Guards throughout China to raid military headquarters, to seize weapons from soldiers, and to cause disturbances and outbreaks of armed struggle. For background on Chiang Ch'ing's statement, see Parris Chang, *Radicals and Radical Ideology in China's Cultural Revolution,* New York, NY, Columbia University, Research Institute on Communist Affairs, 1973, p. 33; also, "Heroic Young Red Guards Criticized Chiang Ch'ing 10 Years Ago," *Jen-min Jih-pao,* May 26, 1977. K'ang Sheng had apparently disapproved of this slogan and had asked that Chiang Ch'ing explain it to a delegation from Anhwei. Chiang stated (in what was known as her "September 5th Talk"), "I came in a hurry, without knowing what had happened. Old K'ang called me here. I said a few things, without any preparation. . . . I have never advocated armed struggle. . . ." At the order of the Staff Office of the CCP Central Committee, recordings of this talk were relayed to all areas of China, in an effort to counteract excesses triggered by the slogan. See "September 5th Important Talk by Comrade Chiang Ch'ing at Meeting of Anhwei Representatives Visiting Peking," a handbill issued by the "Worker Revolutionary Alliance" in Canton on Sept. 18, 1967.

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Third Force evidently never provided all-out support for the Chiang Ch'ing clique's attacks on the bureaucratic clique and its line. Hua Kuo-feng, for one, chose to lend his support to efforts of Chou and Teng to rectify the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, a position which brought him into direct conflict with Chiang Ch'ing.[21] Information circulating in Peking and other areas suggests that K'ang Sheng (who died in late 1975) likewise had not supported Mao's plan to groom the "gang of four" as successors.[22] Certainly, treatment of K'ang in PRC newspapers and periodicals since the October Incident would seem to indicate that he is not considered to have been a member or supporter of the Chiang Ch'ing clique.[23]

Eliminating the Chiang Ch'ing Clique

While Mao still lived, the Third Force more or less served to balance the political strife between the other two major cliques. Once he died, however, this intermediate clique cooperated with the bureaucratic clique, in an arrangement apparently worked out by Yeh Chien-ying,[24] in a joint effort to overthrow the Chiang Ch'ing clique. The consequence was the October Incident and the subsequent dramatic reshuffling of personnel in a number of leading party and government organizations.

The political purge of the Chiang Ch'ing clique took place at all levels. For purposes of the present study, we shall look briefly at developments in the CCP Central Committee, in the State Council, in the province-level committees of the CCP, and in the CCP CC Propaganda Department and the central information media. This examination also affords some insight into the resulting political alignments in these important organizations.

The Central Committee. Since the October Incident, some 77 members (roughly one quarter of the total membership) of the CCP Central Committee have either been openly purged or at least suspended. Of these, 51 are "worker-peasant elements," 14 are civilian cadres, and 12 are professional military.[25] In addition, other members of the Chiang Ch'ing clique have been let off without being demoted, possibly because they exposed the "crimes" of the "gang of four." This group includes Ma Hsiao-liu and Chang Shih-chung of Peking, Chou Li-ch'in of Shanghai, and Hua Lin-sen of Kiangsu.[26] (It is conceivable that some of the 77 CC members who have been purged or suspended may also in the future receive dispensation for their sins and resume

[21] On the clashes between Hua and the Chiang Ch'ing clique, see Ting Wang, "Hua Kuo-feng's Biography," *Chuo Koron* (Tokyo), February 1977, pp. 213-23; Peking Sports Institute's Great Criticism Group, "The Gang of Four and Their Followers Must Be [Held] Responsible for Their Crimes in Opposing Chairman Hua," *Ti-yu Pao* (Peking), March 30, 1977.

[22] Beyond the suggestion of K'ang's opposition to Chiang Ch'ing noted in fn. 20 above, the author has not been able to confirm this information. See *Ming Pao Daily News* (Hong Kong), May 6-7, 1977, on stories circulating about K'ang.

[23] Since the October Incident, there have been a number of articles in Chinese publications criticizing Lin Piao and Ch'en Po-ta by name, yet praising K'ang. See *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* for Feb. 8 and 15, and March 22, 1977. In the first issues of *Jen-min Hua-pao* (Peking) and *China Pictorial* (Peking) for 1977—devoted to commemoration of Chou En-lai—there is a photo of K'ang and Chou together years before in Yenan.

[24] Explicit evidence that Yeh played such a role is lacking. It is clear, however, that Yeh presided in fact if not in name over the important Military Commission in the years after the Lin Piao Incident and that the official newspaper of the People's Liberation Army, *Chieh-fang-chün Pao*, was the first to publish, after the October Incident, three "Editorial Department" articles bolstering Hua's claim to leadership. These appeared in the Oct. 29 and Nov. 8 and 22 issues of the Peking newspaper. Several speeches by Yeh in early 1977 likewise praised and defended Hua as leader.

[25] Below is a listing of those Central Committee members who, according to the author's reading of information on public meetings in the past half year, have been purged or suspended from their responsibilities.

(*continued in next column*)

Worker-Peasant Elements: Chang Fu-heng, Chang Heng-yün, Chang Hung-chih, Chang Wei-min, Chang Yen-ch'eng; Ch'en Chia-chung, Ch'en P'ei-chen, Ch'en Yü-pao, Chin Tsu-min, Chu K'o-chia, Fan Hsiao-chü, Feng P'in-te, Hsia Pang-yin, Hsieh Chia-hsiang, Hu Chin-ti, Hu Liang-ts'ai, Li Yüeh-sung, Liang Chin-t'ang, Liu Chün-i, Liu Sheng-t'ien, Lo Hsi-k'ang, Lu Chin-lung, Lu Chung-yang, Lung Kuang-ch'ien, Ma Ming, P'an Shih-kao, P'eng Kuei-ho, Sung Ch'ing-yu, T'ang Ch'i-shan, T'ang Chung-fu, Ts'ai Hsieh-pin, Ts'ui Hsiu-fan, Tung Ming-hui, Wang Ching-sheng, Wang Hsiang-chün, Wang Hsiu-chen, Wang Hung-wen, Wang Kuang-lin, Wang Mei-chi, Wang Pai-te, Wang Shu-chen, Wang Te-shan, Wei Feng-ying, Wei Ping-k'uei, Wen Hsiang-lan, Wu Chin-ch'üan, Wu Yü-te, Yang P'o-lan, Yang Tsung, and most recently, Kuo Hung-chieh and Nieh Chi-jung.

Civilian Cadres: Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chang Kuo-ch'üan, Chiang Ch'ing, Chou Hung-pao, Chu Chia-yao, Chuang Tse-tung, Hsieh Ching-i, Hsü Ching-hsien, Liu Hsiang-p'ing, Ma T'ien-shui, Ta Lo, Yang Ch'un-fu, Yao Wen-yüan, and Yü Hui-yung.

Military Professionals: Chu Hui-fen, Fu Ch'uan-tso, Hsiao Chin-kuang, Hsien Heng-han, Jen Szu-chung, K'ung Chao-nien, Liu Hsien-ch'üan, Ma Ning, Sung P'ei-chang, T'ien Wei-hsin, Ting Sheng, and Wu Ta-sheng.

In the case of military figure Liu Hsien-ch'üan (and perhaps of several others in the above listing) the purge from the Central Committee may not be exclusively related to the Chiang Ch'ing Affair. Liu's career had already been on a downward curve due to his association with the late Lin Piao.

[26] Ma Hsiao-liu and Chang Shih-chung were important in the suppression of pro-Chou En-lai demonstrations in T'ienanmen Square in April 1976, yet they attended the May 1 meeting in Peking in 1977. Hua Lin-sen and Chou Li-ch'in have also appeared in public activities recently.

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Table 1: Ministers Appointed to PRC State Council Since October 6, 1976

Organization	Current or acting minister	Immediate prior responsibility	Last post in State Council	Minister who was replaced
Ministry of the Coal Industry	Hsiao Han	Vice Minister, Min. of the Coal Industry	Same as in previous column	(post vacant)
Ministry of Culture	Hua Shan [a]	Professional military	None	Yü Hui-yung [b]
Ministry of Education	Liu Hsi-yao	Minister, 2nd Min. of Machine-building Industry; Director, State Council's Scientific and Educational Group	Same as in previous column	Ch'ih Ch'ün [b]
Ministry of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries	Ch'en Mu-hua	Vice Minister, Min. of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries	Same as in previous column	Fang I [c]
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Huang Hua	Ambassador to the United Nations	Same as in previous column	Ch'iao Kuan-hua [b]
1st Ministry of Machine-building Industry	Chou Tse-chien	Vice Minister, 1st Min. of Machine-building Industry	Same as in previous column	(post vacant)
2nd Ministry of Machine-building Industry	Liu Wei [a]	Vice Minister, 2nd Min. of Machine-building Industry	Same as in previous column	Liu Hsi-yao [c]
Ministry of Metallurgy Industry	T'ang K'e	Vice Minister, Min. of Metallurgy Industry	Same as in previous column	Ch'en Shao-k'un [a]
Ministry of Public Health	Ch'ien Hsin-chung	Vice Minister, Min. of Public Health	Same as in previous column	Liu Hsiang-p'ing [b]
Ministry of Public Security	Chao Ts'ang-pi	Deputy Chairman, Szechwan Revolutionary Committee; Director, Szechwan Public Security Dept.	None	Hua Kuo-feng [c]
Ministry of Railways	Tuan Chün-i	Secretary, Szechwan Provincial Committee	Minister, 1st. Min. of Machine-building Industry	Wan Li [c]
Commission for Physical Culture and Sports	Wang Meng [a]	None	Director, Commission for Physical Culture and Sports	Chuang Tse-tung [b]

[a] Professional member of the military. [b] Purged as member of Chiang Ch'ing clique. [c] Transferred.

their activities.) If we count those actually purged, suspended, or found implicated but granted leniency, the Chiang Ch'ing clique may have comprised one third or even two fifths of the total CC membership. Sorting out the loyalties of such a sizable portion of the Central Committee was doubtless a time-consuming process for the victorious cliques and appears to be the primary reason for the failure since October to convene a plenary session of this leading party body.

Looking at the "worker-peasant elements" among those purged from the CC, we find that the overwhelming majority were city workers and leaders of trade unions or workers' militia units. Very few were peasants. Clearly, the "masses" rallied by the Chiang Ch'ing clique were primarily urban workers.

A further observation should be made about the role of "workers and peasants" in the Chinese polity. In the PRC, the mass organizations of the workers and peasants do not form an independent political force, and their leaders are promoted and recruited by, or attach themselves to, one or another political group in power. For this reason one should not generalize about the political orientation of the leaders of the mass organizations, but must study each case individually. Such a study suggests that most of the old "model laborer" types on the Central Committee, who had emerged prior to the Cultural Revolution, attached themselves to the

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Changing of the guard in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: after the October 1976 purge of the Chiang Ch'ing clique, Ch'iao Kuan-hua (left) was replaced as PRC Foreign Minister by Huang Hua (right), former PRC Ambassador to the United Nations.

—Photos from Katherine Young, and from AFP via Pictorial Parade.

provincial power factions and accepted their control. By contrast, most of the worker-peasant "rebels," who emerged as CC members during or after the Cultural Revolution, were recruited and promoted by the Chiang Ch'ing clique and followed its lead.[27]

The State Council. It was not only in the CCP Central Committee that the October Incident triggered important changes of leading cadres. Since the purge of the "gang of four," there have been a total of 12 new assignments at the ministerial level in the PRC's chief executive organ, the State Council (see Table 1). The transfers indicate several things.

In the first place, all important members of the Chiang Ch'ing clique on the State Council have been removed. These include the Minister of Culture, Yü Hui-yung; the Acting Minister of Education, Ch'ih Ch'ün (formerly a Vice Minister); the Minister of Public Health, Liu Hsiang-p'ing; the Director of the Physical Culture and Sports Commission, Chuang Tse-tung; the Minister of the Metallurgical Industry, Ch'en Shao-k'un; and the Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua. The first five were confidants of Chiang Ch'ing and have been roundly denounced in the press.[28] Ch'iao Kuan-hua appears to have been an opportunist who only moved close to Chiang Ch'ing in the 1970's.

It is evident from this listing that the Chiang Ch'ing clique had had only limited success in infiltrating the State Council. The Culture Ministry, in fact, was the only base of power there to fall completely under its control. In addition to the minister, all vice ministers there have been dismissed and replaced since the October Incident.[29]

Second, the overwhelming majority of new ministerial appointees—10 in all—are veteran cadres of the State Council who previously served for long periods as ministers or vice ministers under Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Of these, Chao Ts'ang-pi, Tuan Chün-i, and Ch'ien Hsin-chung have long associations with Teng Hsiao-p'ing, are his confidants, and lost their posts along with him during the Cultural Revolution as members of the "black gang." For example, Chao had been vice director of the Department of Public Security of the Southwest Military and Administrative Committee (SWMAC) under Teng; Tuan, vice director of the Department of Industry of SWMAC; and Ch'ien, Director of the Second Field Army's and then of SWMAC's Public Health Departments. In 1952, when Teng was transferred from the Southwest to Peking and installed as a vice premier, Tuan and Ch'ien moved to the Administrative Council (later to become the State Council) in Peking, and subsequently rose from vice-ministerial to ministerial rank. Purged in the Cultural Revolution, Chao, Tuan, and Ch'ien began to recoup their losses in the 1970's and after the 10th CCP Congress upheld Teng's attempts to rectify the deviations of the Cultural Revolution. For their efforts, they found themselves temporarily driven from power by Chiang Ch'ing early last year.

Another four of the new ministers had special relations with Chou En-lai. Huang Hua and Ch'en Mu-hua were important assistants to the late Premier in matters of foreign policy, and thanks to his

[27] One can point to a number of "model laborers" who became prominent through promotion by local powerholders: Lu Yu-lan and Wang Kuo-fan in Hopeh, Wang Ch'ao-chu in Hupeh, Tsung Hsi-yün in Kirin, and Yang Fu-chen in Shanghai. "Worker-peasant rebels" who joined and depended on the Chiang Ch'ing clique included: Chu K'o-chia in Yunnan, and Chin Tsu-min, Wang Hsiang-chün, and Wang Hsiu-chen in Shanghai.

[28] On these dismissals, see *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Nov. 23, 1976, and March 22, 1977; *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, Nov. 30, 1976; *Ti-yu Pao*, March 2, 1977; and *Hung Ch'i* (Peking), No. 4, April 3, 1977, pp. 15-19. It should be noted that Ch'ih Ch'ün was only an acting minister, having served since the spring of 1976 in place of the deceased Chou Jung-hsin.

[29] The vice ministers dismissed were Chang Wei-min, Hao Liang, Liu Ch'ing-t'ang, and Wang Man-t'ien. See *Jen-min Jih-pao*, May 22, 1977, and *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, Jan. 16, 1977.

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protection they survived the Cultural Revolution unscathed. Similarly, Liu Hsi-yao was Chou's confidant in matters of science and education and served as his "liaison officer" to these circles in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. He subsequently became a deputy director and then director of the State Council's Scientific and Educational Group, where he promoted the Chou-Teng line, worked to improve management of science and technology, and waged a resolute struggle against Ch'ih Ch'ün, who was a member of the Chiang Ch'ing clique.[30] His appointment signaled an affirmation of the Chou-Teng line and the resumption of efforts to rectify the "deviations" of the "educational revolution" fostered by Ch'ih Ch'ün on behalf of the Chiang Ch'ing clique. Finally, there is Wang Meng. Although Wang was a former subordinate of Lin Piao and a veteran political cadre in the 38th Army and the Fourth Field Army, Chou En-lai promoted Wang after the reshuffling of the 38th Army that was carried out in the wake of the Lin Piao affair and

[30] On the struggle in educational circles, see the Education Ministry's Great Criticism Group, "A Political Struggle on Questions Concerning Basic Theoretical Studies in the Natural Sciences," *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, Jan. 16, 1977.

Table 2: Transfers of Province-Level First Secretaries Since October 6, 1976

Province or municipality	Current first secretary	Incumbent's former position	The former secretary	Former secretary's current post
Anhwei	Wan Li	Minister of Railways [a]	Sung P'ei-chang	Purged
Chekiang	T'ieh Ying [b, c]	Secretary, Chekiang Provincial Committee; Political Commissar, Chekiang Military District	T'an Ch'i-lung [c]	First Secretary, Tsinghai Provincial Committee
Heilungkiang	Liu Kuang-t'ao [b, c]	Second Secretary, Heilungkiang Provincial Committee; First Political Commissar, Heilungkiang Military District	Wang Chiao-tao [b, c]	Deputy Commander, Shenyang Military Region
Hunan	Mao Chih-yung	Secretary, Hunan Provincial Committee	Hua Kuo-feng [c, d]	Chairman, Chinese Communist Party
Kansu	Sung P'ing	Secretary, Kansu Provincial Committee	Hsien Heng-han	Purged
Kiangsu	Hsü Chia-t'un	Secretary, Kiangsu Provincial Committee	P'eng Ch'ung [c]	Third Secretary, Shanghai Municipal Committee
Kirin	Wang En-mao [b]	Deputy Political Commissar, Nanking Military Region	Wang Huai-hsiang [b]	Political Commissar, Kirin Military District
Kwangsi	Ch'iao Hsiao-kuang	Second Secretary, Kwangsi Provincial Committee	An P'ing-sheng [c]	First Secretary, Yunnan Provincial Committee
Kweichow	Ma Li	Deputy Secretary, Hopeh Provincial Committee	Lu Jui-lin [b, c]	Unspecified military duties
Ningsia	Huo Shih-lien	Secretary, Shensi Provincial Committee	K'ang Chien-min [b]	(Deceased)
Shanghai	Su Chen-hua [b, c, d]	Deputy Commander and First Political Commissar of Navy	Chang Ch'un-ch'iao	Purged
Tsinghai	T'an Ch'i-lung [c]	First Secretary, Chekiang Provincial Committee	Liu Hsien-ch'üan [b, c]	Deputy Commander, Tsinan Military Region
Yunnan	An P'ing-sheng [c]	First Secretary, Kwangsi Provincial Committee	Chia Ch'i-yün	Purged

[a] Purged in summer of 1976 at instigation of the Chiang Ch'ing clique.
[b] Professional member of the military.
[c] Member of the CCP Central Committee.
[d] Member of the CCP Politburo.

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named him Director of the Physical Culture and Sports Commission. Wang subsequently waged a struggle against the Chiang Ch'ing clique in sports circles, and as a result he temporarily lost his position.[31] His reinstatement is yet another indication of the renewed prestige enjoyed by the late Chou En-lai and his followers.

Third, there was a notable lack of advance of elements associated with Hua Kuo-feng and the Third Force. Not even the two non-State Council veterans among the new ministerial appointees can be classified as belonging to this group. One, Minister of Culture Hua Shan, is a professional soldier; the other, Minister of Public Security Chao Ts'ang-pi, comes to his present post from party work in Szechwan and, as we have seen, had long prior association with Teng Hsiao-p'ing in the Southwest.

Province-level party committees. The months since the October Incident have also seen changes in the staffing of party committees at the province level, including the replacement of 13 of the 29 provincial and municipality CCP first secretaries (see Table 2). Expulsion of elements of the Chiang Ch'ing clique has been an important, although not the sole, aspect of these changes at the provincial level. Shanghai Municipality in Eastern China and Liaoning Province in the Northeast were the two major political bases of the clique, and after the October Incident the respective party committees there were completely reorganized.

In Shanghai, First Secretary Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Second Secretary Yao Wen-yüan, and secretaries Wang Hung-wen, Wang Hsiu-chen, Hsü Ching-hsien, and Ma T'ien-shui were all purged as members of the Chiang Ch'ing clique. The only secretary retained was Chou Ch'un-lin, a veteran military man who had served in the New Fourth Army and Third Field Army. As commander of the Shanghai Garrison, he had not cooperated with the discredited clique.

The newly appointed First Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee is Su Chen-hua. Su had served in the 129th Division, Eighth Route Army and had commanded the Fifth Corps, Second Field Army. An old subordinate of Liu Po-ch'eng and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, he had been squeezed out of power by Lin Piao and Chiang Ch'ing in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. In the 1970's, he resumed his pre-Cultural Revolution position of Deputy Commander and First Political Commissar of the Navy. His appointment as Shanghai First Secretary and Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee appears related to the military takeover of the city in October. The East Sea Fleet under his command is said to have been charged with the heavy responsibility of heading off the Chiang Ch'ing clique's alleged plan for an armed uprising there.

The new Second Secretary in Shanghai is Ni Chih-fu, a "worker" and formerly Secretary of the Peking Municipal Committee and Director of the Peking Federation of Trade Unions. Ni, like Su, is an alternate member of the CCP Politburo, and he may be a member of the Third Force.

The Third Secretary, P'eng Ch'ung, was transferred to the Shanghai Municipal Committee from Kiangsu Province (in which Shanghai is located), where he had been serving as party First Secretary. Like P'eng, the remaining new appointees—Lin Hu-chia, Yen Yu-min, and Wang I-p'ing—are experienced civilian cadres[32] and elements of the bureaucratic clique.

Prior to October, the control of the Liaoning Provincial Committee was effectively in the hands of Secretary Mao Yüan-hsin (First Secretary Tseng Shao-shan who was also Political Commissar of the Shenyang Military Region, had been quite inactive). According to the May 1977 issue of *Hung Ch'i,* Mao (a nephew of Mao Tse-tung) was guilty of "colluding with some so-called 'veteran cadres' who sold their souls to ingratiate themselves," of "trusting a group of political gangsters and shameless writers [*i.e.,* the Chiang Ch'ing clique]," and of organizing "a fascist dictatorship gang to rule the country." More specifically, Mao Yüan-hsin was accused of organizing an "anti-party faction headed by himself with a 'general administrator' and cadres and hoodlums to take over party and government power in Liaoning." The faction presumably included Mao Yüan-hsin's confidants Li Po-ch'iu (from the military), Yang Ch'un-fu (a civilian cadre), Liu Sheng-t'ien (a peasant), and Wei Ping-k'uei (a worker)—all of whom have now been dropped as secretaries of the provincial committee and from other positions in the military, government, and trade unions.

Tseng Shao-shan continues to serve as titular First Secretary of Liaoning Province, although he is

[31] On this struggle, see *Ti-yu Pao*, March 21, 1977.

[32] Lin had served as deputy director of the State Council's State Planning Commission; Yen, as deputy director of the State Council's Internal Affairs Staff Office; and Wang, as a secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee. All three had been removed from office in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution.

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Sign of the times—a poster carried in an October 25, 1976, demonstration in Canton shows caricatures of the purged "gang of four" (from left to right, Yao Wen-yüan, Wang Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, and Chiang Ch'ing) impaled on a bayonet.

—UPI.

still very inactive. Tseng and Ch'en Hsi-lien, Commander of the Shenyang Military Region until his transfer to Peking in early 1974, had maintained a very delicate relationship with Mao Yüan-hsin and were believed to have had contact with the Chiang Ch'ing clique. This would reflect unfavorably on the political future of both figures.

Besides Tseng, three other secretaries (Huang Ou-tung, Hu I-min, and Su Yü—all "black gang" cadres demoted in the Cultural Revolution and rehabilitated in the 1970's)—retained their positions on the Liaoning Provincial Committee. Of the three newly-appointed secretaries, one is a "worker," and two are former civilian "black gang" cadres. Of the latter, the most important is Jen Chung-i, now Second Secretary of the province. Formerly a secretary of the Heilungkiang Provincial Committee and concurrently the First Secretary of the Harbin City Committee, Jen was suspended from these responsibilities in 1967 and had only resumed them in recent years. He is currently the most active cadre in Liaoning and a potential replacement for Tseng as first secretary of the province.

Completing the destruction of the Chiang Ch'ing clique's power base in the province-level party organizations were the dismissals of Hsieh Ching-i in Peking Municipality and of Wang Man-t'ien and Wang Shu-chen in Tientsin Municipality.[33] These four had also served as vice chairmen of the revolutionary committees of their respective cities.

The explanations for the other changes of assignment of provincial first secretaries are less obvious and probably diverse. Liu Hsien-ch'üan had not been actively identified as First Secretary of Tsinghai since the late 1960's and, as a remnant of the Lin Piao group, appears to be losing power. In Kirin, Wang Huai-hsiang lost his party first secretaryship but continues to function in a military capacity. In Yunnan, Chia Ch'i-yün was reportedly undergoing investigation. Both Wang and Chia, as well as Hsien Heng-han in Kansu and Sung P'ei-chang in Anhwei, appear to be under a cloud for having dragged their heels in suppressing members of the Chiang Ch'ing clique.

The remaining removals of provincial first secretaries involved transfers to other positions or (in the case of K'ang Chien-min) the death of the incumbent from natural causes. There has been some speculation that the transfer of T'an Ch'i-lung from Chekiang to Tsinghai was a "demotion" or "banishment." However, Tsinghai is no longer a wasteland without economic value. It is a new industrial base with nuclear industries and serves as a terminus of the Tsinghai-Tibet railroad now under construction. T'an persistently defended the Chou-Teng line, struggled against the Chiang Ch'ing clique, and rather effectively settled worker disputes in Hangchow.[34] With long experience in local party committee affairs and a firm hand in dealing with disturbances, he may well have been transferred to the somewhat turbulent Tsinghai as a trouble-shooter to strengthen the local party leadership.

While provincial party committees continue to undergo reorganization, there have been relatively

[33] Hsieh is the daughter of Hsieh Fu-chih and Liu Hsiang-p'ing and is reportedly an adopted daughter of Chiang Ch'ing. She and Ch'ih Ch'ün were known as the "two black generals" of Chiang Ch'ing in Peking. Wang Man-t'ien is related to Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Ch'ing. A Tientsin "worker," Wang Shu-chen served concurrently as a secretary of the Tientsin Municipal Communist Youth League.

[34] See *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Nov. 24, 1976; and reportage by a Japanese correspondent in Peking, in *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Tokyo), Jan. 29, 1977.

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Table 3: Key Figures in the Current Propaganda and Media Apparatus

Officials by organization	Title (if known)	Post from which purged in Cultural Revolution [a]
CC Propaganda Department		
Chu Mu-chih [b]		Deputy Director, New China News Agency
Ts'ao I-ou [c]		Cadre in unidentified Central Committee department[d]
Hu Yao-pang		First Secretary, Central Committee, Communist Youth League
Wu Leng-hsi		Deputy Director, CC Propaganda Department; Director, New China News Agency
Hsiung Fu		Secretary General, CC Propaganda Department
***Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily)**		
Hu Chi-wei	Chief Editor	Deputy Chief Editor, *Jen-min Jih-pao*
Sun I-ch'ing	Deputy Chief Editor	Chief Editor, *Chung-kuo Ching-nien Pao*
Ch'ih Hao-t'ien	Deputy Chief Editor	Political Commissar of a 27th Army unit [d]
P'an Fei	Deputy Chief Editor	Deputy Director, International Department, *Jen-min Jih-pao*
***Hung Ch'i* (Red Flag)**		
Wang Shu	Chief Editor	New China News Agency reporter in West Germany
Central Broadcast Bureau		
Chang Hsiang-shan	Director	Deputy Chairman, Sino-Japanese Friendship Association
Li Lien-ch'ing	Deputy Director	Cultural Counsellor, PRC Embassy in the Soviet Union
Chin Chao	Deputy Director	Deputy Director, Central Broadcast Bureau
New China News Agency		
Chu Mu-chih [b]	Director	Deputy Director, New China News Agency
Tseng T'ao	Deputy Director	Ambassador to Algeria
Shih Shao-hua	Deputy Director	Deputy Director, New China News Agency [d]
Mu Ch'ing	Deputy Director	Deputy Director, New China News Agency
Miao Hai-ling	Deputy Director	Deputy Director, New China News Agency

[a] With exceptions as noted.
[b] Chu has been identified in two posts.
[c] Ts'ao is the widow of K'ang Sheng.
[d] Not purged in Cultural Revolution.

few transfers of leaders of the military regions. The most noteworthy change was the appointment of Nieh Feng-chih to replace Ting Sheng (a holdover from the Lin Piao group) as commander of the Nanking Military Region. Nieh is a veteran military man of New Fourth Army and Third Field Army background, an old subordinate to T'an Chen-lin and Su Yü (the general, not to be confused with the Liaoning party secretary of the same name), and a close comrade-in-arms of Hsü Shih-yu (on whom, more presently).[35]

The propaganda and media structures. Perhaps even more worthy of attention than the changes in the State Council and the provincial party committees is the all-round reorganization of the leadership of the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee and of the central information media since the October Incident. The propaganda and media organizations constitute a "sensitive area" in political struggles in the PRC. Whoever controls them is able to create a favorable "public opinion" and to assume the role of defending "orthodox" positions within the CCP Central Committee. When Mao Tse-tung launched the Cultural Revolution 11 years ago this summer, he supported Chiang Ch'ing's initiative to seize power in the Propaganda Department and the media. Later, Yao Wen-yüan took over

[35] On this background, see Nieh Feng-chih, "Three Days and Nights of Pitched Battles in Shanghai," in *Hsing-huo liao-yüan*, Vol. 10, pp. 368-83; and Huang Chen-hsia, *op. cit.*, pp. 699-700.

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this power to control "public opinion and propaganda." [36]

Since the October Incident, there has been a massive turnover of leading officials in the party's Propaganda Department, in the party daily *Jen-min Jih-pao,* the theoretical journal *Hung Ch'i,* the New China News Agency, and the Central Broadcast Bureau. Among those dismissed as members or adherents of the Chiang Ch'ing clique were Lu Ying (Chief Editor of *Jen-min Jih-pao*), Chieh Li-fu (head of the New China News Agency), and Teng Kang (Acting Director of the Central Broadcast Bureau).

Seventeen key figures currently holding eighteen management posts of the propaganda and information hierarchies have been identified (see Table 3). Of these, 14 are officials who were purged during the Cultural Revolution. Eleven had been cadres in the propaganda-information field before that period. Four persons (Chang Hsiang-shan, Li Lien-ch'ing, Wang Shu, and Tseng T'ao) came to their new responsibilities from work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee, having served under Chou En-lai or Keng Piao, Director of the Central Committee's International Liaison Department.[37] Only one leader in this area is a military man—Ch'ih Hao-t'ien. An old subordinate of Hsü Shih-yu and Nieh Feng-chih,[38] Ch'ih had been Deputy Political Commissar of the Peking Military Region as well as Political Commissar of the 27th Army, which participated in the takeover in October.

The reorganized propaganda structure clearly is under the control of old Chou-Teng cadres. Of particular significance is the reemergence of Chu Mu-chih, Hu Yao-pang, and Wu Leng-hsi. These three "black gang" figures had first reappeared in the 1970's but then lost their positions in 1976 for supporting the Chou-Teng line of rectifying Cultural Revolution deviations. Hu was in charge of reorganizing the Academy of Sciences and drafted the "Report Outline of the Academy of Sciences." For this, he was attacked by the Chiang Ch'ing group and accused of "instigating rightist reversal of verdicts." [39] That these three were rehabilitated a second time and put in charge of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department amounted to a

Chu Mu-chih, Director of the New China News Agency (NCNA) and leader of a Chinese delegation which toured the US in 1973 at the invitation of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, is greeted at New York's Kennedy Airport by Warren H. Phillips of The Wall Street Journal. *Purged from NCNA in the Cultural Revolution, Chu had returned in the 1970's and had risen to the directorship. In 1976 he was once again purged, only to be reinstated as NCNA Director and appointed to a position in the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee after the October purge of the "gang of four."*

—Wide World.

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[36] For post-October charges against the Chiang Ch'ing clique's misuse of the media, see Wen Ch'ing, "Apostles of Goebbels," *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Nov. 20, 1976, and *Hung Ch'i* Great Criticism Group, "Disturbance, Failure, and Extinction Record—Exposing Yao Wen-yüan's Crimes in Using *Hung Ch'i* to Create Counterrevolutionary Opinions," *Hung Ch'i*, March 1977, pp. 36-47.

[37] Chang had been serving as Deputy Director of the Central Committee's International Liaison Department; Li, as a Cultural Counsellor in Japan; Tseng as Ambassador to France; and Wang, as Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Keng Piao in 1949 was a subordinate to Nieh Jung-chen and served as Deputy Commander of the 19th Corps in North China. Since then, he has served abroad as an ambassador and then as Deputy Foreign Minister and confidant to Chou En-lai. In the October Incident, Keng reportedly led troops to take over the propaganda establishment—a rumor which seems reliable to the author, particularly in light of the fact that four of Keng's former subordinates have been transferred to work in this field. All of them had some experience in propaganda work aimed at foreign audiences.

[38] See Huang Chen-hsia, *op. cit.*, pp. 643, 699, 700.

[39] Peking University and Tsinghua University Great Criticism Group, "Counterattacking the Rightist Movement to Reverse Verdicts in Science and Technology Circles," *Hung Ch'i*, February 1976, pp. 3-11; and Kan Li and Yen Feng, "Before and After the Appearance of the 'Report Outline'," *loc. cit.*

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direct repudiation of the Chiang Ch'ing clique's views of "readjustment." Indeed, it was a major "reversal of a verdict."

As we have seen above, a major redistribution of power has been going on in China since October 1976. While the changes recorded so far are themselves far-reaching, the process has not been completed. For one thing, the Central Committee itself awaits reconstitution. However, from what information we have at hand, one can draw some conclusions about why the Chiang Ch'ing clique fell and about the future alignment of political forces in Peking.

The clique fell because of its political inexperience and the lack of a solid political base. With its main support among the predominantly urban members of the "worker-peasant rebels," the clique proved unable to infiltrate to a sufficient degree the civilian and military hierarchies which wield the ultimate power in Peking. The group's ranks included only quite limited numbers of veteran civilian cadres. Likewise, very few high-ranking military leaders came over. As noted above, the principal military support came from a handful of Lin Piao associates, although there is some evidence of partial infiltration of the Air Force, the Navy, and the Nanking Military Region.[40] Finally, the clique failed in its efforts to link up with the Third Force. A prime objective was to establish bases in the six factories and two schools guarded by the 8341st Troop Unit. But in the end, the Chiang Ch'ing clique was unable to subvert Wang Tung-hsing and the "8341st."

The power of the Chiang Ch'ing clique has collapsed at the central and local levels, and the possibility of a comeback is very limited. While local remnants may be able to cause disturbances for a while, they appear unable to regroup for a power seizure at the center.

Re-Resurgence of Chou-Teng Line

As striking as the fall of the Chiang Ch'ing clique has been the spread of the Chou-Teng policy line and the reemergence of members of the bureaucratic clique in major positions of responsibility in Peking and in the provinces.

The bulk of appointees to the Central Committee apparatus, the State Council, and provincial organs since the October Incident are veteran cadres. Very few former "worker-peasant elements" or county-level cadres have been able to "ascend to high positions by helicopter" (a term commonly used to describe the rapid promotion of such persons during the Cultural Revolution). Nor is there any evident tendency for the professional military to expand its power in party and government organizations.

Most of the veteran cadres newly installed in office have long administrative experience in party affairs at the provincial level, or in the State Council. Their appointments are believed to represent an effort by the CCP leadership to normalize administrative and economic controls in order to promote implementation of the plan for "four modernizations."

Certainly, the great bulk of these cadres were victims of the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, they disagreed with the Cultural Revolution line and disliked the words and deeds of the Chiang Ch'ing clique. Hence, they can be expected to push hard for "correction" of the "mistakes" of the Cultural Revolution and to promote the "four modernizations." They may also contribute to resolution of the issue of how to bring Teng Hsiao-p'ing out of his second retirement (i.e., that of April 1976). However, the more powerful this force becomes and the greater the possibility of its success in bringing about an official reevaluation of the Cultural Revolution, the more difficulties the CCP leadership will have in preserving Mao Tse-tung as a political idol and a source of prestige or legitimacy—a point to which we shall return at the conclusion.

One other aspect of the bureaucratic clique deserves comment here: the signs of developing local factions within it. The most prominent example has at its nucleus Hsü Shih-yu and Wei Kuo-ch'ing, respectively Commander and First Political Commissar of the Canton Military Region. Of the newly appointed provincial first secretaries, Ch'iao Hsiao-kuang in Kwangsi and An P'ing-sheng in Yunnan

[40] Since October, Air Force Commander Ma Ning, Air Force Political Commissar Fu Ch'uan-tso, and Navy Deputy Commander K'ung Chao-nien have been suspended, possibly for involvement in the October Incident. (Major political incidents in Peking—such as the Lin Piao Affair—have invariably involved some persons in these two branches of the People's Liberation Army). Also dismissed was Ting Sheng, Commander of the Nanking Military Region. In addition, the following two figures appear to have been suspended: Wu Ta-sheng (Political Commissar of the Nanking Military Region and concurrently First Political Commissar of the Kiangsu Military District) and Yang Kuang-li (Deputy Political Commissar of an unidentified troop unit in Kiangsu Province and simultaneously a secretary of the Kiangsu Provincial CCP Committee and vice chairman of the Province's Revolutionary Committee). These three are all believed to have been involved with the Chiang Ch'ing clique.

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have worked with Wei for long periods and assisted him in resisting power thrusts by the Chiang Ch'ing clique. T'an Ch'i-lung in Tsinghai and Huo Shih-lien in Ningsia were veteran political cadres in the New Fourth Army and Third Field Army, with which Hsü and Wei served. Ch'en P'i-hsien and Chang Chih-hsiu, newly appointed secretaries in Yunnan, and Wang Pi-ch'eng, a Yunnan provincial secretary and Commander of the K'unming Military Region (transferred there from the Nanking Military Region —then Hsü's bailiwick—in the early 1970's), all have a similar background. Nieh Feng-chih, newly appointed Commander of the Nanking Military Region, also belongs to the New Fourth Army and Third Field Army historical faction. A veteran cadre of the 27th Army, Nieh worked under Hsü for a quarter of a century and is one of Hsü's confidants. Finally, Ch'ih Hao-t'ien, the only military figure in the new leadership of the party's propaganda and information apparatus, has been a Hsü-Nieh confidant and a political cadre in the 27th Army.

While it is still too early to determine whether Wei and Hsü have fully organized their local power, it is an undeniable fact that veteran cadres of the New Fourth Army and Third Field Army, as well as Wei's local cadres in Kwantung and Kwangsi, have become very active since the October Incident. Veteran cadres of the New Fourth Army and Third Field Army are active in East China (the former region of Hsü's political activities) and also in Peking. For example, T'an Chen-lin is Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and Su Yü is Vice Chairman of the party's Military Commission. In addition, three of the six vice ministers in the Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Education are persons newly transferred from duties in Kwangtung and Kwangsi.[41]

Moreover, it has been rumored (but not confirmed) that Hsü and Wei wrote to Hua Kuo-feng requesting prompt reinstatement of Teng Hsiao-p'ing and reevaluation of Mao's deeds and mistakes. If there is any truth to this story, the political movements of Hsü and Wei in the future will bear even closer attention.

For the future, the CCP leadership seems committed to the Chou-Teng line adopted after the 10th Party Congress. The party now advocates vigorous rectification of the Cultural Revolution excesses, rebuilding of enterprise management systems, rehabilitation of production, development of the economy, correction of leftist deviations in culture and in education fields, expansion of foreign relations and trade, and all-out pursuit of the plan of "four modernizations." The three policy documents drafted under Teng's sponsorship have now been reaffirmed. On these matters, there seems to be no dissension among civilian and military leaders in the bureaucratic clique or among members of the Third Force.

The Question of Teng

However, there is obvious dissension and dispute at the highest level regarding Teng's personal reinstatement. Since November 1976, numerous articles have appeared in party newspapers and journals advocating reversal of the April 1976 decision to

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, photographed in May 1975 during a state visit to France as Deputy Premier of the People's Republic of China, a year before his second fall from power.

—Gamma/Liaison.

[41] Among the new vice ministers of the Education Ministry are Yung Wen-t'ao (formerly a Kwangtung Provincial Committee secretary) and Hsiao Han (formerly a secretary of the Nanning City Committee in Kwangsi). Tang Hsiang-min, formerly a member of the Standing Committee of the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee, is now a vice minister of the Culture Ministry.

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remove Teng Hsiao-p'ing from his post as Vice Premier and CCP Vice Chairman and seeking a declaration of his innocence, but neither step has yet been taken.

While Teng has in reality been cleared, his "formal" reinstatement is a difficult matter which will continue to bedevil the CCP at the highest level until it is resolved. For Teng's rehabilitation is not simply a matter of personal power and position. The Central Committee resolutions of April 7, 1976, dismissing Teng from all party and government posts and elevating Hua Kuo-feng to First Vice Chairman of the Central Committee and Premier, bore the distinct imprint of Chairman Mao.[42] To formally reinstate Teng, the party must upset at least the first of those two resolutions, and also reverse the evaluations of the T'ienanmen Incident of April 1976 (demonstrations in the memory of Chou En-lai) and of the Cultural Revolution which they reflected. Even if Teng is eventually restored to prominence, time will be needed to make appropriate arrangements so that such a move can be made without destroying Mao Tse-tung as national symbol.

A recent photo of Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, showing a new hairstyle (replacing his former crewcut) that is more evocative of the late Mao Tse-tung.

—Katherine Young.

With the exception of Hua Kuo-feng, members of the Third Force are reported to oppose Teng's reinstatement, although with varying degrees of fervor. The bureaucratic clique, in contrast, strongly supports this action, and by bringing about the reinstatement of Hu Yao-pang, Chu Mu-chih, and Wu Leng-hsi in the propaganda establishment, they appear to be in a highly advantageous position to promote such a course. Teng, personally, has a political base and considerable prestige. In the past, he rose stoutheartedly to resist the ambitions of the Chiang Ch'ing clique. Many civilian and military bureaucrats remember the persecution that Chou En-lai himself suffered at the hands of the Chiang Ch'ing clique and hence feel sympathy for Teng.

Informed circles generally believe that Teng Hsiao-p'ing will probably return to public office in the future, but that there will be considerable additional wrangling over the time and form of his reinstatement and the position to which he is named. Rumors circulating in Peking and Canton aver that Wei Kuo-ch'ing, Hsü Shih-yu, and other local power-holders have requested that Teng be appointed Premier and that the Third Force resists this. The two sides seem temporarily stalemated on the issue. The best one can predict is that Teng will not be named to a post which outranks either Hua Kuo-feng or Yeh Chien-ying.*

Long-Range Prospects

Looking further down the road, one sees considerable potential for political instability within the CCP leadership, for ultimately a new generation of political leaders must succeed to power as those of the

[42] The text of the two resolutions, both adopted "on the proposal of" Chairman Mao, are translated in *Peking Review*, April 9, 1976, p. 3.

* On July 21, 1977, after this article had been completed, the CCP Central Committee met and reinstated Teng as CCP Vice Chairman, Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army, and Vice Premier. See FBIS, *op. cit.*, July 22, 1977, p. E15.—*Eds.*

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first and second generations die or withdraw to second-line positions.

Already we have some evidence of the emerging importance of young cadres of the fourth generation, *i.e.*, those in their mid-50's who joined the CCP during the War of Resistance to Japanese aggression (1937-45), a development that the author four years ago predicted would occur soon after Mao's death.[43] In the Third Force, one would point to three individuals—Hua Kuo-feng, Chi Teng-k'uei, and Wang Tung-hsing—who represent this group. The first two are precisely " '37 " or "War of Resistance" cadres, while Wang joined somewhat earlier and is now about 65. All will play important roles hereafter, and the possibility is rather great that Chi and Wang will advance further. Within the top circle of the bureaucratic clique, one finds only a few representatives of the "War of Resistance" cadres—Chao Tzu-yang in Szechwan, Ch'iao Hsiao-kuang in Kwangsi, and Liu Kuang-t'ao in Heilungkiang. Although few cadres of this generation have yet assumed high-level positions, power will gradually flow to their hands with the passage of time and the passing of the remaining representatives of the early revolutionary generations, now over 70.

For the time being, Hua Kuo-feng stands at center stage, but his attainment of this status depended on the support of two key political forces. One was the "8341st" secret-police unit controlled by Wang Tung-hsing; the other was key elements in the military led by Yeh Chien-ying. The latter force was of particular importance, for without Yeh's support, it would have been very difficult for Hua to achieve the leadership position he holds. Yeh's motivations are not altogether clear, but one may surmise that he felt forced by circumstances to support Hua as a means of winning over Wang and his "8341st" unit for the purge of the Chiang Ch'ing clique. There was very possibly a tacit understanding, or political bargain, among Yeh, Hua, and Wang.

Yeh is an elder statesman who, because of his prestige as well as his dominant position in the Military Commission, can act to balance the Third Force and those who have developed local power bases. However, he is approaching 80 and thus cannot remain on the political scene forever. Once he goes, the Third Force and the local powerholders may well engage in a power struggle. In addition, the Chinese polity still faces the thorny issue of reevaluating Mao Tse-tung and the Cultural Revolution, a task which may also lead to clashes.

Whether the leading figures in the CCP can arrive at a peaceful resolution of these delicate issues and prolong the *modus vivendi* which has obtained since the October incident remains an open question. It will not be an easy task.

[43] Ting Wang, "Looking Inside China: The Succession Problem," *loc. cit.*

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Post-Mao Policy in Asia

By Golam W. Choudhury

The recent deaths of Mao Tse-tung, long the ultimate decision-maker on China's vital issues, and Chou En-lai, the country's ablest administrator in foreign as well as domestic affairs, inevitably raised questions about what international course China would follow with these two leaders gone from the political scene. Would the Sino-Soviet rift, to which Mao was a major contributor, continue, or would there be a narrowing of differences between the two Communist giants? Such a development would, of course, affect not only bilateral ties, but also the triangular relationship among Washington, Moscow, and Peking. And how would the new government view the United States specifically? Would there, in short, be a major change in the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, where the interests of the major powers interact? Moreover, how would the Chinese approach Japan in view of the fact that its gains from normalization of relations with Tokyo had fallen short of initial anticipations, and what would Peking's attitude be vis-à-vis the regional tensions and conflicts in many parts of the Third World—especially those in Asia, where China already had the capability of playing a significant role?

Mao's successor, Hua Kuo-feng, has himself acknowledged the uncertainties that China's novel situation produced. In a speech in late December 1976, he noted:

. . . our people, our comrades, and our foreign friends and comrades were gnawed by deep anxiety and concern over the destiny of our Party and state. Everybody was saying to himself: In the past with Chairman Mao at the helm, we defied whatever difficulty or hazard before us; now that Chairman Mao has passed away . . . [w]hat will become of China's future? [1]

At the same, Hua went to some pains to cloak himself in the mantle of Maoist tradition. He declared that "both internally and internationally, we shall unswervingly forge ahead along the course charted by Chairman Mao," and he went on to say:

We are determined to uphold the principles of proletarian internationalism, carry out the revolutionary line and policies in foreign affairs formulated by Chairman Mao, strengthen our unity with the international proletariat and the oppressed nations and oppressed people of the world, strengthen our unity with the third world countries and unite with all countries suffering from imperialist and socialist-imperialist aggression, subversion, intervention, control, and bullying, so as to oppose the hegemonism of the two superpowers—the Soviet Union and the United States.[2]

While it was predictable that Hua would at least verbally seek to identify himself with Mao in light of Hua's heavy dependence on the deceased Chair-

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[1] See his speech at the Second National Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agriculture, Dec. 25, 1976, in *Peking Review*, Jan. 1, 1977. p. 34.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 44.

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man's personal blessing for his own legitimacy as a successor, the embrace of the Maoist legacy has gone far beyond mere words. Chinese foreign policy over the last year has in fact displayed essential continuity with that pursued during the 1970's by Mao and Chou. This article will attempt to demonstrate the continuity in looking at the major strands of Chinese policy before and after Mao's demise, with particular attention to Asia.

The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle

From the very inception of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the prime objective of its foreign policy has been national security, and its quest for national security has been closely tied up with its relations with the two superpowers, the United States and the USSR. In the wake of its confrontation with the United States on the Korean peninsula in the early 1950's, China during the 1950's felt threatened by the United States. Chairman Mao expressed the Chinese perspective quite forcefully to Pakistan Prime Minister Hossain S. Suhrawardy when the latter visited Peking in 1956. In trying to justify Pakistan's adhesion to SEATO, Suhrawardy argued that "Americans are not enemies of China but only afraid of China's designs in Asia," but Mao responded: "If because the United States is afraid of us, they must control the Philippines, Thailand, and Japan, then we can say that, because we are afraid of the United States, we must control Mexico, Nicaragua, and even Pakistan." [3]

With the deterioration of Sino-Soviet ties during the late 1950's and early 1960's, and especially with the USSR's dispatch of military supplies to India after the 1962 Sino-Indian war when the United States was doing the same thing, the Chinese became convinced that there was a "collusion" between the two superpowers for the containment of China. Chou En-lai told Pakistan's President Mohammad Ayub Khan on March 3, 1965, that "both the United States and the Soviet Union had the common objective of weakening and isolating China." He added that "in a future global conflict, the United States, the Soviet Union, and also Japan and India will be fighting against China; the main target will be China." [4] Mao, too, conveyed to Ayub the belief that "the United States and the Soviet Union are now trying to have some sort of understanding so as to follow a policy of containment against China." [5] Similar views were expressed by the Chinese in their friendly dialogues with Pakistan over the 1966-69 period.[6]

However, 1969, the year that witnessed China's final emergence from the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, brought events that changed the Peking leadership's perceptions of the dangers they faced. During March, serious armed clashes took place between Soviet and Chinese forces on the Ussuri River along the Sino-Soviet border. Subsequently, the two countries engaged in sharp polemical exchanges, and there were public reports in the Western press that the Kremlin leaders were planning a preemptive attack on China's nuclear facilities in Sinkiang Province. That these reports had some degree of substance is attested by the dispatches of June-July 1969 from the Pakistani ambassador in Moscow, who indicated that the Kremlin leaders had consulted with their East European allies regarding a contingency plan to destroy China's nuclear capability. At the same time, Pakistan's diplomatic sources in Peking reported China's grave concern about the possibility of such a preemptive strike by the Russians.[7]

Although the threat of a full-scale conflict between the two Communist giants subsided in due course, the Chinese leadership continued to see the USSR, with its nearly 40 divisions along the Sino-Soviet frontiers, as a major military challenge. Consequently, they were receptive to the soundings of President Richard M. Nixon about ending two decades of hostile and frozen relations between the United States and China. The end results were the trips of US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and then of President Nixon to Peking, and the signing of the Shanghai joint communiqué by Nixon and Chou on February 28, 1972. This document looked toward normalization of relations between the two countries.

In accordance with the evolving state of affairs, the Chinese also adopted a new line on the American military presence in Asia. Rather than oppose it, they decided to regard it as a necessary evil to be tolerated for the time being—except, that is, when

[3] Based on the author's reading of the Pakistan government's unpublished documents and papers.

[4] *Ibid.*, and interviews with Ayub.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Based on the author's reading of the Pakistan government's unpublished documents and papers.

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Premier Chou En-lai and US President Richard M. Nixon exchange toasts at a Peking reception during the historic 1972 meetings between the Chinese and American leaders.

—White House Photo.

it came to Taiwan.[8] In 1975 Elliott Richardson, former US Undersecretary of State among other things, aptly summed up their general outlook as follows:

China's leaders want the United States to play a major role in Asia indefinitely, to head off Soviet domination of the region. I don't think the Chinese would want to see any shifts in Asia for the foreseeable future. The Chinese have an interest in the preservation of a major U.S. role toward the rest of the world, if only because Chinese security to a degree depends on a continuing American countervailing role against the Soviet Union.[9]

During the last years of Mao's life, the Chinese did apparently grow restive at what they regarded as the slow pace at which normalization was proceeding and as American vacillation in dealing with the USSR, but suspicions of Soviet intentions clearly continued to override all other considerations in the Chinese calculus. For example, on the eve of Mao's death, Ch'iao Kuan-hua, then China's Foreign Minister, in a welcoming speech to the former US Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, said:

The imperialist power that styles itself socialist used the rhetoric of "detente" most vociferously while most energetically expanding its armaments and preparing for war. . . . it talks peace, but it practices war. Confronted with the expansionist ambitions of this superpower, some people try appeasement and concession or even sacrifice others in an attempt to protect themselves. This is, of course, wishful thinking. The lesson of Munich in the thirties proves that to do so can only mean rearing a tiger cub and bringing ultimate disaster upon oneself. In our opinion, the correct policy should be to face reality, mobilize and rely on the people, and unite with all the forces that can be united with to wage a tit-for-tat struggle against it.[10]

After Mao's passage from the scene, Moscow launched a major campaign to improve its relations with Peking. As part of this effort, Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Il'ichëv, the chief Soviet negotiator in the stalled border talks, returned to the Chinese capital in November 1976 after an 18-month absence.

However, the Chinese have consistently rejected all Soviet overtures and have persisted in their criticisms of the USSR. For example, in early October 1976, shortly after Mao's death, Ch'iao Kuan-hua told the UN General Assembly that "the Soviet Union is trying to expand its influence in the world, and it ultimately will wind up in a war with the United States." Then he went on to utter the usual Chinese denunciation of Soviet "social imperialism" and its "expansionist activities." Moreover, he urged the European states and developing countries to shake off any fear of the USSR because its outward appearance of strength was undermined by internal dissension. As he expressed things,

There is now a strange phenomenon in the world. Some people are terrified at the mention of the Soviet Union, thinking that it cannot be touched.

[8] In deference to Kim Il Sung, the Chinese also officially called for the removal of US troops from South Korea and the unification of the North and the South, but it has never been certain that Peking would actually welcome withdrawal of US troops from the Korean peninsula.

[9] *Durham Morning Herald* (Durham, NC), May 22, 1975.

[10] See PRC Mission to the United Nations, Press Release No. 216, New York, NY, Nov. 29, 1976.

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This is superstition. Soviet social imperialism is nothing to be afraid of. It is outwardly strong but inwardly weak. [11]

On December 25, 1976, Chairman Hua Kuo-feng took the provocative step of releasing a hitherto unpublished major address given by Mao in April 1956, shortly after Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech criticizing Stalin at the 20th Congress of the Soviet party. Among other things, Mao said:

At the time of the war of liberation, Stalin first would not let us press on with the revolution, maintaining that if civil war flared up, the Chinese nation ran the risk of destroying itself. Then when fighting did erupt he took us half seriously, half skeptically. When we won the war, Stalin suspected that ours was a victory of the Tito type, and in 1949 and 1950 the pressure on us was very great.[12]

After lengthy conversations in April 1977 with Chinese leaders—including Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and Foreign Minister Huang Hua—Julian Amery, a member of the British Parliament, came away with this assessment of Chinese attitudes toward the USSR:

The basic reason for Peking's antagonism to Moscow is the Chinese conviction that the Soviets are out for world hegemony. They see the growing military strength of the Soviet Union, and they have also looked under the surface at the social and economic mainsprings of Soviet imperialism.[13]

In May 1977, the Kremlin leaders, after eight months of watching and waiting, apparently gave up hope for an early breakthrough in relations, and they authorized the resumption of polemics. A remarkably vituperative article in *Pravda* described Chairman Hua and the new Chinese leaders as "expansionists, militarists, and no better than Mao." It also quoted General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's comments on China in his report to the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1976:

Peking's frantic attempts to torpedo détente, to obstruct disarmament, to breed suspicion and hostility between states, its efforts to provoke a world war present a great danger for all peace-loving peoples. We shall continue to repulse this. . . .[14]

It would seem, then, that the new Peking leadership has for the present decided that China's interests dictate adherence to the course that Mao and Chou charted with respect to the triangular relationship. Just how lasting this decision may be, however, is moot. There is no question that the nature of the Sino-Soviet relationship depends upon many factors aside from US policy toward Peking or Moscow. Nevertheless, if the Chinese come to believe, rightly or wrongly, that Washington is merely using its "China connection" as leverage in its dealings with Moscow, they could reassess their overall line. While confirmatory evidence is scarce, this author is convinced that there exists within the Chinese leadership a group which has never been happy about China's "flirting" with the United States

Yu Chan (left), Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, and Vasiliy Tol'stikov, Soviet Ambassador to the PRC, at Peking Airport in late 1976 awaiting the return of the Soviet negotiator in the Sino-Soviet border talks, Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Il'ichëv.

—Camera Press.

[11] Speech at the 31st session of the UN General Assembly, Oct. 5, 1976, as contained in PRC Mission to the United Nations, Press Release, Oct. 5, 1976.

[12] Speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on April 25, 1956, New China News Agency, Dec. 25, 1976.

[13] *Sunday Telegraph* (London), April 13, 1977.

[14] *Pravda* (Moscow), May 14, 1977. For an account of this commentary, see *The Washington Post*, May 15, 1977.

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and which might argue as follows: "We have tried the Americans. Why don't we try the Russians now? Neither of them is our friend. But we have looked expectantly to the Americans for five years. Why not pause a while and see if Moscow will give us a better deal?"

Japan

While the Chinese entered into extensive trade contacts with Japan as far back as the early 1950's, their attitudes toward Tokyo fluctuated greatly during the years prior to 1970, with hostility at high levels in the 1958-60 and 1966-69 periods. However, as China reemerged in the 1970's from the self-imposed isolation of the Cultural Revolution and became increasingly apprehensive about Soviet intentions after the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, the Peking leadership moved to improve its relations with the Japanese government. In doing so, the Chinese implicitly recognized Tokyo's key role in the changing balance of power in Asia—the result of Japan's position as the world's third largest economy and its revived status as a major political power.

Japan, for its part, found a rapprochement desirable too. The Japanese had long stressed the existence of traditional cultural ties with the Chinese, and they now anticipated that some major economic benefits would accrue to Japan from the greater access to the huge Chinese market that closer ties would provide. They also perceived implications for Japan in President Nixon's enunciation in 1969 of a policy of lowering the US profile in Asia and in his subsequent opening of a dialogue with the Peking leadership.

All these considerations led to the establishment of formal diplomatic links between China and Japan during the visit of Japan's then Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka to Peking in September 1972. This, in turn, opened the way for an expansion of ties in a variety of ways. The two countries entered into negotiations to conclude agreements on civil aviation, navigation, and fisheries. Peking began to import Japanese steel on a long-term basis. An agreement negotiated in the second half of 1973 and signed during a visit by Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira to Peking in January 1974 provided for "most favored nation" treatment in tariff and payment arrangements, the creation of a joint trade committee at the official level, the holding of trade fairs, and the expansion of technical exchanges; but the agreement did not stipulate concrete levels for these activities.[15] China undertook to supply oil to Japan, and its shipments, particularly after the 1973 Arab oil boycott, proved mutually beneficial to both countries.

At the same time, the Chinese proved more demanding and less cordial than at least some quarters in Japan had expected them to be. The problem did not lie, as one might logically have anticipated, in Japan's continued support of its security treaty with the United States. As one analyst has pointed out, "the American connection with China can have a serious impact on Russia only if the United States also maintains a close rapport with Japan," [16] and the Chinese made clear to a variety of Japanese visitors that they recognized this reality. Rather, the difficulties arose from Japanese-Soviet relations and Tokyo's attitudes toward these.

The Sino-Japanese rapprochement plainly created unease in Moscow, and the USSR quickly set about trying to strengthen its own influence in Tokyo. For example, in March 1973 it issued an invitation to Prime Minister Tanaka to visit Moscow—a visit which took place in October of the same year. In addition, it intensified its efforts to interest the Japanese in its proposals for joint economic development of Siberia and its scheme for the construction of a second, 2,000-mile trans-Siberian railway (slightly north of the existing line) to convey coal, oil, and other goods to the Pacific coast of the USSR.

Although such undertakings produced little in the way of concrete accomplishments for the Soviets, Japan did strive to maintain some balance between its relations with the USSR and its relations with China. As a consequence, Tokyo found itself embroiled in the rivalry between the two. Perhaps the most important issue on which the Japanese incurred Chinese displeasure concerned whether to include an "anti-hegemony" clause in the proposed Sino-Japanese peace treaty.

Negotiations for a bilateral peace treaty to formally end what Peking's leaders still viewed as a legal state of war between the two countries began not long after the establishment of official diplomatic ties; however, the negotiations soon ran into trouble because of China's insistence on incorporating into the treaty a clause against any country's

[15] See Susumu Awanohara, "Japan Changes Direction," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Oct. 1, 1976.

[16] Joseph Kraft, "Japan's Crucial Role in Sino-American Relations," *The Washington Post*, Dec. 17, 1975.

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seeking "hegemony" in Asia. Opposition to any form of "hegemony" had become an important feature in China's post-Cultural Revolution foreign policy, and the Chinese had sought to obtain the support of other countries for this stand. For instance, the Shanghai communiqué signed at the close of President Nixon's visit to China in 1972 contained a statement on the subject.[17] So too did the joint Sino-Japanese communiqué issued at the conclusion of Prime Minister Tanaka's trip to China,[18] as well as most of the joint communiqués put out in conjunction with the visits to China of leaders from other Asian countries in ensuing months. In accordance with these precedents, the Chinese wanted to write an "anti-hegemony" clause into the proposed treaty.

The Japanese, for their part, were perfectly willing to conclude a peace treaty with China even in the face of Soviet displeasure. This Prime Minister Miki made quite clear in a statement on January 13, 1976, just hours after Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko ended a five-day visit to Tokyo that had apparently been designed to dissuade the Japanese from going ahead with the project.[19] But the Japanese were not prepared to antagonize Moscow unduly; hence, they were reluctant to agree to the inclusion of an "anti-hegemony" clause in the treaty.

In conversations with defense and foreign policy officials in Japan in July 1976, the author found that they cited three specific reasons for this reluctance:

(1) The word "hegemony" has acquired a definite meaning and significance in the context of the Sino-Soviet feud, and Japan would like to remain neutral in that conflict.

(2) China's 1975 Constitution speaks against "hegemony of the two superpowers." Japan is not willing to oppose the US presence in Asia, which is vital to Japanese security, and the "anti-hegemony" clause could be construed as a commitment to do just that.

(3) If Japan signed the treaty with the "anti-hegemony" clause in it, Moscow would be so offended that Japan would have no hope of getting back the four northern islands that the USSR seized after Japan's defeat in World War II and that Japan still claims.

During a trip to China shortly thereafter, the author raised these points with Chinese officials. In relation to the northern islands, a senior Chinese expert on foreign affairs asked him to tell his Japanese acquaintances that the Russians never return any territory once they occupy it. As for the first point, the Chinese indicated that the word "hegemony" has a clear and unambiguous meaning, and that China opposes any form of hegemony, not merely the Soviet variety. With regard to the second point, the Chinese said that Japan is welcome to have special relations with the United States—including security pacts and military bases—but she cannot, as a self-respecting Asian nation, support US hegemony. "Friendship" and "hegemony" are two different things.

Up to Mao's death in September 1976, the negotiations remained deadlocked. Nonetheless, relations between the two Asian neighbors continued to be much more than just *pro forma* in nature. Not only did Japan retain its status as China's most important trading partner, but Peking took pains to register approval of Tokyo's refusal to abandon its claims to the northern islands in the face of Soviet pressure or to be a party to the Asian collective security plan of Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev.[20] On the Japanese side, there were efforts to strengthen the mutually beneficial economic links between the two countries.

Since Mao's departure from the scene, the new Chinese leaders have made no significant move toward amelioration of relations with Tokyo. Nor, for that matter, has Japan's new Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda taken any big steps either. The Chinese press has continued to denounce Soviet attempts to influence Japan, and to harp on Moscow's "blackmailing of Japan,"[21] while Tokyo has seemed to be interested in preserving a "genuine" nonalignment in the Sino-Soviet conflict. With regard to the concrete issue of the peace treaty, the impasse over the "anti-hegemony" clause has persisted. China has maintained its position in favor of the inclusion of the clause, and Japanese efforts to bring about a softening of that stand have thus far proved of no avail. In 1974, Kiichi Miyazawa, then

[17] For the text of the communiqué, see *The New York Times*, March 1, 1972.

[18] See the official English text released by New China News Agency, Sept. 29, 1972.

[19] For a discussion of Miki's statement and its implications, see the editorial entitled "Gromyko's Tokyo Rebuff," *The New York Times*, Jan. 19, 1976.

[20] See, for example, the commentary in *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), July 25, 1976, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China*, (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), July 27, 1976, pp. A1-2.

[21] See, for instance, *Peking Review*, March 11, 1977.

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Japan's Foreign Minister, had offered the Chinese "a Japanese interpretation" of the clause which would make it palatable to Tokyo; but in conversations with Yoshikatsu Takeiri, chairman of the opposition Komeito (Clean Government Party), in early 1977, Hua Kuo-feng for the first time indicated plainly that the Miyazawa "interpretation" would amount to "an abandonment of Chinese principles" and a "retreat from the spirit" of the Sino-Japanese communiqué of 1972 (even though Prime Minister Fukuda had specifically asked Takeiri to convey assurances to Hua of Japan's intention to honor the spirit of the 1972 communiqué).[22]

Despite these difficulties, the new Chinese leaders continue to seek Japan's friendship and to try to contain Soviet influence and designs in Japan. For example, in his talks with Takeiri, Hua blamed the stalemate in the treaty negotiation on "Japanese officials opposed to Sino-Japanese friendship, not . . . the Japanese people in general."[23]

[22] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Feb. 4, 1977, pp. 8-9.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

Southeast Asia

Since the late 1950's, China's aim in Southeast Asia—as elsewhere in the Third World—has been to secure a major stake in regional affairs at the expense of the Soviet Union, to become both the ideological fountainhead for the area's Communist forces and the dominant influence there generally. In pursuing this goal, Peking has encountered two major problems: (a) the presence of 15 million or so Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asian countries and (b) competing claims for support from local Communist movements attempting to win power and from local non-Communist governments in power.

As to the first, Peking authorities have repeatedly

A photo on the occasion of the talks between the Chinese Communist Party and Japan's Komeito (Clean Government Party) on January 22, 1977, in Peking. In the front row center is Hua Kuo-feng, Chairman of the CCP and Premier of the People's Republic of China, and to his immediate right (without glasses) is Yoshikatsu Takeiri, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Komeito and leader of the party's delegation.

—Photo from *China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 4, 1977, inside front cover.

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advised persons of Chinese ancestry abroad to seek citizenship of the countries within which they reside, but if such persons choose not to do so, Peking officials have counseled them at least to respect the laws of the land where they live or to return to China. In accordance with this policy, the People's Republic of China repatriated 100,000 Chinese from Indonesia in 1966 and refrained from complaining about the anti-Chinese campaigns in Malaysia in 1969.

To reassure its Southeast Asian neighbors of the benign nature of its approach toward Chinese abroad in the post-Cultural Revolution period, the Peking government abolished the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission in 1973. This body had been in existence since 1949 to handle matters concerning the Overseas Chinese.

With respect to the second problem, the post-Cultural Revolution period brought a substantial shift in line by Peking. Throughout the 1960's, and especially during the Cultural Revolution, the PRC had given priority to support for insurgent or "national liberation" movements in Southeast Asia, and this policy had constituted a serious hurdle to closer relations with the existing regimes in the area, which feared Chinese-backed attempts to overthrow them. After 1969, however, Peking began to emphasize efforts to woo these regimes and to downplay support of insurgent movements, although it did not entirely foresake its championing of such movements.

Before Mao's death, the new policy led to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. It also produced a reversal in the PRC's attitude toward the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Whereas China had initially denounced this group as "a new anti-China, anti-Communist alliance" at the time of its establishment in August 1967, Radio Peking on January 18, 1976, praised the efforts of the ASEAN nations at economic cooperation as "successive victories in their common struggle against hegemonism." [24] The Chinese also endorsed an old ASEAN proposal to establish "a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality in Southeast Asia," as reaffirmed in ASEAN's Bali Declaration of February 24, 1976.[25]

To further Soviet ends, Moscow's propaganda directed toward the non-Communist Southeast Asian

Mao Tse-tung's June 1975 meeting with Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos in Peking. Madame Ymelda Marcos looks on.

—EUPRA.

countries continued to play upon the theme of China's alleged attempts to "export revolution." For example, a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast of September 8, 1975, declared that Southeast Asian nations faced a "common threat to peace from the Chinese-supported insurgent movements," and it charged that "the all-round support given by Peking to the anti-government forces active in Southeast Asian countries is just one of the time bombs planted by the Chinese leaders to wreck peace in Asia and to impose their hegemony." [26]

But much of the fear of Peking on the part of the non-Communist Southeast Asian governments seemed to have dissipated, and they appeared to consider China's new overtures as a counterpoise to those of the USSR. Certainly, none of the regimes rushed to back Brezhnev's proposal for the establishment of an Asian collective security system.

As for the victorious Communist forces in Indochina, Peking sought to maintain cordial relations with all of them. The growing Hanoi-Moscow entente, to be sure, worried the Chinese leaders.[27] Nevertheless, they remained confident that the people of

[24] *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 23, 1976, p. A9.

[25] On this declaration, see *The Times* (London), Feb. 25, 1976.

[26] Radio Peace and Progress (Moscow), Sept. 8, 1975.

[27] For further discussion of this development and other aspects of Vietnam's foreign policy, as well as analysis of the international outlooks of the new Communist regimes in Cambodia and Laos, see Ellen J. Hammer, "Indochina: Communist but Nonaligned," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1976, pp. 1-17.

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

Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng (right) and CCP Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying (left) converse with General Vo Nguyen Giap, member of the Politburo of the Vietnam Communist Party and Minister of National Defense of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, during his visit to Peking on June 2, 1977.

—Hsinhua via UPI.

Vietnam, who had made such great sacrifices to secure their independence, would not be reduced to satellite status in the way the East Europeans had been after World War II. The Chinese also claimed that China and Vietnam have been bound to each other for 2,000 years. While Vietnam wants independence from China as well as from the USSR, the geographical proximity of Vietnam and China, their cultural affinity, and many other factors give the two countries so much in common that they must stay on good terms.[28]

In the post-Mao era, China has persisted in its efforts to cultivate better relations with all the existing governments in the area. For example, when ASEAN foreign ministers met in special session in Manila on February 24, 1977, the Peking media reported the gathering without adverse comment.[29] Moreover, China welcomed the agreement signed shortly thereafter by Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore on safety of navigation through the Strait of Malacca, and it termed the conclusion of the agreement "a telling blow to Soviet maritime hegemony."[30] For the ASEAN countries, China now "is not even an ominous cloud on the distant horizon."[31]

Peking's undertakings vis-à-vis Vietnam, however, have proved less successful. Competing claims for islands in the South China Sea, where oil shapes the "power game," have kept China and Vietnam uneasy neighbors, although not yet squabbling comrades. At the same time, Peking appears to be watching with keen interest Hanoi's attempts to improve its relations with ASEAN countries and with the United States. The Chinese would no doubt be happy to see these efforts bear fruit so as to reduce Hanoi's dependence on Moscow.

South Asia

Throughout the period from the early 1960's to the mid-1970's, the broad outlines of Chinese policy toward South Asia were shaped by the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. This war, which resulted in a military debacle for India, froze relations between New Delhi and Peking for many years, and it provided the USSR an opening to expand its influence in the area. Indeed, India became a key factor in Moscow's overall efforts to isolate and weaken China. Therefore, Peking turned to Pakistan, India's prime enemy, as China's chief informal ally in South Asia.

[28] This account of Chinese views is based on the author's talks with Chinese leaders and diplomats in July-August 1976.

[29] See, for example, the New China News Agency dispatch of Feb. 24, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 25, 1977, pp. A8-9.

[30] *Peking Review*, March 25, 1977, p. 18.

[31] For this assessment of ASEAN attitudes, see *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Feb. 18, 1977, p. 26.

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Sino-Pakistani ties survived the strains of the Cultural Revolution of 1966-69, and relations grew more cordial during the 1969-71 period, when Pakistan assisted in the formative stages of the Sino-American rapprochement of 1971-72. Nonetheless, the Chinese leaders told Pakistan's President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan during his visit to Peking in November 1970 that China and India might resume full diplomatic relations, which had not existed since the 1962 war.[32]

But the 1971 Bangladesh crisis and the third Indo-Pakistani war brought any plans of this sort to an abrupt halt. India's role in the dismemberment of Pakistan, China's closest friend in the area, was disturbing enough to Peking, but even more unsettling was India's reliance on Soviet diplomatic backing to sustain its intervention in what was East Pakistan. The new balance of power that emerged in the area after the crisis thus represented a big diplomatic triumph for Moscow.[33]

Signs of a change in atmosphere began to appear, however, in 1975-76, during the last months of Mao's life. New Delhi, for its part, seemed to feel constrained by a lack of diplomatic options. During Jawaharlal Nehru's heyday, India had enjoyed an excellent diplomatic position: she was a leader of the nonaligned countries, and both superpowers sought her friendship. But the 1971 crisis had tarnished her image in the Third World. Even in Bangladesh, essentially her client state in 1972-74, there was widespread anti-Indian feeling. (This eventually brought about the overthrow of the pro-Indian government on August 15, 1975.) More important, New Delhi's ties with Washington were severely strained, and its relations with China remained totally frozen. Consequently, the Indians set out to improve their standing with Peking.

The Chinese, hoping to make some dent in the Moscow-New Delhi entente, responded positively. On April 15, 1975, China and India announced that they were restoring diplomatic links at the ambassadorial level.[34] The new ambassadors presented their credentials in an amicable atmosphere, and by August 26, 1976, it could be reported in the Indian parliament that there had been no anti-Indian propaganda by the Chinese in recent months. A few days later, the Indian parliament was also informed that New Delhi was exploring prospects for trade with China, which had ceased in 1962.[35]

These cautious moves by China and India to bridge the long-standing gap between them were bound to cause worry in Pakistan. Reliable sources in Peking told the author in July-August 1976 that Islamabad had been assured of China's continued friendship and help. But it was clear that just as the Indians wanted to widen their diplomatic options, so the Chinese wished to have more than one friend among the countries of South Asia. This was particularly true because the Chinese realized that the cordial attitude of Pakistan's Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto might reflect his perception of the exigencies of Pakistan's situation rather than genuine conviction on his part. It was Bhutto, for example, who had rejected Chou En-lai's offer of a "friendship pact" on January 27, 1964, and when President Ayub was reshaping Pakistan's foreign policy after the 1962 Sino-Indian war and trying to better relations with Peking, Bhutto's advice to Ayub had been "to look toward Moscow" instead of Peking.[36]

In keeping with its desire for expanded links in the area, Peking also opened up diplomatic relations with Bangladesh after the military coup there on August 15, 1975. Under the joint influence of India and the Soviet Union, Mujibur Rahman, the founder and leader of Bangladesh until the coup, had adopted a negative attitude toward Peking, but the new government evinced a willingness to establish ties on the basis of mutual interests. China responded accordingly.

Since Mao's departure from the scene, Chinese policy toward South Asia as a whole has been essentially an elaboration of the more diversified approach followed during the year or so prior to the Chairman's death, although events in India and Pakistan have produced some changes in nuance. As far as Bangladesh is concerned, China has endeavored to solidify the new links between the two countries with utmost dispatch. On January 2-6, 1977, General Ziaur Rahman, then the Chief Martial Law Administrator but President since a May referendum, made a state visit to China, and he received a warm and grand reception, with Chairman Hua appearing at the airport to greet him. Zia, on his side, paid warm tributes to the growing China-Bangladesh friendship. More important from the Chinese standpoint, he

[32] Based on the author's reading of the minutes of the talks between Yahya and Chou En-lai in November 1970.

[33] For details, see this author's *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers*, New York, NY, Free Press, 1975.

[34] See *Times of India* (New Delhi), April 16, 1975.

[35] See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Oct. 1, 1976, pp. 67-68.

[36] Based on the author's reading of the Pakistan government's unpublished documents and papers.

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

Hua Kuo-feng (right), Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and Premier of the People's Republic of China, talks with Major General Ziaur Rahman, Chief Martial Law Administrator (now President) of Bangladesh, in Peking on January 4, 1977.

Photo from China Pictorial (Peking), Nos. 2-3, 1977, p. 3.

specifically denounced "expansionism and hegemonism"—a veiled reference to Soviet maneuverings in Asia—in his speeches during his stay.[37]

The increased amicability between Peking and Dacca has had concrete, as opposed to verbal, manifestations as well. During Zia's visit to China, the two countries signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement and a trade and credit agreement.[38] More significant is the fact that the Chinese have offered military supplies to Bangladesh. Reliable sources have informed the author that China has agreed to send four squadrons of MIG 21's for the Bangladesh air force. The Chinese, according to the report, were willing to provide as many as 12 squadrons, but Bangladesh was unable to accept so many because of "the lack of storage and maintenance facilities." Bangladesh pilots have also gone to Peking for training.[39]

With regard to Pakistan, the Chinese have continued to be friendly, but they have exhibited less enthusiasm about Prime Minister Bhutto himself than the Russians have. For instance, Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress attributed Bhutto's success in the Pakistani election of March 1977 to his "sober and positive foreign policy," and *Pravda* spoke of his "realistic foreign policy." [40] The Chinese, in constrast, merely reported the results of the election without comment.[41] This reservation may stem from the fact that since China began to try to improve its relations with India, Bhutto has appeared a little cool toward Peking and hinted at closer ties with Moscow.*

[37] *Peking Review*, Jan. 7, 1977, p. 20; *Bangladesh Times* (Dacca), March 16, 1977.

[38] *Peking Review*, Jan. 7, 1977, p. 4.

[39] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 22, 1977.

* As this article was going to press, the armed forces of Pakistan, reacting to the impasse which had developed in relations between ruling and opposition forces in the country over the results of the March 1977 election, overthrew Prime Minister Bhutto. The effects of this change on Soviet and Chinese relations with Pakistan are not clear.—*Eds.*

[40] See *Impact International* (London), March 25-April 7, 1977.

[41] New China News Agency report of March 8, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, March 9, 1977, p. A6.

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For the first several months after Mao's demise, the new Chinese leaders behaved cautiously but amicably toward India. For example, they sent a group of scientists to make a week-long study tour of different enterprises and research and development centers in India in October 1976.[42] But the great weight that New Delhi attached to Moscow's assistance, particularly its military supplies, and India's unhappiness at China's continued support of Pakistan served to keep the relationship from blossoming rapidly.

The defeat of Indira Gandhi and her Congress party in the March 1977 election, however, introduced a new element into the equation. This was particularly true in light of speculation that the new Indian government headed by Morarji Desai might follow a "genuine" nonalignment policy—that is, it might move away from the close relationship that Mrs. Gandhi had forged with Moscow and try to improve India's ties with both Peking and Washington.

Chinese media reported Mrs. Gandhi's downfall hopefully as well as positively. Commenting on the election results, *Peking Review* said:

This significant change in the Indian political scene will have an important bearing on the situation in the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean.

. . . . .

The results not only declared the bankruptcy of the internal and external policies pursued by Indira Gandhi who had tailed after the Soviet Union, policies which harmed the country and brought suffering to the people; they also marked a serious setback to Moscow's expansionist scheme in the South Asian region.

India occupies an important strategic position in Asia and the Indian Ocean. To realize their fond dream of dominating the world the new tsars curried favor with the Indira Gandhi government and tried to drag India into the orbit of their counterrevolutionary global strategy. . . .[43]

But it is still too early to discern the shape of India's foreign policy under Desai, and the Chinese—like the rest of the world—seem to be waiting and watching.

Prospects

In sum, then, the disappearance of Mao and Chou from the Chinese leadership have not thus far produced any earthshaking changes in China's outlook toward the world abroad, and especially toward Asia. As for the future, it is predictable that the passage of time will probably bring changes of one sort or another, but it is difficult to foresee now what the character of these might be. New developments and altering circumstances will have at least as much influence on them as subjective factors, and such things are virtually impossible to anticipate with any great accuracy.

At the same time, the record of the post-Mao Chinese leadership to date does suggest a few observations relevant to Chinese foreign policy in the years ahead. To begin with, China has emerged from the early stages of the succession to Mao with its unity intact. The Chinese people have accepted the decision of the Communist Party without exceptional turmoil or bloodshed, not to speak of civil war. To be sure, there have been reports of disturbances in some provinces, but none of these disturbances has posed an immediate threat to China's stability and continued progress. Thus, the current regime appears to be in a position to uphold the country's national security interests and to pursue policies consonant with the country's national, regional, and global political interests.

Under such conditions, the Chinese leaders are likely to insist forcefully that no important issues in Asia can be decided without China's involvement, for China has now emerged as the key local power in the region. Moreover, they will probably persist in efforts to realize China's potential for becoming a superpower with tremendous appeal to Afro-Asian countries.

[42] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Oct. 1, 1976, p. 68.
[43] *Peking Review*, April 8, 1977, p. 23.

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Foreign Technology and Economic Growth

By Shannon R. Brown

Modern economic growth, economists now recognize, is increasingly dependent upon technological change. This is not to deny the importance to the growth process of other contributions, such as those of capital accumulation and education, but even these seemingly separate inputs often serve in large part as vehicles for technological change. The problem of economic growth in poor countries like the People's Republic of China (PRC), then, can be reduced—though a bit oversimply—to the achievement of a high rate of technological change. This being so, one is forced to ask where the new technology will come from. The present essay represents an attempt to answer this question for the Chinese case.

Scientific knowledge and technological change are international in character. The Chinese are aware of this, of course, and have made much use of foreign technology. This is hardly surprising when one considers that in the 1950's, a period when American technological leadership was at its peak, more than half of the new knowledge that affected economic growth in the United States was of foreign origin.[1] If such was the case in the leading country, then the likelihood for genuine technological self-reliance and independence—both common themes in the Chinese press—in follower countries such as China, must seem remote indeed. Many examples of how Chinese industry, like that of every other country, is dependent upon foreign technology could be offered, but perhaps a look at the situation of one branch of industry in two very different epochs will suffice to make the point.

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The first modern fertilizer plant in China was built in 1935 in Manchuria and owned by a Japanese company. To produce the basic input, ammonia, the firm utilized a patented German process so new that it had not yet been introduced in Japan.[2] Similarly, nearly 40 years later, in a major effort to modernize fertilizer production, the Chinese government relied on non-Chinese technology of the 1970's when it contracted with foreign firms to construct 13 of the most modern ammonia-urea complexes available. The production process of these plants utilizes patented technology owned by American, Dutch, and Danish firms; the design and construction of the plants themselves are being supervised by American, French, Japanese, and Dutch companies.[3] Cases like this are becoming increasingly common, and they underline the international character of technological change. For, in addition to the Chinese, the beneficiaries of the particular technology involved have included Russians, Algerians, Indonesians, Canadians, Venezuelans, and Oklahomans.

The importation of complete plants, despite its high visibility, is not the only vehicle for the international transfer of technology, however. There are at least three other more mundane, and collectively more important, sources. One is the importation of printed matter, such as books, scientific reports, and periodicals, which is an ongoing process that provides a constant stream of new knowledge. A second

[1] Edward F. Denison, *The Sources of Economic Growth in the U.S.*, New York, NY, Committee For Economic Development, 1962, p. 234.

[2] Jung-chao Liu, *China's Fertilizer Economy*, Chicago, IL, Aldine Publishing Co., 1970, p. 8.

[3] Hans Heymann, Jr., "Acquisition and Diffusion of Technology in China," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1975, Table B-5, pp. 726-27. Heymann's article is an excellent survey of the transfer of technology to China.

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is the importation of new machinery, both for purposes of capital investment and as prototypes for copying, which is an important source of technological change in most countries and one that the Chinese have used to advantage. And a third is the international movement of scientists, engineers, and other technicians. These movements can be short-term, as when Chinese technicians tour the US; medium-term, as when foreign technicians assist in the construction and start-up operation of new plants in China; or long-term, as when Chinese students and scientists study abroad. In practice, since 1960 the Chinese have sent very few people abroad for long-term study and research. But those who studied in the Soviet Union in the 1950's or in the West before then have continued to play a critical role in the Chinese economy, particularly in research and development activities.

Because importation is the most efficient method of acquisition, nearly all new technology introduced in China in the near future will originate abroad and will be brought into the country by the means just discussed, *i.e.* the importation of printed matter, machinery and equipment, and complete plants, and the transfer of knowledge through the movement of people. Very little technology is likely to be developed *de novo,* although considerable adaptation of imported technology to Chinese conditions will be necessary. It is clear, therefore, that the policy of self-reliance, in the Chinese context, does not mean the development of technology unknown in other countries. That would be wasteful. Rather, it means the mobilization of Chinese efforts to select, adapt, disseminate, and use within China the highly productive new technology already developed elsewhere. China's efficiency and effectiveness in performing this task will do much to determine her rate of economic development.

Does this state of affairs mean that Chinese technology will never be independent, or that it will fail to catch up with the levels found in the developed countries? For the foreseeable future the answer to both parts of the question is yes, especially since the developed countries will themselves continue to progress. Failure to achieve independence cannot be considered a negative comment on Chinese abilities, however, since the high cost of research and development and the savings derived from specialization in such activities make independence an unreasonable goal for any country. Catching up, on the other hand, is not unreasonable: it is simply unlikely. Consider for comparison's sake

Part of a giant ammonia-urea agricultural chemical complex which began operation in the People's Republic of China in 1976. This plant, capable of producing 1,620 tons of urea fertilizer a day, is one of eight such plants to be erected under terms of 1973 contracts with the Pullman Kellogg division of the US firm, Pullman, Inc., and with the division's Dutch affiliate, Kellogg Continental. The Western firms are providing design, engineering, procurement, and construction advisory services.

—Photo courtesy of Pullman Kellogg.

the experience of the Soviet Union. The Russians have achieved fairly rapid rates of growth in per capita output over the past quarter century, but this has been accomplished mainly by means of a high rate of capital formation and a rapid transfer of labor out of agriculture into more productive areas of employment.[4] In recent years, it has become increasingly difficult to rely heavily on these two factors, and Soviet growth rates have declined. Thus, while the rate of technological change within the Soviet Union has been fairly rapid, the technological gap between the USSR and the US or the leading European countries has not closed appreciably, at

[4] Abram Bergson, *Soviet Post-War Economic Development,* Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell, 1974, pp. 17-25. Bergson holds that "Soviet under-performance in respect of productivity growth must be due primarily, if not entirely, to relatively slow technological progress." *Ibid.,* p. 21.

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Table 1: Value of PRC Contracts for Complete Plant Purchases

(in millions of US dollars)

Year	Value
1972	50
1973	1209
1974	831
1975	371
1976	200

SOURCE: David L. Denny and Frederic M. Surls, "China's Foreign Financial Liabilities," *The China Business Review* (Washington, DC), March-April 1977, p. 14.

least not in the civilian industrial sector.[5] Of all countries in the world, only Japan has been successful in rapidly closing the technological gap with the United States.[6]

With respect to technological change, then, China is not likely to be self-reliant or independent, or to catch up with the advanced countries. This does not mean that China cannot attain high rates of increase in per capita income or that technological change will be irrelevant to that increase. It suggests instead that the transfer of technology is a continual process and not a once-and-for-all event, and that to participate fully in this international activity China will be required to make effective long-term use of its domestic resources. If China does so, then the new technology—which as a matter of efficiency must be acquired from foreigners—will be all the more productive.

To say that China will need to exploit its internal resources effectively, of course, implies that Chinese institutions and policies will have considerable impact on the rate of transfer of technology into the national economy of the PRC. Before exploring the issues involved here, however, it is helpful to review briefly China's past experience in the realm of technology transfer.

The Record Since 1949

The history of the transfer of technology to China since 1949 can be divided into three periods.[7] During the first, from 1949 to 1960, Sino-Soviet relations were good, and China received what one economist has called "the most comprehensive technology transfer in modern history."[8] After the withdrawal of Soviet advisers from the PRC in 1960 and the dramatic changes in economic policy that occurred at the same time, China entered a decade when rates of both technology transfer and technological change were much reduced. The first half of this period, from 1961 to 1965, was dominated by the recovery from the Great Leap Forward and the withdrawal of Soviet advisers. Reduced exports, the beginning of large grain imports, and the repayment of debts to the Soviet Union nearly eliminated the transfer of technology to China altogether, at least in the form of imports of machinery and whole plants. After 1965, when economic circumstances would have been more favorable, the onset of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution created economic and political conditions that once again retarded the transfer of technology. Con-

Table 2: Trends in PRC Imports of Machinery and Equipment

(in millions of 1963 US dollars)

Years	Average Annual Value
1952-56	409
1957-61	683
1962-66	224
1967-71	318
1972-76	693 [a]

[a] Value for 1976 assumed equal to that for 1975.

SOURCES: For trade data, Hans Heymann, Jr., "Acquisition and Diffusion of Technology in China," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1975, p. 685; US Central Intelligence Agency, *People's Republic of China: International Trade Handbook*, Washington, DC, October 1976, p. 17. For price deflators, Alexander Eckstein, "China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade," *U.S. China Business Review* (Washington, DC), July-August 1974, p. 16; United Nations, *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* (New York, NY), March 1977, Special Table D.

[5] ". . . in most of the technologies we have studied there is no evidence of a substantial diminution of the technological gap between the USSR and the West in the past 15-20 years (early 1950's to around 1970) . . .," R. Amann and R. W. Davies, "The Technological Level of Soviet Industry," paper presented to the Annual Conference of the National Association for Soviet and East European Studies, Cambridge, England, April 1975, cited in Philip Hanson, "International Technology Transfer From the West to the U.S.S.R.," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 791.

[6] Edward F. Denison and William K. Chung, *How Japan's Economy Grew So Fast*, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1976, pp. 78-82.

[7] For a survey of the changing politics of technology transfer, see William W. Whitson, "China's Quest for Technology," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1973, pp. 16-29.

[8] Heymann, *loc. cit.*, p. 678.

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

The No. 1 blast furnace of the Wuhan Iron and Steel Works in central China, built with the help of the Soviet Union after the Chinese Communist victory in 1949.

—Eastfoto.

sequently, it was not until the third period, which began in 1970 and has continued to the present, that China was again able to contemplate implementation of an extensive and systematic program of technology transfer. In late 1972 this policy was dramatically underlined when the Chinese began, for the first time, to purchase complete plants from the West and Japan. The volume of these purchases since then is shown in Table 1.

Unfortunately, in part because of data problems, it is much easier to date the shifts in Chinese policy on technology transfer than it is to evaluate the contribution of imported technology to growth. For two of the four forms of technology transfer—the movement of people and the importation of printed matter—there are no data. And while the data on the acquisition of complete plants by the PRC are better, it is hard to identify when the equipment was actually imported, as opposed to when the contracts were signed. As a result, the best data available for evaluating the transfer of technology to China are data on Chinese imports of machinery and equipment (which include shipments for complete plants). Table 2 shows the value of such imports, expressed in constant dollars and grouped in five-year periods so as to clarify overall trends. Such grouping clearly reveals the significance of recent policy changes.

It should be underscored here that imported machinery and equipment contributes to economic development in two ways: first, directly, by its contribution to capital formation, and second, indirectly but critically, by acting as a carrier of new technology which may be copied or which may simply provide a stimulus to technological change in related production processes and elsewhere. Therefore, any simple statement of the volume or share of foreign machinery and equipment in Chinese capital formation tends to understate the contribution that such machinery makes to Chinese economic growth.

Recently, Robert Dernberger attempted to estimate the relative importance to economic growth in China of imported machinery and equipment as compared to that produced domestically. His findings were that imports constituted about 27 percent of all investment in machinery in the 1950's and about 7 percent in the 1960's and early 1970's.[9]

[9] Robert Dernberger, "Economic Development and Modernization in Contemporary China: The Attempt to Limit Dependence on the Transfer of Modern Industrial Technology from Abroad and to Control Its Corruption of the Maoist Social Revolution," revised version of a paper presented at the Conference on Technology and Communist Culture, Bellagio, Italy, 1975, p. 28.

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But since machinery and equipment represent only about one third of all capital formation,[10] imported machinery and equipment in fact constituted less than 10 percent of capital formation in the 1950's and probably less than 3 percent since then. Even if one assumes that foreign machinery and equipment is two or three times as productive as that produced by the Chinese themselves, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that China cannot simply import modern economic growth.

Beyond the mere act of importation, the PRC must also develop a domestic capability to borrow, adapt, disseminate, and use foreign technology. As Simon Kuznets has observed, the knowledge and technology embodied in people and machines are necessary conditions for modern economic growth, but it is institutional and social adjustments that determine whether they will become sufficient conditions as well:

The gap between the stock of knowledge and inventions as the necessary conditions, and the institutional and social adjustments that would convert the former into a sufficient condition, is wide—as past history of the economically developed countries and the current history of the less developed amply show.[11]

What are the institutional and social adjustments and the economic conditions that are most likely to affect China's ability to introduce modern technology into the economy in the foreseeable future?

Capacity to Absorb Technology

The modification of political attitudes, including cultural values, is one of the most difficult problems of social adjustment the Chinese have had to face in their efforts to absorb foreign technology. Initially, Chinese pride and ethnocentrism led to the flat rejection of modern science and technology as valueless. Later, these were grudgingly accepted as "merely" useful. And now, while the conscious expression of such views is no longer heard, there remains much evidence of a continuing emotional ambivalence toward technology which is modern (good) and yet foreign (bad). The many anti-foreign incidents of the Cultural Revolution, the emphasis on self-reliance and independence, and the denunciation of people for having a "slavish compradore mentality" or for "worshipping things foreign" indicate the continuation of anti-foreign attitudes, which must create difficulties in learning from foreigners. But as a political impediment to the transfer of technology this problem should not be overemphasized; and in any case, such traditional attitudes are likely to be of less significance now that Mao Tse-tung has passed from the scene.

The Chinese government is not alone in being able to create political impediments to the transfer of technology, however. Foreign governments can do so as well, although efforts in this direction have not been notably successful in the past. The long American embargo on trade with China and continuing export controls, for example, do not seem to have had much effect on China's economic development (as opposed to military capabilities). But the past effects of these actions may not be a good guide to what will be the case in the future, as US policy was motivated more by American domestic political considerations than by economic criteria. The future policies of high-technology countries regarding the transfer of technology to less developed areas are just now being shaped, and the preeminent role of economic considerations is clear.[12] The technology-importing countries are pushing for a more rapid transfer of technology, but without direct investment, while the technology-exporting countries are increasingly concerned about the possible negative effects of such technology transfers on their own export and employment situations.

For the time being, however, more strictly economic variables are of greater significance than either Chinese or foreign political attitudes. These variables include the PRC's financial capacity to purchase foreign technology and the quality of the economic institutions that will determine the country's ability to select the most useful foreign technologies, to adapt them to Chinese conditions, to disseminate them throughout the Chinese economy, and to assure their effective use.

China's ability to finance imports of new technology will depend upon current earnings of foreign exchange, the structure of imports, and a willing-

[10] K. C. Yeh, "Capital Formation," in Alexander Eckstein *et al.*, Eds., *Economic Trends in Communist China*, Chicago, IL, Aldine Publishing Co., 1968, p. 520.

[11] Simon Kuznets, "Two Centuries of Economic Growth: Reflections on U.S. Experience," *American Economic Review* (Menasha, WI), February 1977, p. 7.

[12] See, for example, Henry Nau, *Technology Transfer and U.S. Foreign Policy*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1976, Chaps. 2 and 3.

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ness to incur debt. In theory, foreign exchange can be earned through trade in invisibles such as tourism, through the provision of services such as insurance and shipping, and through remittances from Overseas Chinese. But in practice, because of China's size and political attitudes, none of these sources is likely to be of much significance compared to earnings from exports (see Table 3). In the short run, export earnings will be strongly influenced by business conditions in the West, as was the case in the 1974-76 period, but over the long run they will depend upon China's ability to export manufactured goods and raw materials like petroleum. Compared to the optimistic expectations of two years ago, petroleum exports have developed very slowly. If this was caused by the opposition of the "gang of four," as has been alleged in the Chinese press,[13] or if it was due to an unfulfilled need for foreign technical assistance, then future prospects should be much better.

Agricultural conditions as well will continue to affect China's ability to import foreign technology. Good conditions will allow the export of raw and processed agricultural goods, such as cotton textiles, while bad conditions will necessitate the import of agriculture-related items such as grain, cotton, and fertilizer. The cost of agricultural imports in terms of technology transfer forgone is rather dramatically illustrated by the fact that since 1961 the total value of grain and fertilizer imports has exceeded that of imported machinery and equipment.[14]

China's ability to import modern technology, of course, need not be limited by current earnings of foreign exchange, since there is always the alternative of incurring debt.[15] In the 1950's, China accepted long-term credits from the Soviet Union, which were finally repaid completely in 1965. The experience apparently left the Chinese determined never again to be so deeply dependent upon a single foreign country. But it did not prevent them from making further purchases on credit. Among these have been numerous wheat deals, which began in 1961, and the more recent purchase of complete plants on the basis of "deferred payment," as the Chinese prefer to call de facto five-year loans. Over the last five years, Chinese payments for a number of complete plants have come due, and, after a bad harvest in 1972 necessitated increased grain imports in 1973 and 1974, debt obligations have mounted rapidly. By the end of 1976, China's foreign financial obligations—mostly debt, but also including commitments for future plant purchases—totaled about US$2 billion.[16]

[13] Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Jan. 14, 1977, p. E1-8.

[14] Heymann, *loc. cit.*, p. 685; Nai-ruenn Chen, "China's Foreign Trade," in *China: A Reassessment*, p. 648; Liu, *op. cit.*, p. 54; and data from Table 3, *supra*.

[15] For an excellent discussion, see David L. Denny and Frederic M. Surls, "China's Foreign Financial Liabilities," *The China Business Review* (Washington, DC), March-April 1977, pp. 13-21.

[16] *Ibid.*, Table 6.

Table 3: Characteristics of PRC Trade

(in millions of US dollars)

	Exports			Imports		
Year	Total	Manufactured goods	Petroleum and its products	Total	Grain and fertilizer	Machinery and equipment
1966	2210	928	nil	2035	555	455
1967	1945	856	nil	1950	495	380
1968	1945	856	nil	1820	505	275
1969	2030	812	nil	1830	465	240
1970	2050	861	nil	2240	510	395
1971	2415	1063	nil	2305	405	505
1972	3085	1327	nil	2835	535	520
1973	4960	2260	80	5130	1060	860
1974	6570	2655	525	7380	1410	1610
1975	6930	2565	910	7385	1135	2165

SOURCES: US Central Intelligence Agency, *People's Republic of China: International Trade Handbook*, Washington, DC, September 1972, p. 12; *ibid.*, October 1975, p. 13; *ibid.*, October 1976, pp. 13, 14, 17, 20; and Hans Heymann, Jr., "Acquisition and Diffusion of Technology in China," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1975, p. 685.

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It is not the absolute size of foreign financial obligations that is important, however, but rather the claim their payment makes on export earnings. Payments on foreign obligations rose rapidly from 4 percent of export earnings in 1973 to 23 percent in 1976. But based on present commitments, and on the assumptions that exports will expand at 5 percent a year and that annual grain purchases will average four million tons a year, such payments are expected to decline to 12 percent in 1978 and to 8 percent in 1980.[17] By international standards, and in comparison with China's own 40 percent debt service ratio of the early 1960's, the PRC would be in an extremely conservative financial situation. Even if one takes into account the uncertain nature of Chinese agriculture and of foreign demand for Chinese exports—evidenced on the one hand by China's recent and unexpected purchase of 5 million tons of grain for 1977 [18] and on the other by the export problems of developing countries during the worldwide recession of 1974-76—such a low service ratio would allow for much greater use of credit. In the post-Mao era resort to such an option appears more likely.

Still, while foreign exchange earnings, agricultural performance, and changing policies toward debt may increase China's financial ability to import foreign technology in the form of machinery and complete plants, the quantitative significance of such imports for the country's economic development will always be small. The main source of innovation will have to be domestic; more precisely, domestic institutions and conditions will determine the rate at which foreign knowledge and technology is put to the service of Chinese economic growth and development.

Economic Institutions and Growth

In essence, then, China's absorptive capacity for foreign technology depends not only on her financial ability to purchase foreign plants, equipment, and technical services, but also on the effectiveness of

[17] *Ibid.*
[18] *The China Business Review*, March-April 1977, p. 45.



The crowd examines a display of the firm Friedrich Krupp GmbH (Essen) at the first Industrial Fair of the Federal Republic of Germany in the People's Republic of China. This fair took place in Peking in 1975.

—Katherine Young.

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her domestic institutions in internalizing this knowledge and technology. The ability to develop institutions capable of performing such a task is the true test of self-reliance. Success or failure in this regard will greatly affect China's rate of economic development.

In order to achieve a high rate of technological change and economic growth, China needs institutions that can: (1) identify the foreign technologies that will make the greatest contribution to Chinese growth; (2) adapt them, if necessary, to Chinese conditions; (3) supply them where needed; and (4) insure that such technologies are actually used. All four steps are important, and failure with respect to any one will likely prevent the full realization of the potential benefits of modern technology for China. The domestic institutions that will most affect the degree of attainment of these goals are those concerned with the promotion of technological change and the quality of the Chinese labor force. The technical level achieved in Chinese industry before the introduction of foreign innovations will obviously also be an important factor.

The efficiency of economic institutions under socialism has long been the subject of debate, but only recently has that debate been expanded to consider dynamic as well as static efficiency. In the case of Soviet industry, Joseph Berliner has concluded that there is a systemic bias against technological change.[19] If correct, this conclusion would help explain the failure of Soviet technology to catch up with that of the West. Among the causes of bias which Berliner distinguishes are: (1) a price structure that undervalues new products; (2) rules of decision-making that favor conservative choices; and (3) an incentive system in which the rewards for innovation are not commensurate with the risks involved. In addition, he found that the organizational structure of the Soviet economy discourages innovation by separating research and development (R&D) from production and by separating production from sales. The former leads to the inefficient implementation of new technologies, while the latter diminishes producer concern with new product marketability.[20]

Unfortunately, much less is known about the inner workings of the Chinese economy than is known about the Soviet economy. This is especially true

Research on wheat and corn goes on at the laboratory of the Fenghuo People's Commune in Shensi Province.

—China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

with respect to innovation. We do know, though, that some of the same disincentives to innovation and technological change that exist in the Soviet Union also exist in China.[21] And the common ancestry of Chinese and Soviet economic institutions suggests that other disincentives, as yet unidentified in the PRC, may also have been inherited by the Chinese.

As mentioned earlier, the first task in importing foreign technology is to determine which technologies will make the greatest contribution to growth. This requires systematic search procedures and a method of calculating the return to be expected from each new technology. Since it is not known in detail how the Chinese plan for technological change, it is impossible to assess the overall efficiency with which this task is accomplished. There are, however, a few aspects of Chinese methods that can be discussed. One problem, for example, is that decisions on new technology are often made by some other body than the firm that will actually use it. This has

[19] Joseph Berliner, *The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1976.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 8-18 and *passim*.

[21] See Thomas G. Rawski, "China's Industrial System," in *China: A Reassessment*, esp. pp. 181-84 and 197.

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

Chinese mechanics inspect a Caterpillar pipelayer just assembled in the Shengli oilfields of China. A company representative stands in the foreground.

—Photo furnished by the National Council for US-China Trade.

been a continuing source of complaint by foreign firms that sell capital goods to the Chinese. While the exact specification of capital equipment and its most effective use depend upon close and continuing contact between supplier and user, foreign firms very often find themselves confined to dealing only with middlemen, the foreign trade corporations, that are unable to provide the precise technical information required.

How the Chinese allocate research and development funds is also unknown, but one recent piece of evidence suggests that it may be far from optimal in terms of economic growth. The American Plant Studies Delegation that visited China in 1974 found Chinese research on new strains of wheat and rice to be well informed by international standards, but that on hybrid corn was nearly 30 years behind the times.[22] Given the advances that have taken place in hybrid corn development over the last 30 years, a small investment in adapting this knowledge to Chinese conditions would be almost certain to produce a very large return. Grain production is one of the most critical sectors of the Chinese economy, so that the apparent misallocation of resources in this case implies that an effective mechanism for guiding research and development—such as cost-benefit calculations or the profit motive which operate in a market economy—does not exist in China, or at least was not used.

Once the technology to be imported or developed has been chosen, deficiencies of skilled labor may still prevent its efficient implementation. Two kinds of labor are of paramount importance in the introduction of new technology: research and development personnel, and skilled construction and industrial labor. A high quality research and development effort, utilizing highly trained personnel, is critical in the adaptation of foreign technology to local conditions. Yet it is precisely this effort that was most disrupted by the educational policies of the Cultural Revolution, with their emphasis on the "sending-down" of scientists and the popularization of science and technology. Although it would be foolish for China to allocate extensive resources to basic research, there is nonetheless a substantial amount of adaptive and developmental research which must be done simply to make use of existing knowledge. Foreign scientific delegations have found this aspect of Chinese science to be the weakest.[23]

The scarcity of skilled Chinese construction and industrial labor has also often been a bottleneck in the transfer of technology to the PRC. A shortage of skilled welders, for example, has hampered construction of the large number of petrochemical plants recently purchased abroad; and it has been difficult to train in a short time the great number of skilled operators required for the new plants. But unlike the problem of research and development personnel, these difficulties seem unrelated to politics and should therefore be easier to rectify. A more general problem, created by the Cultural Revolution, has been the emphasis placed on political orthodoxy as opposed to professional expertise. To the extent that this emphasis has had results, it may have lowered the overall quality of skilled and educated personnel.[24]

If the new technology chosen as best suited to China's needs is not simply to be imported, the problems of adapting it to Chinese conditions and then initiating the production of the machinery and

[22] National Academy of Sciences, *Plant Studies in the People's Republic of China: A Trip Report of the American Plant Studies Delegation*, Washington, DC, 1975, p. 66.

[23] For a survey of visitors' views, see US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology, *Science in China and U.S.-China Scientific Exchanges: Assessment and Prospects*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1976, pp. 13-22. This study was prepared by Leo Orleans.

[24] In an unprecedented gesture of appreciation, the Chinese hosted a New Year's Eve reception for foreign experts in Peking in 1976. The guests—engineers and other technicians—"chatted about the excellent revolutionary situation in the world." *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 3, 1977, pp. A1-2.

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equipment that will embody it take on added significance. It is at this point that the problem of technological complementarity arises and the general level of China's technological development comes into play. Simply stated, technological complementarity is the technological aspect of input-output relations that exist in any economy. It can create problems when, as is often the case, the introduction of technological change in one sector of the economy is dependent upon a certain level of technology already having been achieved in another. Because of the nature of Chinese raw materials, for example, further technological progress in China's iron and steel industry will require the introduction of new technology for coal-washing and iron-ore beneficiation.[25] In terms of decisions already taken, it is instructive that deficiencies in the domestic production of necessary corrosion-resistant metals and seamless tubing by China's iron and steel industries were largely responsible for the extensive purchasing of complete plant facilities in the petrochemical industry discussed earlier. It is the interdependence of technological capabilities that makes the importation of complete plants so attractive to the Chinese. But, as the Chinese no doubt recognize, in such a large economy as the PRC's the bulk of technological change, to the extent that it is embodied in machinery and equipment, is going to have to come from domestic sources.

It is for this reason that the machine-tool industry, which produces the equipment embodying the new technology, plays such a critical role in the process of technological change. In the 1950's, thanks to Soviet assistance, this industry grew rapidly. Interestingly, though, it has not been the Soviet-built machine-tool plants that have proven the most innovative. Rather it has been those plants whose origins, often foreign, go back long before 1949.[26] Presumably this has been due to their pragmatic growth, resulting from the wide assortment of problems they solved and the accumulated experi-

[25] See William W. Clarke, "China's Steel," *U.S. China Business Review* (Washington, DC), July-August 1975, pp. 29-32; and *FBIS-CHI*, No. 22, 1976, pp. E11-13.

[26] Thomas G. Rawski, "Problems of Technology Absorption in Chinese Industry," *American Economic Review*, May 1975, pp. 383-88. For a longer-run perspective, see Rawski's excellent paper, "The Growth of Producer Industries, 1900-1971," in Dwight H. Perkins, Ed., *China's Modern Economy in Historical Perspective*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1975, pp. 203-34.

Dr. Donald Swenson (right) of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory in New Mexico shows Chinese visitors part of the meson accelerator during a 1973 tour of unclassified areas of the lab.

—Wide World.

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ence of their employees. For political reasons, up to now these firms have not received the support and attention they deserve if rapid technological change is to be achieved. Under China's new leadership, however, they and their potential offspring may be allowed to play an even more important role in China's future growth.

Even if this turns out to be the case, though, the adaptation and domestic production of new technology does not guarantee that once available it will be used effectively. That requires an effective system of incentives. We have mentioned the failure of the Soviet system to provide strong incentives to technological change in industry. How effective the Chinese incentive system is at the enterprise or commune level is not as well known, in part because there has been comparatively little new technology introduced. Similarities between certain Chinese and Soviet institutions suggest that difficulties may exist, but current knowledge does not permit us to do more than simply draw attention to the incentive system as a potential problem area.

Conclusions

In view of the power that the government of the PRC has to organize and direct economic activity, the pace of technological change achieved in the past quarter century must be considered modest. The apparent reason for the record is a combination of excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1950's (which created enormous problems when the Soviets withdrew their advisers), the Maoist preoccupation with equity and cultural revolution, and functional deficiencies in some of China's economic institutions.

The current post-Mao leadership of the PRC seems more interested in improving production than in promoting revolution (though it should be noted that a policy shift in this direction can be dated from the early 1970's, long before the death of Mao and the purge of the "gang of four"). If, as seems increasingly clear, this leadership wishes to accelerate the rate of economic growth, it will be necessary to absorb more rapidly into the Chinese economy knowledge and technology available abroad. To do this will require increased international contacts, including stepped-up purchasing of foreign plants and equipment, greater use of foreign technicians in China,[27] and more extensive foreign visits, or even study, by Chinese scientists and technicians. In addition it will require some reform of domestic institutions and policies in order to facilitate the production, distribution, and use of new technology. Such changes are more than simply economic. But they will be required in order to achieve a high rate of technological change, and hence of economic growth.

[27] Two very interesting accounts of foreign technicians in China are Stephanie R. Green, "U.S. Technicians in China: The Pullman Story," *U.S. China Business Review*, September-October 1976, pp. 33-39; and Alistair Wrightman, "Foreign Technicians in China: The Japanese Experience," *ibid.*, November-December 1976, pp. 28-32.

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Rural Marriage Customs

By Martin K. Whyte

What changes in peasant life and customs have occurred in China, and how have these changes been brought about? The relevant literature is filled with conflicting observations and impressions but very little in the way of concrete data and analysis. In the absence of detailed information, abstract conceptions or models of the process of change in China fill the gap. But such models may lead their users to assume patterns of change for which there is little evidence. In particular, there are two rather common conceptions that vie for attention and influence the way many people think about the process of social change in China.

One of these conceptions stems from Marxist theory, with Maoist additions. In this view, most traditional customs are regarded as the negative legacy of the class oppression inherent in the feudal landlord system that existed in China prior to 1949.[1] Once socialism was established and collectivized agriculture implemented, so the thinking goes, the social basis for customs such as arranged marriages, bride prices, and wedding feasts was eliminated. But changes in social relationships, attitudes, and customs are not immediate. Thus, it is assumed that many people who were born and raised before 1949 continue to be affected by Confucian ideas and other "harmful" influences from the previous era, especially in villages that are isolated and where political work is done poorly. With the passage of time, however, old people will die off and be replaced by a new generation reared under socialism. It is held that this process of change can be accelerated by ideological campaigns, which can persuade even older peasants to abandon outmoded feudal customs. In short, time and further ideological work will cause traditional customs to wither and disappear, to be replaced by new socialist customs and relationships.

A competing conception of the process of change maintains that traditional customs are rooted not in the feudal landlord system but in centuries of Chinese history. It is claimed that these customs hold so much cultural meaning and provide such harmony, security, and satisfaction that Chinese peasants continue to cherish them today. But the Chinese Communist government finds traditional customs threatening and demands that peasants give them up in favor of new customs that are much less satisfying—loyalty not to kin but to distant party elites, politicized and dull national holidays instead of the boisterous traditional festivals, and so forth. According to this view, the peasants will not make the desired changes unless forced to do so. The government therefore stages repeated campaigns aimed at coercing peasants to abandon traditional ways. In this conception, there is widespread change in peasant behavior, but it is brought about by government coercion rather than by changes in economic institutions or mobilized persuasion. And peasants do not change their attitudes correspondingly but rather continue to cherish traditional customs, observing the old ways in private when they can escape detection.

We have here two quite different conceptions of how change in Chinese peasant customs is occurring and why. It is the author's view that both of these

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[1] Throughout this paper the term "traditional" will be used as shorthand for the set of pre-1949 practices and customs. This is done for the sake of brevity; the author realizes full well that peasant customs were already changing in important ways before 1949 and varied from village to village.

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conceptions distort reality—that the actual process of social change in China is considerably more complex than either "model" allows. The present article will defend this contention by examining a case in point—namely, the changes and continuities in marriage customs in rural China.

Official Marriage Policy

The first step in such an analysis is to identify the aspects of traditional marriage practices that the Chinese Communists particularly wanted to alter. The intended changes were embodied in the 1950 Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China and in later modifications of family policy.[2]

The major provisions and addenda of the Marriage Law were as follows: Marriage was to be based upon the free choice of the couple, without parental or other compulsion. The woman was to be at least 18 years of age to marry, the male at least 20 (in recent years, in connection with a campaign to encourage "late" marriage, new administrative minima have been set at the respective ages of 23 for women and 25 for men in rural areas). The degree of intermarriage among collateral (same surname) relatives was to be governed by local customs. No child bethrothal or concubinage was to be allowed. The exaction of money or gifts in connection with marriage was prohibited. A system of civil registration of marriages was to be instituted, with local cadres directed to refuse registration to couples who did not satisfy the provisions of the Marriage Law. The patriarchal form of family authority was to be replaced by a system of equal rights for both sexes, with special protection given the interests of women and children. For example, both males and females were granted the right to keep their own family name; to participate in work and social activities; and to possess, manage, and inherit property. The wedding itself was to be frugal and secular; instead of wedding feasts and processions, a simple tea party after the registration was advocated, with a few friends and close relatives in attendance, perhaps with a welcoming speech to the bride by the brigade party secretary. Divorce was to be by free

A 1960 photo of a young Chinese family; both adults are members of the Huangchunying Production Team under the Naitsufang Production Brigade of Hoping People's Commune near Peking.

—China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

choice if both partners desired it, or after mediation and a local court decision if only one spouse wanted to terminate the marriage (in recent years lengthy mediation has been advocated, even when both parties desire a divorce.) The division of child custody and family property in the event of a divorce was to be negotiated between the two parties, with the local people's court having the obligation to make sure that the interests of the woman were protected. Widows were to be allowed to remarry without interference.

In general, these provisions represented an effort not to destroy the Chinese family or even to eliminate extended families (*i.e.*, family groups with several sons, spouses, and offspring living under one roof) but rather to give family relationships a more egalitarian, "conjugal" emphasis—an effort that paralleled changes occurring very widely in other parts of the globe.[3] Far from being revolutionary statements, these regulations simply modified policies promulgated by the Chinese Nationalists in the 1930's. But after 1949, particularly in the period

[2] Extensive discussions of the Marriage Law and its implementation are available in C. K. Yang, *The Chinese Family in The Communist Revolution*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1959; and M. J. Meijer, *Marriage Law and Policy in the Chinese People's Republic*, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1971.

[3] For a review of the evidence that modern forces, particularly industrialization and urbanization, tend to produce a conjugal family emphasis (with the authority of extended kin in the everyday life of the family reduced, and the husband-wife tie becoming the most important bond), see William J. Goode, *World Revolution and Family Patterns*, New York, NY, The Free Press, 1963. Chapter VI of the Goode volume examines the evidence for China, which is also the focus of an article by the present author, "The Family," in Michel Oksenberg, Ed., *China's Developmental Experience*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1973.

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1950-53, very vigorous efforts were made to make the Marriage Law known in every corner of the land and to pressure the masses to comply with its dictates—things the Nationalists had not done. It is clear from press and propaganda coverage that these initial efforts ran into some popular opposition.[4] But in later years, as the government's attention increasingly shifted to other priorities, information touching on the degree of compliance or noncompliance with official marriage policy became very scarce.

Current Peasant Marriage Customs

What are peasant marriages like in China today? The answer to this question as elaborated below is based on comprehensive interviews of Chinese émigrés who were formerly residents of 63 different villages in rural Kwangtung Province. The interviews were conducted in 1973-74 in Hong Kong by a fellow China scholar, William J. Parish, and myself and covered a variety of subjects which will be analyzed in a forthcoming full-length study.[5] In assessing responses, we have not assumed that customs in Kwangtung are identical with those elsewhere in rural China, but we do claim that they are not atypical, since on a number of points our observations mirror those found in less detailed reports from villages in other regions.

The basic approach to presentation of our research findings will be to describe the general set of marriage customs being followed today (*i.e.*, in the post-Cultural Revolution period of 1969 through 1974) and to make a qualitative comparison of these contemporary customs with the official marriage ideals and also with the picture of similar customs in Kwangtung conveyed in studies of the pre-1949 period.[6] From this rough comparison an attempt will be made to assess which parts of marriage practices have changed markedly and widely, which have changed partially or in some villages but not in others, and which have undergone little change at all.

Among current customs, there are a few obvious and dramatic changes to be noted. While the prac-

Two young farmers return from market to their commune near K'unming in Yunnan Province.

—Marc Riboud/Magnum.

[4] The strongest popular opposition concerned the efforts to foster freedom of divorce (see the discussions in Yang, *op. cit.*, and Meijer, *op. cit.*). On the other hand, many provisions of the law met with popular approval.

[5] The primary device for obtaining information about current marriage customs was to ask our informants to describe recent weddings they had seen or attended and to tell how the couple had first met, decided to marry, celebrated their wedding, and so forth. Additional information came from descriptions of nearby families and details about when they had married, where the spouse had come from, etc. A more extensive analysis of our results is presented in a joint monograph, *Village and Family in Contemporary China*, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, forthcoming. Some other results of our research have appeared in these pages previously: see William L. Parish, "China—Team, Brigade, or Commune," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1976, pp. 51-65.

[6] There are a number of studies of Kwangtung village life in the pre-1949 period. See, *e.g.*, C. K. Yang, *A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1959; Daniel H. Kulp, *Country Life in South China*, New York, NY, Teacher's College Bureau of Publications, 1925. John L. Buck, *Land Utilization in China*, Nanking, University of Nanking, 1937, and other publications based on massive rural surveys conducted by a team headed by Buck circa 1930 provide some demographic, financial, and other information dealing with Kwangtung and the farming region of which it is a part, the double-cropping rice region. In addition, the journal *Min Su*, published by the Sun Yat-sen University in Canton from 1928 to 1933, contains many articles describing folk customs (including those relating to marriage) for various parts of rural Kwangtung.

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tice of taking concubines was never widespread in China—since few males could afford it—our interviews turned up no evidence at all of new instances of concubinage (although occasionally the Chinese press mentions such cases). Child betrothals were considerably more common in Kwangtung in the past, particularly among the poor, but this practice also disappeared in the early 1950's. Thus, all rural marriages today are monogamous and involve individuals who are at least adolescents.

With regard to marriage age there have also been important changes, but the government has been only partially successful in achieving compliance with the official "late-marriage" policy adopted after the Cultural Revolution. Table 1 offers some crude figures showing changes in marriage ages over time.[7] It indicates that in the pre-1940 period women in rural Kwangtung on the average married in the age range 17-18.5, and men in the range 20-21.5. For the post-Cultural Revolution period, the average female marriage age is about 21, and the male age about 25. But according to our rough figures, most

[7] Our own study and the unpublished works by Robert M. Worth and Janet W. Salaff cited in Table 1 all rely on informants from Kwangtung recalling their ages when they married or the ages of other couples. The number of cases is often small, and the information is obviously less exact than could be obtained from formal birth and marriage records. Ages are corrected to conform with Western reckoning. The figures come from villages throughout rural Kwangtung, but they still do not constitute a systematic sample of *all rural marriages. Thus the figures in the table should be regarded* as only rough indicators of general trends, useful mainly in the absence of more comprehensive information.

Table 1: Change over Time in Average Marriage Ages of Kwangtung Peasants

Source	Year of Marriage: pre-1940	1940-49	1950-58	1959-67	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973-74	1968-74 [a]
	FEMALES										
Ch'iao/Wang (N) [b]	17.0 (?) [c]	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Worth (N)	18.6 (129)	19.2 (118)	19.5 (136)	20.5 (73)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Salaff (N)	18.4 (8)	18.8 (10)	20.7 (8)	22.2 (16)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Parish/Whyte (N)	—	—	20.0 (12)	20.9 (31)	20.8 (16)	21.0 (11)	21.2 (10)	20.8 (13)	21.3 (17)	21.4 (19)	21.1 (86)
	MALES										
Ch'iao/Wang (N)	20.4 (?) [c]	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Salaff (N)	21.5 (8)	21.0 (10)	23.6 (8)	25.3 (16)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Parish/Whyte (N)	—	—	24.5 (13)	25.3 (29)	24.9 (16)	26.0 (12)	24.0 (11)	24.1 (17)	24.7 (18)	25.3 (22)	24.8 (96)

[a] In this column, figures for age are averages computed from the preceding six columns; figures for the number of cases (in parentheses) are totals computed from the same columns.
[b] (N) = Number of cases.
[c] The source does not specify the number of cases used to compute this average.

SOURCES:

Ch'iao Ch'i-ming and Wang Chung-wu, "Population," in *Chung-kuo ching-chi nien-chien* (Chinese Economic Annual), 3rd ed., Vol. 1, Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1936, p. B-27. (The averages refer to the double-cropping rice region circa 1930, not to Kwangtung specifically.)

Robert M. Worth, "Recent Demographic Patterns in Kwangtung Province Villages," unpublished paper. Information is from 456 women interviewed in 1965 in Macao and asked about their own marriage ages. The raw data supplied by Dr. Worth have been recomputed to fit our own periodization.

Janet W. Salaff, "Youth, Family and Political Control in Communist China," unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, (Berkeley, CA), 1972. Couples interviewed in Hong Kong in 1968 who had come from Kwangtung were asked about their age at marriage. Dr. Salaff has recomputed her figures to fit our periodization.

William L. Parish and Martin King Whyte, *Village and Family in Contemporary China,* forthcoming, Chapter 10. Our interviews with former Kwangtung residents included information about their own ages at marriage and also about those of nearby peasants well known to them. All examples given by informants to illustrate unusually early or late marriage are omitted from our figures.

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of this change took place in the 1950's, and since the early 1960's there has been little upward movement in age levels in spite of the increased official pressure for later marriages. In recent years 40-60 percent of the males and 60-80 percent of the females in the sample have been married before they reached the new minimum ages of 23 and 25.

There are several ways in which couples can marry below the ages stipulated by commune officials. In some villages in 1973-74 the administrative minima were not strictly enforced. After a perfunctory attempt to dissuade younger couples from marrying, they were allowed to register. In many other localities, however, commune marriage registration officials refused to register underage couples. In this circumstance, one of two strategies was adopted by peasants intent on marrying. Commune marriage registration officials seem to rely not on official commune records but on certificates (*cheng-ming*) provided by brigade cadres, testifying that the couple is of the appropriate age. A couple can usually find a cooperative brigade cadre, often a close relative, who is willing to falsify their ages on such a certificate. If this tactic is not possible, the couple can still get married in a family ceremony and then wait until they have passed the minimum ages before going to register the marriage (by which time children may already be arriving).[8] The government does not consider such a couple married, but the 1950 Marriage Law does state that children born out of wedlock have all the rights of legitimate children. And our informants uniformly state that local peasants regard the family ceremony and not the registration as legitimating the marriage and the beginning of conjugal relations. Thus, kinship ties with cadres and the support of village opinion allow parents and young couples determined to carry through an "early marriage" to do so, and in virtually all of our villages there were cases of one or another of these tactics being used to get around the late-marriage policy.

In regard to the freedom of choice of mates, again the contemporary picture is one of marked change but still some gap between peasant customs and official ideals. Today there are very few "blind marriages," in which parents use a marriage arranger

Table 2: Change over Time in Ways Marriage Partners Met

Met through	1950-58	1959-67	1968-74
		(percent [a])	
Professional go-between	43	27	21
Relative	29	35	33
Friend or acquaintance	14	8	24
Direct contact	14	31	23
TOTAL	100	101	101
		(number)	
TOTAL	7	26	92

[a] Rounded to nearest percent.

to seek out a spouse for their son or daughter, with the young couple not meeting until the day of the wedding. But in contemporary marriages the parents still have a great deal of control, with the degree of youth initiative varying widely from case to case.[9] As a general rule, both generations have veto power. Few parents force their offspring into marriages against their will, but few young people elope or marry contrary to parental wishes.

The actual process by which a match is agreed to is quite involved. In some cases the parents decide it is time to look for a spouse for their offspring, and they initiate the process, using relatives, friends, or a marriage go-between (*mei-jen*) to scour the area for likely prospects. The figures in Table 2 show that professional go-betweens are involved in fewer marriages in the 1960's and 1970's than was the case in the 1950's. Occasionally, they even come under attack during propaganda campaigns. But in most localities a few go-betweens continue to ply their trade, circulating from village to village with their files of prospects, glowingly described.[10] Even if it is the parents who have taken the initiative in promoting a match, the consent of the young couple is now required. Generally, this is sought through a meeting between the two families, often in a teahouse in a market town. There the young couple meet and exchange a few timid words, forming some initial impression of their potential lifelong mate. After the meeting both families return home to consider the matter. If the initial impression formed by

[8] A recent account from a village in another part of China (Honan Province) mentions such a case. When a couple was refused registration by the commune because the male was only 19, they went ahead and had a family wedding anyway and soon produced a child. See Jack Chen, *A Year in Upper Felicity*, New York, NY, Macmillan, 1973, pp. 77-78.

[9] For a more detailed discussion of the variation in youth initiative in choice of mates, see Janet W. Salaff, "The Emerging Conjugal Relationship in the People's Republic of China," *Journal of Marriage and the Family* (Minneapolis, MN), November 1973, pp. 705-17.

[10] On the role of marriage go-betweens in a village in Honan, see Chen, *op.cit.*, pp. 72-88.

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Table 3: Change over Time in Closeness of Roots of Marriage Partners

	pre-1949	1950-58	1959-67	1968-74
Community of origin				
		(percent [a])		
Same village	3	21	30	23
Same commune,[b] different village	47	33	38	42
Outside commune [b]	50	46	32	35
TOTAL	100	100	100	100
		(number)		
TOTAL	34	48	53	158
Surnames of Couple				
		(percent [a])		
Same surname	0	38	44	22
Different surname	100	62	56	78
TOTAL	100	100	100	100
		(number)		
TOTAL	5	8	16	55

[a] Rounded to nearest percent.
[b] Or same area as the commune, in the cases of the pre-1949 and 1950-58 period.

either the young couple or their parents is negative, the matter usually will not be pursued further.

In some cases young people take the initiative. If they have seen or heard of a marital prospect through schooling, commune meetings, or some other activity, they may ask their parents or a friend or relative to make initial inquiries on their behalf. If they are not yet acquainted, there will still be a ritual meeting of the two families in the market town. But if the couple is already acquainted, this step can be dispensed with. However, there is very little in the way of pairing off and courting as preliminaries to a decision to marry. In fact, informants say young people who are seen off alone talking to a member of the opposite sex will be subjected to public ridicule or even to cadre criticism for immoral behavior. As a result, the marriage negotiation process is generally begun as soon as an initial interest is expressed, before any romance has been allowed to develop.

One former obstacle to a freer choice of mates is breaking down in some localities. In the past, it was common in Kwangtung for villages to have taboos against the marriage of two people from the same lineage or from the same village (even if of a different lineage). This has made it difficult for young people to choose their own mates, since most of their social contacts are with nearby youths.[11] In some localities this taboo is still followed, but in others it has weakened as peasant youths have begun to marry kinsmen (although not members of the same lineage branch) and fellow villagers, as the figures in Table 3 show. Where this has happened, the possibility for youth to take the initiative in marriage decisions is enhanced.

Mating Criteria and Finance Customs

After the preliminary contacts and the initial consent of the young couple, the two families consider the match further. (We stress that this is a matter for both families, and not just the young couple.) Each side uses a variety of contacts to investigate the potential spouse. Several criteria are involved. For the girl's family, class labels are important. Their daughter will enter the groom's family, and marriage to the offspring of a former landlord or rich peasant results in the class label being applied to the woman and to her children, with the accompanying stigmatization.[12] As a result, marriage into such families is avoided unless there are compensating advantages, and in many villages there are a number of males in their 30's and 40's who for this reason have been unable to marry.[13] Economic criteria are also important to the bride's family. The bride and her parents want to know how wealthy the man's village is (in terms of such things as grain rations and work-point values [14]), what sort of annual income his family has, how well built and spacious their housing is, and whether there are many dependents or claimants on family resources. In some localities it is the custom for the prospective bride's family to be invited to a meal in the man's home to enable her relatives to make a direct inspection of the

[11] This same-lineage taboo exists elsewhere in rural China as well. See *ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

[12] The continued importance of class labels in rural China, even though they are based on economic conditions that ceased to exist a generation ago, is discussed in my article, "Inequality and Stratification in China," *The China Quarterly* (London), December 1975, pp. 698-703.

[13] The problems of the offspring of former landlords, particularly sons, in finding spouses are visible elsewhere in rural China as well. See Chen, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

[14] Peasant work efforts are recorded in terms of work points, and the remuneration received for these varies widely from one production team to another. In our interviews, 10 work points (a typical value for a day's labor for an adult male) were worth only .02-.30 *yüan* in some teams but over 1 *yüan* in others. At the time of our interviews the official exchange rate was about 2 *yüan* to US$1.

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household, even to the point of looking over the size of the grain reserves the man's family has stored away. The economic situation of the man's family is important, but the bride and her family also consider whether the groom-to-be is healthy and able to work hard and thus likely to earn a decent income. Additional criteria involve personality concerns, such as the likelihood that the man and his parents will treat the new bride well. The groom and his family are less interested in class labels and economic status because the woman will be leaving her home to be incorporated into theirs, thereby assuming the status that they have. More important for them are whether she is healthy and strong, whether she is capable of hard work and bearing children, and whether she has a pleasing personality and a good moral reputation.

If these further inquiries are resolved to the satisfaction of both sides, the stage is set for another meeting to negotiate marriage finance. There the parents play the leading role. Virtually all marriages in rural Kwangtung involve substantial financial transactions, and this is as true of marriages initiated by youths as of those arranged by parents. The bride's parents present a list of "bride-price" demands, which usually includes some clothing items for the bride, a large number of food items, many small wedding pastries (used to announce the match to the bride's relatives), and a cash portion. The total cash value in some cases is as little as 100 *yüan*, but in others exceeds 1,000 *yüan*.[15] The groom's family considers the list and either presents a counterlist of its own, usually somewhat reduced, or decides to call off the negotiations. If both families agree on marriage finance, then the marriage is agreed to, and all that remains is to set the date. In some localities there is an engagement (*ting-hun*), which is recognized by the groom's family sending the bride's family an engagement gift or a portion of the bride price. In other villages the couple is simply regarded as betrothed without any special gifts.

There are several features to be noted about current marriage finance customs. The first is that expenditures involved in the bride price (*li-chin* or *p'in-chin*) are often very substantial. As best we can estimate, they are not any less now in relation to average peasant income than was the case in the 1930's, and they may be even larger.[16] The financial burden involved requires families to begin saving up long in advance of the marriage of a son, and even so, many peasants have to borrow from relatives and go into debt. High bride-price payments also work to the disadvantage of poor families, who cannot compete with their more prosperous neighbors and may have to delay the marriages of their sons.[17] In other words, many of the negative consequences of "marriage by purchase," as described in Chinese Communist marriage reform documents of the early 1950's, continue to be visible today.

One part of marriage finance has clearly changed, however. The two families do not negotiate over a dowry, and the bride in fact brings very little with her into the marriage: some clothing, personal effects, perhaps a thermos bottle, etc. The traditional custom was not, in fact, a true "bride price," but an "indirect dowry,"[18] since much of the expenditure

[15] See footnote 14 for value of the *yüan*. Often in a locality there is a particular combination of goods and cash which is considered appropriate for a bride price, but wealthy families may be asked for somewhat more, while poor families will bargain for sharper reductions in the list.

[16] A precise comparison would require figures both on bride prices and on average peasant incomes in Kwangtung currently and at some point in the pre-1949 period. We lack precise estimates of peasant income for either period, and the only systematic data on ceremonial expenses for the pre-1949 period that we are aware of come from Buck's survey, in which the bride price is not separated from other wedding expenditures (particularly the feast). We calculate, however, that in the current (post-1968) period, the average expenditure on the feast *and* bride price by the male's family in our interview cases has exceeded 700 *yüan*, while at the same time the average peasant household income for all of China (not just Kwangtung) has not been much more than 700 *yüan*. Thus, Kwangtung peasants are now spending about as much on these parts of the wedding as the average Chinese peasant family earns in a year. In Buck's data, circa 1930, the average male wedding expenditure in seven Kwangtung locations was 230 *yüan*, while the estimate Buck gives of average peasant household income for all of China at that time was 400 *yüan*; hence, the sampled Kwangtung peasants spent only about 60 percent of what an average Chinese peasant family earned in a year on these expenses (see Buck, *op. cit.*, p. 468, Statistics Volume, pp. 408-12.). Since this comparison procedure is crude and the ratio of Kwangtung peasant income to national average peasant income may have changed, we go no further than the conservative conclusion that the burden of these wedding expenditures has probably remained at least as substantial as in the past.

[17] One Chinese document from 1963 described a poor male lamenting, "With wives so expensive, I cannot get one even if I work myself to death at my farming." C. S. Chen, Ed., *Rural People's Communes in Lienchiang*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1969, p. 213. In recent years marriage finance customs have made it difficult for "sent-down" urban males (those mobilized by the government for work in the countryside) to find peasant brides, since they usually cannot accumulate the necessary funds. "Sent-down" urban females, in contrast, do not have families in the village to demand a bride price, and thus they are attractive mates for peasant males, who refer to them as "controlled-price brides."

[18] This distinction is explained in Jack Goody, "Bridewealth and Dowry in Africa and Eurasia," in Jack Goody and S. J. Tambiah, *Bridewealth and Dowry*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973. The terms "bride price" and "bridewealth" refer to the same thing.

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by the groom's family returned as a dowry with the new bride—furniture, bedding, and other items needed by the young couple. Today very little comes back with the bride; most of the bride price is used to put on the wedding feast in the bride's village and to start a fund to get a bride for one of the woman's brothers. In other words, the current practices in rural Kwangtung come closer to the proscribed "marriage by purchase" than was the case in the 1930's, since the movement of funds is now more of a one-way arrangement. Local cadres do not denounce bride prices and in fact have to offer them themselves if they are to find brides for their sons. So in terms of marriage finance, we see a pattern not of change and progress toward official goals but, if anything, of movement in the opposite direction.

The Wedding and After

After the match is agreed to, there is often an interval of some months or even years before the wedding itself. During this time the couple does engage in some restrained courting behavior. The man may visit the woman regularly in her home, or they may go to the market to buy small items or even go to the movies. Many informants could tell of individual exceptions to this restrained pattern, of couples who got more romantically involved and even of premarital pregnancies, but the rural environment works to make such cases unusual. And the courting that does take place occurs after the match is agreed to, so it serves more as a preparation for marital compatibility than as part of the search for a mate. The wedding date is generally set by the two families, with an eye to work schedules and grain distribution times; the traditional practice of consulting a fortune-teller to pick an auspicious day has generally been abandoned, but families often pick a date with a nine in it, since in Chinese nine is a homophone for "long-lasting." Generally, a few days or weeks before the wedding the couple goes to the commune to register the marriage, but again it must be stressed that it is the wedding rather than the registration which determines whether the couple is married in the eyes of the peasants.

The family of Li Po-yu, a peasant in Kwangtung Province, enjoys a holiday at home.

—China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

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The wedding is a festive occasion. In our interviews there are virtually no cases of the frugal, politicized tea parties described in the Chinese press. For rural party members and cadres as well as ordinary peasants, marriage is still an occasion for feasting and for joyful communion with relatives and friends. The bride's family usually holds a feast for its relatives first, using food items supplied in the bride price. Then the groom sends out a party of young males (with bicycles, now, rather than sedan chairs) to fetch the bride. With firecrackers and much excitement the party sets off for the groom's home. There, a much larger feast is often in progress. Typical male wedding feasts involve six to ten tables (i.e., 50-80 people), but prosperous families with many relatives may have 30 tables or more, with people eating in shifts and in many adjacent houses and open spaces. The groom's family may spend several hundred *yüan* or more on the festivities. Generally, feasting and toasting the new couple are the primary activities, but occasionally there are domestic rituals in which the couple kneels before the family elders or the ancestral shrine for a blessing. Marriage ceremonies are probably more secular than in the past; while the importance of worship and ritual in prerevolutionary rural weddings is not entirely clear from the evidence, there is certainly little such emphasis now. When the feast concludes, those invited start their trek homeward, but younger guests return the same evening for the "teasing of the new family" (*nao hsin-fang* or *wan hsin-fang*), in which challenges and pranks continue late into the night until the last exhausted guests decide to leave the couple in peace.

One innovation in wedding practice does occur in a few villages. Some couples now have a "traveling marriage" *(lu-hsing chieh-hun).* They register the marriage and then go off on a trip to the city or some scenic location for what is essentially a honeymoon. After they return they hold a meal for relatives and friends, but this seems to be more modest than the wedding feasts most peasants hold. Our informants were somewhat vague on the origins of this new practice and the reasons why some couples follow it rather than the general custom, but they did note that traveling marriages are not advocated either by rural cadres or by the mass media. Perhaps this new custom has diffused into some villages from educated and Western-influenced urbanites, without official encouragement.

After the marriage the couple lives with the groom's parents. There is little evidence of a shift toward separate residence or residence with the bride's family. In a few villages, it is considered desirable to build new housing in advance of the wedding. More often, however, housing is simply rearranged and spruced up; a room is usually set aside for the young couple, with new furniture, bedding, and so forth (involving still more expenditure). But the household does not remain in this extended form for very long. Two readjustments occur, one physical and the other social or economic. As children are born and other brothers prepare to marry, the quarters become cramped, and—in part with the increased earnings the bride has brought in—additional housing is built. The social change occurs in response to similar pressures, so that within three or four years after marriage the household "divides"—that is, the young couple are separated from their elders for economic accounting purposes. Work points, private plots, and rations will now be distributed separately, but the two branches will continue to cooperate extensively on such things as domestic work and child care. These two kinds of rearrangements do not always occur simultaneously, and it is possible for the household to divide economically while all continue to live together under one roof. But families divide now at a relatively early stage, rather than waiting until the death of one or both parents.[19]

Within the initially extended family, the pattern of relationships also has changed. The picture given in traditional accounts of a new bride as isolated and miserable—made to suffer the taunts and beatings of the mother-in-law and husband while doing much of the domestic work, until she can prove herself and bear a son—is not echoed in our interviews. Young wives begin immediately to work in the collectivized fields. They can prove themselves there to some extent, even before they bear a son. And the mothers-in-law are stuck with most of the domestic chores during working hours, although the young woman shares the burden when she is at home. The father-son relationship has also "softened," with many fathers turning over the

[19] If the family has only one son, then family division will not occur. Instead, the aging parents will continue to live with their married son until their deaths, and to be supported by him and his wife. If there are several sons, generally the older ones will set up separate households a few years after they marry, while the youngest son will continue to live with the parents until they die. In this case, however, all the sons will share the burden of supporting the parents. Thus, over time there has been a shift from joint family structures, at least as an ideal, to a stem-famliy-and-associated-nuclear-families arrangement.

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family headship as soon as they retire from full-time field work to become leisured but still respected advisers. In general, the relations between the generations seem less autocratic now; family obligations and authority are still strong, but the oldest family members now share that authority with other adult members more than in the past.

The relationship between the sexes has not altered as dramatically. Domestic work is still the province of women, not of men, and so women bear the double burden of working women in other societies —they get less sleep than men, they have less time for leisure and relaxation, they are less able to take an active part in local organizations and community leadership, and so forth. The male is still the acknowledged head of the household and makes the major decisions, although he consults other adult members, male and female. Family income is pooled and managed by the family head, rather than each family member's being allowed to retain his or her earnings. Men continue to dominate local political leadership posts, although women now have token representation in most communities. And although there is less family property to inherit these days, what there is is still passed on only to the sons, with daughters getting no share.

Some rural marriages do not work out. Divorce is not common, and it is hard to tell whether marital disruption occurs more or less often now than in the past. But cases do surface, and at least one contrast with the traditional situation is that initiative has shifted to the female side: about 80 percent of the cases described to us were based on the wife's demand for a divorce. Divorces are not easy to get, since prolonged mediation and attempted dissuasion by team, brigade, and commune cadres occur, in keeping with official policy. For those women granted divorces, remarriage now seems fairly rapid if not automatic, and we were told that it is more common today for the man to have a problem finding a new spouse. (Widows also seem to have little problem remarrying, the traditional stigma on such women having largely faded away.) But the rights that divorcing women and remarrying widows are supposed to have are largely ignored. Generally, such women take with them only their personal property —clothing, combs, brushes, etc. No share of the housing, consumer durables, or other property acquired partly through the woman's earnings is given to her. Furthermore, children generally remain with the man and his family, or the woman is allowed to have custody only of the younger female children. In some cases, if the marriage is of recent vintage and has not yet produced many "returns" (in earnings and children), the commune cadres decide that the woman's family must pay back the bride price before they will agree to the divorce. So even the commune cadres seem to operate on the view that the bride price paid by the groom's family, although illegal, entitles that family to the fruits of the woman's work and her fertility. The woman's rights in regard to property and children are supposed to be protected by the court, but most divorce cases are resolved and settled within the commune before they ever reach the county people's court. In sum, women have improved their ability to get out of bad marriages and into better ones, but they forfeit important rights in doing so.

The Pattern of Persistence and Change

We have now reviewed a number of customs and practices surrounding rural marriage and assessed how much evidence of change or continuity each provides. The conclusions to be drawn can be summarized in schematic form. In Figure 1 the customs that have been discussed are arrayed in two columns. One column involves those marriage customs the government has tried to change. The other lists those customs which the government has been content to leave alone. The figure is divided horizontally into three rough categories. At the top are listed those customs we feel have changed markedly and widely, in the middle are those which have changed partially (either markedly but only in a few villages, or slightly in many villages), and at the bottom are those customs that have changed little at all in the direction of official ideals.

The striking thing about Figure 1 is that no clear relationship between government pressure and actual changes in marriage customs appears. Some customs the government has tried to change have persisted, while others it has ignored have been altered. For example, bride prices are prohibited but still widely used and involve substantial sums; the Marriage Law says that local customs in regard to marriage among kin should be adhered to, yet taboos against such marriages are breaking down. These results do not fit either of the two general conceptions of social change discussed at the outset. If the socialist transformation of the rural economy destroys the basis for traditional customs, which are then generally eliminated through per-

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Figure 1: The Pattern of Change and Persistence in Rural Marriage

	Changes Advocated by the Government	Changes Not Advocated
Marked Change Has Occurred	No concubines No child betrothal Increasing female ability to initiate divorce Ability of women to remarry Better treatment of new brides Declining power of the aged	Earlier family division Earlier transfer of family headship to the son Declining value of dowries More marriage partners introduced by friends
Partial Change Has Occurred	Later marriage ages Increasing youth initiative and voice in mate choice Decline of marriage go-betweens More secular wedding ceremonies (though information on past religious ritual is scarce)	Innovation of "traveling marriages" Increase in same-lineage marriages Increase in intra-village marriages
Little or No Change Has Occurred	Sharing of domestic work by men Decline of the bride price Increasing inheritance by daughters Greater frugality of wedding feasts Protection of women's child custody and property rights in a divorce	Shift from patrilocal to independent or matrilocal residence after marriage Rise in divorce rate Declining role of divorce dissuasion Declining importance of familial support of the aged

suasion and education, why are burdensome bride prices and lavish wedding feasts so resistant to change? If officially applied coercion eliminates those traditional customs that are visible and enforceable while peasants continue to cherish old ways in private, why do same-lineage marriages increase in the absence of any coercion in favor of them, and why do very visible customs like wedding feasts persist while more "private" ones, such as the way a new bride is treated, change? Both of the given "models" of the process of social change assume that government pressure should be a critical determinant of what will change, although they differ over whether that pressure is applied non-coercively or coercively. In neither framework does the pattern in Figure 1 make sense.

We suggest that a different sort of explanation of the process of social change is needed if we are to explain our findings. We argue that the key to understanding which rural marriage customs have changed and which have persisted is to consider the consequences of the transformations of the rural social structure that took place during the 1950's. In this respect, we agree with the Chinese Marxist analysis. But we part company with that analysis on two other points. We do not believe that the structural changes of the 1950's destroyed the basis for traditional marriage customs—we argue, instead, that it had mixed consequences, undermining some traditions while supporting others. Nor do we believe that new campaigns and educational efforts will have much success in eliminating traditional marriage customs unless further changes in the structure of rural life are introduced. We also disagree with the rival conception of change discussed initially. We contend that most changes in rural marriage practices occurred indirectly, as peasants adapted to the changing social environment in which they lived, rather than directly, as a result of being threatened or punished for certain kinds of customary activities.[20]

Very great changes in the structure of rural social life were introduced after 1949. Landlord property was confiscated, and then agricultural land was collectivized; lineage property and ritual centers were taken over; prior village elites were dethroned and stigmatized, while new, generally younger, leaders

[20] The important distinction between social change that is induced directly (through extortion, reward, or punishment of individuals) and that induced indirectly (by an alteration of the social environment in which individuals live) is discussed in James S. Coleman, "Conflicting Theories of Social Change," in Gerald Zaltman, Ed., *Processes and Phenomena of Social Change*, New York, NY, John Wiley, 1973.

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took their place; rural education was expanded rapidly; women were mobilized for schooling and for work outside the home; and new collective economic and political structures spanning many villages were organized.

But not everything was changed—many elements of the previous rural structure were preserved and built upon. The corporate peasant family still remains the basic building block of the entire system, performing many functions (such as the organization of consumption, subsidiary economic production, housing construction, domestic work, early child care, the care of the aged[21]), even though some functions have been partially withdrawn (*e.g.*, the organization of farm production and the socialization of older children). Families and villages continue to vary widely in their incomes and levels of consumption. Peasants still live in their ancestral villages, in which the core figures are a group of patrilineally related males. Today's team and brigade cadres are local peasants and kinsmen, rather than outsiders. In fact, the roots of young males in their native villages are strengthened by official policies—including restrictions on urban migration and reforms in rural education which make schooling through the lower-middle-school level available in most brigades (so students can live at home and contribute to family income in their spare time), while deemphasizing education as a device for mobility out of the villages. Thus, at the base of the commune system are social units that have their roots in the distant past rather than in the revolution.

We argue that much of what has changed and what has persisted in marriage customs can be understood in terms of this combination of old and new structures in which peasants live. The decline in the power of the aged—apparent in many ways, including the increased freedom of choice of mates and the better treatment of new brides—reflects in large measure the fact that, as a result of collectivization, parents no longer control all of the economic resources needed to establish a family (although they still control some, such as housing) and that much of the management of daily farm labor is done outside of the family context. (No doubt the expanding education of the young and the younger ages of local leaders play some role here as well.) Better treatment of new brides, the disappearance of child brides, and more female ability to divorce and remarry reflect the increased economic role and value of women (who are no longer regarded as "lost goods" by their families) and the greater freedom of marital choice that exists today. Greater freedom of marriage reflects in part the increased opportunities that young people have to meet today—in school, in agricultural labor, and in brigade and commune meetings and construction projects. Thus, the structural transformations of the 1950's set the stage for important changes in some aspects of rural marriage.

Even changes not advocated by the government can be seen as flowing from the altered rural social structure. Earlier family division and transfer of family leadership to the son are not a response to

Young boys and girls from Kiangsu Province study together at the Changshu agricultural middle school.

—China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

[21] When people's communes were first set up in 1958, they often included collective facilities to take over such functions from the family: mess halls, nursery schools, old age homes, and so forth. With the collapse of the Great Leap Forward and the ensuing economic crisis, most of these facilities were closed down, and today they are not often found in the countryside. For example, collective nursery schools or kindergartens are found only in some relatively large and wealthy teams in the fertile Pearl River Delta region of Kwangtung (according to our interview responses).

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official pressure for such changes; instead, they reflect the loss of family landholdings and the reduction of the family farming enterprise, with the labor power of the young more important to family income now than the managerial ability of the old. The decline of the dowry reflects the increased economic value of women, and the increase in same-lineage and intra-village marriages is a response to the greater social contacts of the young already referred to, as well as to the reduced importance of lineages and lineage regulations, now deprived of both resources and leaders.

The contemporary rural social structure can also help to explain those customs which have not changed much in spite of official displeasure with them. The primary role of women in domestic work reflects in part the scarcity of collective organizations to handle such tasks, as well as the fact that men continue to earn higher work points than women for agricultural labor (so that male energies are preserved for remunerative activities). The lavish wedding feasts reflect the continued vital importance of the corporate family and the life-cycle events which transform it, as well as the continued influence on rural social standing of family wealth (and displays of such wealth). The continuing or increased importance of "marriage by purchase" and women's limited child-custody and property rights reflect the fact that a woman still moves at marriage and is incorporated into the family of her husband, while her economic value (both to her parents and to her husband's family) has increased. The practice today of such "deviations" from official marriage ideals is also made possible by the fact that the cadres who have to enforce the rules are kinsmen and neighbors of the local populations rather than outsiders. These cadres are themselves bound by ties of mutual obligation and support to the local peasants and are unwilling to alienate them by vigorously enforcing official marriage ideals that do not fit local conditions.

Finally, we argue that at least some of the things we have labeled partial changes represent cases in which the contemporary rural social structure has contradictory implications. For example, marriage takes place later now, in part to allow more time for schooling and for daughters' economic contributions to their families; but if it takes place too late, peasants are concerned about not having a daughter-in-law to help with arduous domestic chores, and about becoming old and possibly disabled before children are grown and able to support them. (They are also concerned about losing out in the competition for eligible mates with other families and villages in the area.) We have already mentioned some of the new forces encouraging freedom of choice of mates and same-lineage marriages, but it should also be noted that official schooling and migration policies continue to restrict the social field of most young people to their immediate brigade, and that youths still depend upon their families for housing and for the finances needed to celebrate a marriage. These contrary influences make parental influence and approval a vital element in rural marriage, and give some continued life to traditional marriage go-betweens.

We have not discussed every custom listed in Figure 1, but the picture of the process of change to which our analysis leads is one in which a variety of changes, including some not particularly fostered by the government, have occurred in response to alterations in the rural social structure; it is at the same time a picture in which a number of traditional customs, including some denounced and even declared illegal by the government, have persisted because they make sense within, and are reinforced by, that structure. A separate analysis of variations in marriage customs from village to village within our interview sample and of intra-village variations supports the kind of explanation we have been developing, although all the details cannot be given here.

To refer again to the models defined at the start, if suasive pressure for ideological change is the key motor for the promotion of new customs, we should expect those villages with the highest proportion of Communist Party members, the greatest penetration by the mass media, the closest proximity to urban centers, or the highest economic levels to have the most non-traditional marriage practices. If we follow the other model and regard official coercion as the key, then again the proportion of local party members or the level of development of the local political infrastructure (reflected by such things as an actively functioning poor and lower-middle peasant association) should be associated with marriage change. In either case, some villages should be "backward" or traditional, while others should be "advanced" or socialist.

Again, our findings do not fit these expectations. Villages which register more youth initiative in choice of mates than others may hold more lavish wedding feasts, while those with more frugal feasts may give larger bride prices. Some families may

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Family and friends celebrate a Chinese wedding.

—Marc Riboud/Magnum.

allow their young to have more initiative in mate choice than their neighbors while actually marrying them off at an earlier age. In general, there does not seem to be any coherent group of advanced, "socialist" villages or families in terms of adherence to official marriage norms. What influences whether a village will conform to official ideals in respect to any one aspect of marriage customs is not so much things like the proportion of party members or the degree of penetration by official communications as it is things like the size of the team and brigade, whether the residents are Cantonese or Hakka, whether many local residents are receiving overseas remittances, and so forth.

In other words, internal comparisons based on our interview materials point again to an explanation of the process of change which stresses peasants responding to distinctive circumstances in their immediate social environment, some of which foster traditional customs and some of which undermine them. And the local characteristics which foster free choice of mates (things like high levels of school attendance and a large brigade size, both of which expand social contacts among the young) may be irrelevant or counter-productive when it comes to fostering late marriage or frugal wedding feasts.

Conclusions

The Chinese government continues to use media efforts and campaigns to foster new marriage forms, but if these fail to fit the local situation, they are *often ignored.* Kwangtung peasants emerge in this analysis neither as earnest students of official ideas whose minds unfortunately remain clouded by Confucian ideology, nor as individuals so wedded to traditional ways or ingrained with a selfish and con-

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servative nature that they are unwilling to change unless coerced. Rather, like peasants in societies elsewhere (and many nonpeasants as well), they are concerned about fostering the welfare and security of themselves and their families. When the social environment around them changes and new forms of behavior begin to make more sense, Kwangtung peasants are perfectly willing to abandon traditional ways. When they calculate that an old custom still provides satisfaction within the altered structure, however, they are just as willing to ignore official demands for change. Peasants are thus flexible and adaptive, but it is primarily to the changing situation in their immediate locale that they adapt, rather than to directives and exhortations from Peking. If China's communes and villages do not undergo fundamental structural changes in the future (and only minor changes have occurred since about 1962), there is no reason to suppose that the children and grandchildren of today's peasants will be motivated to give up those traditional marriage customs that still persist.[22]

We cannot say how well the sort of analysis developed here would apply to other processes of change in China. No doubt official pressure is more of a determining factor when the policy is one of higher priority than trying to alter marriage customs and is backed up with more rewards and sanctions. There is no clear evidence, in fact, that China's leaders are greatly distressed by the wealth of traditional marriage practices engaged in by the peasantry, in spite of the recurrent exhortations to abandon them.[23]

We do wish to stress, however, that most scholars who study China rely heavily on the Chinese press and on material gathered during briefings on trips to China. Both types of material create the impression that traditional customs and practices are outmoded "survivals" of the pre-1949 society which are generally and gradually receding under the assault of official media campaigns and sanctions. In the case of rural marriage customs, at least, this impression is clearly a serious obstacle to an understanding of what is really going on.

[22] A number of structural changes in rural organization would, in our view, promote further changes in marriage customs—*e.g.*, the loosening of migration restrictions so that rural youths could leave for the cities; the provision of collective- or state-financed pensions to replace familial support for the aged; the provision of public housing for new couples, separate from the groom's parents; the formation of collectivized domestic work facilities; the provision of income subsidies to level family and village economic differences; or the dispatch of outsiders to come in and lead brigades and teams. But such changes would all have costs and potential dangers for the authorities and would alter a commune organization that in most respects is working quite effectively. It seems unlikely that major structural changes such as these, designed to foster further change in marriage customs, will be adopted.

[23] The general reform of traditional family life has not been a high priority goal since the conclusion of campaigns to implement the Marriage Law in 1953, although particular aspects of family life, such as birth control and late marriage, have received more recent attention. It can even be argued that some traditional customs perform what sociologists call "latent functions" for the commune system. For example, peasants have to work very hard in order to save up the money needed for bride prices and wedding expenses, and this makes them more diligent and productive than they might be if they complied with the official ideal of simple and frugal ceremonies.

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Books

Maoism and Marxist Utopianism

By John B. Starr

JEROME M. GILISON. *The Soviet Image of Utopia*. Baltimore, MD, and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975.
JAYANTANUJA BANDYOPADHYAYA. *Mao Tse-tung and Gandhi: Perspectives on Social Transformation*. Calcutta, Allied Publishers, 1973.
LESLIE R. MARCHANT. *To Phoenix Seat: An Introductory Study of Maoism and the Chinese Communist Quest for a Paradise on Earth*. Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1973.
WOLFGANG LEONHARD. *Three Faces of Marxism: The Political Concepts of Soviet Ideology, Maoism and Humanist Marxism*. Tr. by Ewald Osers. New York, NY, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974.
JULIUS JACOBSON, Ed. *Soviet Communism and the Socialist Vision*. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Books, 1972.

NEITHER MARX nor his immediate successors were very clear when treating the utopian side of Marxian political thought, and their ambiguity has inspired rather different ideological positions concerning this aspect of Marxism among contemporary political theorists and actors who conceive of themselves as working in the Marxist vein. Indeed, the question of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of an emphasis upon the utopian strain of Marxism constituted one of the points of contention in the ideological dispute between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China which began in the mid-1950's. Based on an examination of the five books under consideration here, each of which touches, either centrally or peripherally, upon the theme of utopianism in the Marxist tradition as that tradition has evolved into contemporary Soviet, East European, and Chinese political thought, the present essay will seek to illuminate the evolution of Mao Tse-tung's view of utopianism, the roots of that view as found in the writings of Marx and Engels, and the interaction between Mao's view and contemporary Soviet perspectives on the significance of Marxian utopianism for Marxism in the 20th century.

IN FACT, only during two relatively brief periods of his long career as a revolutionary thinker and actor did Mao Tse-tung give vent to a utopian strain in his otherwise remarkably pragmatic political philosophy. The start of the first period was signaled by a very early article by Mao entitled "The Great Union of the Popular Masses," published during the summer of 1919 in *Hsiang Chiang P'ing-lun* (The Hsiang River Review), a magazine which Mao himself edited. Mao had been introduced to Marxism by this time, but his article gave little evidence of Marxist influence on his thinking. He called for the formation of "unions" of all sectors of society to overthrow the militarists and capitalists, whom he held responsible for the oppression of the Chinese people. "We are awakened," he said. "The world is ours, the nation is ours, society is ours. If we do not speak, who will speak? If we do not act, who will act?" [1] The article was utopian in its affirmation of the ability of the masses to act spontaneously to seize political power from those who hold and wield it, and, more important, in its conclusion, in which Mao looked forward to the "golden age, our age of brilliance and splendor," which would lie before China following the seizure of power by the "great union" which he had proposed.

Subsequent to his acquisition of a more thorough command of

[1] For a translation of Mao's article, see Mao Tse-tung, "The Great Union of the Popular Masses," in *China Quarterly* (London), January-March 1972, pp. 76-87.

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the principles of Marxism-Leninism, of course, Mao's naive and youthful optimism concerning a future golden age was tempered, first, by the underlying mistrust of utopian thought which he found in these principles; second, by the epistemology which he derived from his study of Marxist-Leninist texts; and finally, by his growing experience with the revolutionary tasks which had to be accomplished before any such "golden age" could be realized. As Maurice Meisner shows in his thought-provoking study of the intellectual origins of utopian thought in Chinese Marxism,[2] and as is emphasized in several of the books under review here, the Marxist-Leninist tradition presented Mao with an ambiguous legacy in this regard. It posited a communist stage that would follow the end of the class struggle and the victory of the proletariat and put an end to the alienation that afflicted the working class under capitalism. But its materialist foundation precluded the possibility of describing this ultimate stage of political and economic development fully until it had actually been brought into being.

Marx and Engels described the communist stage in a famous passage in *The German Ideology* as one in which "society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming a hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic." [3] Thirty years later Marx amplified this picture with the idea that the eventual achievement of the communist stage would be accompanied by the achievement of a condition of abundance in which labor would become a means for human self-realization rather than simply a necessity for survival, so that society might then "inscribe on its banner: From each according to his ability; to each according to his need." [4] And Engels added, in a much quoted phrase, the idea that once the class struggle was over, state power would be rendered "superfluous"; the state, as a consequence, "withers away of itself." [5] The formulation of these suggestions as to the nature of the communist stage of the future did not prevent Marx and Engels from simultaneously utilizing the materialist epistemology which they had developed as a basis on which to criticize their contemporaries the utopian socialists for painting "fantastic pictures of future so-

[2] Maurice Meisner, "Utopian Goals and Ascetic Values in Chinese Communist Ideology," *Journal of Asian Studies* (Chicago, IL), November 1968, pp. 101-10.

[3] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "The German Ideology," (1845-46), in Robert C. Tucker, Ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader*, New York, NY, W. W. Norton, 1972, p. 124.

[4] Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Program," (1875), in Tucker, *op. cit.*, p. 388.

[5] Friedrich Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, (1878), Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959, p. 387.

Reviewers in this Issue

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ciety at a time when the proletariat . . . has but a fantastic concept of its own position." [6]

Assimilating the problematic nature of what was at issue here, Mao came to place far greater emphasis in his own thought on the idea of the epistemological impossibility of describing the stage of development beyond socialist society than he did on the implicit utopian strain of Marxism and Marxism-Leninism. He argued that because knowledge could only be derived from direct observation in the course of revolutionary practice, there was no possibility of accurately depicting social circumstances which were far from realization.[7] He showed little interest in the concept of the alienation of the proletariat under capitalism, which some interpreters of Marxist thought have argued persuasively is the central concept upon which Marx's idea of the liberation achieved in the communist stage is predicated.[8] As Donald Munro has recently pointed out, this lack of interest has been characteristic of Chinese Marxists since 1949.[9]

NONETHELESS, there was a second occasion on which utopianism figured prominently in Mao's writings. It occurred in 1958-59, a particularly euphoric period in Mao's career. During the early years of Chinese communism, Mao had found himself and his ideas in opposition, both vis-à-vis Moscow and vis-à-vis the Comintern-directed leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. However, after the commencement of the Long March in 1934, Mao assumed a position of leadership in the party which he maintained until his death. And from the successful, though enormously costly, completion of the Long March, through the Yenan years, the Civil War, the period of reconstruction which followed Liberation, the socialist transformation of the Chinese economy, and the collectivization of agriculture, every project which Mao undertook was, as he assessed his activity in retrospect, both popular and successful.[10]

His optimism was translated into a concept of political and economic development for China which involved the abandonment of the Soviet model—upon which the Chinese had depended during the early post-Liberation years—in favor of greater reliance on the mobilization of China's vast labor forces as a means to accomplish the industrialization and agricultural modernization of the People's Republic much more rapidly than had been done in the Soviet case, despite the fact that China had had a substantially smaller industrial base in 1949 than the Bolshevik regime had inherited when it came to power in Russia in 1917.

One of the innovations associated with this uniquely Chinese "Great Leap Forward" was the commune. Mao disclaimed authorship of this novel organizational form, but he nonetheless endorsed its introduction after it had already been implemented on the initiative of local cadres.[11] A particular strength which Mao saw in the commune, which at one point was intended to be instituted in urban as well as rural areas, was that it would serve to facilitate the transition from socialist ownership by the collective to ownership by the whole people, thus to communism.[12] In conjunction with this reasoning, Mao advanced a theory of "uninterrupted revolution" (*pu-tuan ko-ming*). "Do not mistake this for Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution," he cautioned. "In making revolution one must strike while the iron is hot—one revolu-

[6] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "The Communist Manifesto," (1848), in Tucker, *op. cit.*, p. 360.

[7] Mao first set out his epistemological principles in 1937 in the lecture "On Practice" (*Shih-chien*), which he delivered at Resist Japan University (*K'ang Jih Ta-hsüeh*) in Yenan. An edited version of the lecture appeared in *Mao Tse-tung Shuan-chi* (Selected works of Mao Tse-tung), Peking, Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she, 1969, pp. 259-73; it appeared in English translation in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 1, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1964, pp. 295-309.

[8] Marx developed the concept of the alienation of the proletariat under capitalism most forcefully in his *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844; for relevant excerpts, see Tucker, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-67. On the centrality of this concept, see, for example, Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Marx*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1968.

[9] Donald J. Munro, "The Chinese View of 'Alienation'," *China Quarterly*, July-September 1974, pp. 580-83.

[10] For an indication of the euphoria which Mao felt as a result of these successes, see his editorial comments, appended to a collection of articles describing the process of collectivization at the local level, in Mao Tse-tung, *Chung-kuo nung-ts'un te she-hui chu-yi kao-ch'ao* (The Socialist Upsurge in the Chinese Countryside), 3 vols., Peking, Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she, 1956. Excerpts from these comments are translated in *The Socialist Upsurge in the Chinese Countryside*, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1956.

[11] See, for example, Mao's "Speech at the Sixth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee," Dec. 19, 1958, in *Mao Tse-tung szu-hsiang wan-sui* (Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought), n.p., 1969, p. 259, translated in US Department of Commerce, Joint Publications Research Service, *People's Republic of China* (hereafter *JPRS-CHI*), Report 61269-1, Feb. 20, 1974, p. 140; and his "Speech at the Lushan Conference," July 23, 1959, in *Mao Tse-tung szu-hsiang wan-sui, op. cit.*, p. 304, translated in *Chinese Law and Government* (White Plains, NY), Winter 1968-69, p. 41.

[12] See his "Speech at the First Chengchow Conference," November 1958, in *Mao Tse-tung szu-hsiang wan-sui, op. cit.*, pp. 247-51, translated in *JPRS-CHI* Report 61269-1, *supra*, pp. 128-32.

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tion must follow another." [13] Mao himself refrained from drawing the conclusion to which his organizational and theoretical modifications naturally led, namely, that China would enter the stage of communism prior to the Soviet Union.[14] A number of his colleagues, however, published articles, some in language surprisingly reminiscent of Marx's own, in which they enthusiastically affirmed this conclusion:

A few years from now China will become a communist society. In that society, each and every person will be able to take up his position in the division of labor—he will be able to farm, to work, to carry out several specialized fields of work, to participate in scientific research, and to write. In other words, each and every one of us will be a "Jack of all trades" [tuo-mian-shou].[15]

MAO ABANDONED his second dalliance with utopianism almost as soon as he entered into it, but the effect on Soviet ideology of his euphoric moment was profound. In what is in many respects the best of the works under review here, Jerome Gilison, after presenting a particularly useful, concise, and faithful introductory summary of the utopian strains found in the Marxist-Leninist tradition, traces the effect on Khrushchev and on Soviet ideology of the Chinese claim to be outdistancing the "socialist motherland" on the road to communism. In chapters devoted to explicating the ideological treatment of the "transition to socialism," "the future communist society," and "the new communist man," Gilison shows in a carefully documented fashion how Khrushchev's insistence on the imminence of the achievement of communism in the Soviet Union on the one hand contributed to the revitalization in the post-Stalin period of what had become a bureaucratized and stagnant society, but on the other hand created serious problems by raising the expectations of the Soviet population so high that it proved impossible for him—or for his successors—to fully satisfy them.

What is most striking in Gilison's work for the student of contemporary China is the extent to which his description of the "production of ideology" in the Soviet Union in the 1960's and 1970's confirms the accuracy of Hannah Arendt's analogy of the onion to describe levels of belief in totalitarian systems. While belief in ideology is strong among the outermost layers—the masses—of the society, she asserted, the closer one penetrates to the heart of the system, the weaker belief grows until, at the center, there is a wholly cynical manipulation of ideology by the leader and his immediate entourage.[16] Gilison makes it clear that there was an apparent element of ideological belief in Khrushchev's professions of the imminence of the arrival of communism, and he asserts no mechanical correlation between the six 'modes' of belief, ranging from "active belief" to "cynicism," [17] which he postulates and proximity to or distance from the center of the political system. Nonetheless, his frequent references to doctrinal manipulation by what he terms the Soviet "ideology machine" leave the impression of an ideology which serves the instrumental ends of the Soviet leadership far more than it shapes their world view or constitutes an analytical tool which they themselves employ to understand Soviet political life.

Perhaps because it is very difficult to find evidence for the view that Mao disbelieved his own political theory, the application of Gilison's interpretation of the Soviet ideological system to China during Mao's lifetime—an application which, one must add, Gilison does not suggest making—would result in a substantial distortion of the situation there. Whether Gilison's interpretation will remain irrelevant in the wake of Mao's death, however, is of course another question. After all, the "decline" of Soviet ideology may be explained in part by the absence of a personality commanding and authoritative in

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[13] "Speech at a Supreme State Conference," Jan. 28, 1958, in *Mao Tse-tung szu-hsiang wan-sui, op. cit.*, p. 158, translated in Stuart R. Schram, Ed., *Chairman Mao Talks to the People*, New York, NY, Pantheon, p. 94. This period of Mao's thought is authoritatively covered by Stuart Schram in *La révolution permanente en Chine* (Permanent Revolution in China), Paris, Mouton, 1963; Schram updated his coverage on the basis of new materials in "Mao Tse-tung and the Theory of the Permanent Revolution, 1958-69," *China Quarterly*, April-June 1971, pp. 221-44.

[14] In his "Speech at the Sixth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee," *loc. cit.*, p. 263 (English version p. 145), Mao chided his colleagues for their excesses in this regard, suggesting, however, not that it was impossible for China to enter communism prior to the Soviet Union, but rather that it would be unseemly to do so.

[15] *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily—hereafter *JMJP*). July 29, 1958, cited in Jerome Gilison, *The Soviet Image of Utopia*, Baltimore, MD, and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975, p. 4.

[16] Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York, NY, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966, p. 387.

[17] The six modes of belief postulated by Gilison (p. 19) are active belief, remote belief, apathy, skepticism, active disbelief, and cynicism.

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theoretical matters, at least since the death of Stalin, and perhaps even since Lenin's untimely demise on what was, by comparison with Mao's long post-Liberation career, the virtual morrow of the revolution. Such a personality may henceforth be lacking in China as well.

Paradoxically, Khrushchev's response to Maoist utopianism during the Great Leap Forward period contributed in an important way to Mao's abandonment of his utopian position. Mao responded to Khrushchev's insistence on material abundance as a precondition for entry into communism —and to his conclusion that the Chinese version, for the moment, must inevitably be "communism without pants"—by denouncing Khrushchev for preaching a "phoney" "goulash" communism which, far from projecting an unprecedented historical advance for the Soviet Union, actually represented a plan for historical regression. Mao argued that under Khrushchev's direction the Soviet Union was engaged in a full-scale restoration of capitalism.[18] After reflecting on the setbacks of the Great Leap Forward, his colleagues' response to these setbacks, and economic and political developments in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin, he concluded that socialism had to be viewed as a "very long historical period," fraught with a prolonged, and even sharpening, class struggle. The communist stage would be postponed far into the future, and the road toward its achievement would be one of "continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat." [19] Clearly, the utopianism evident in Mao's thought in the late 1950's had given way to something approaching its antithesis.

IT IS FOR this abandonment of utopianism—of the "teleological end" on the basis of which Marx, and particularly Lenin, justified the need for a dictatorship of the proletariat — that Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya criticizes Mao in his interesting though controversial book *Mao Tse-tung and Gandhi*. Professor Bandyopadhyaya measures the achievements of the two theorist-actors, whose common ground he finds in their attempts to liberate and modernize two enormous, primitive, and divided Asian agricultural societies, first in terms of the degree to which each contributed to the realization of these goals, and then in terms of their promotion of what he considers the "ultimate values" of liberty, equality, and fraternity—values with which he somewhat questionably equates Marx's humanism. In successive chapters he compares Mao's theory of people's war with Gandhi's use of nonviolent resistance (*satyagraha*) and, in a somewhat less successful parallelism, Mao's "mass line" with Gandhi's Constructive Program.

Unfortunately, Bandyopadhyaya's comparison in both instances is distorted by a fundamental misconstrual of dialectical thought, whereby he sees in the resolution of each contradiction the necessary destruction of one element by the other. Indeed, he attributes to Gandhi, as opposed to Mao, what is far closer to a correct interpretation of the dialectical conception of *Aufhebung* (supercession) as it evolved from its Hegelian roots through the Marxist tradition:

> *It is the transformation of both elements in the contradiction, and, therefore, of the entire contradiction, rather than the elimination or liquidation of one element by the other, as in the Marxist-Maoist view of contradictions, which constitutes the essence of the social and political thought of Gandhi, and distinguishes it clearly from two other contemporary conflict theories, namely, Marxism and Social Darwinism (including its political heir, Fascism).* (p. 31)

Proceeding on the basis of this misconstrual, Bandyopadhyaya concludes that Gandhi's strength lay in the unity between his methods and his goals, and his weakness in the disavowal of technical modernization. He further contends that Gandhi's strength was Mao's weakness: the latter failed to understand what Bandyopadhyaya takes to be an unquestionable truth, namely, that humanistic goals can be realized only by humanistic means.[20] Mao's

[18] "On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism and It's Historical Lessons for the World" was the last of nine lengthy comments written in response to the July 1963 Open Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It appeared in *JMJP*, July 14, 1964, and was translated in *Peking Review* (hereafter *PR*), July 17, 1964, pp. 7-28.

[19] A collection of quotations under the heading "Chairman Mao's theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" was published in *PR*, Sept. 26, 1969, pp. 3-10. I have discussed the origins and implications of this theory in my article, "Conceptual Foundations of Mao Tse-tung's Theory of Continuous Revolution," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), June 1971, pp. 610-28. See also Schram, "Mao Tse-tung and the Theory of the Permanent Revolution," *loc. cit.*

[20] In support of his point Bandyopadhyaya argues that all loss of life is reprehensible and cites statistics (many of a highly questionable nature) concerning the number of those killed in the course of the Chinese revolution (p. 106).

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strength, on the other hand, lay in an awareness—which Gandhi shared, but which his followers rejected—of the necessity for mass mobilization to accomplish the modernization of a society such as that of China or India.

Professor Bandyopadhyaya tries to trace the outlines of a third model, one which would combine the positive ideas of both Gandhi and Mao, while rejecting the two leaders' respective weaknesses. Mao, of course, denied the existence of any such "third model." Quoting Stalin, he saw it as a variation of the second model, that is, of a bourgeois-democratic society based on liberty, equality, and fraternity.[21] Whereas Bandyopadhyaya sees these as ultimate absolute values, Mao viewed them as eminently bourgeois.

AT THE SAME time that Mao moved from a qualified utopianism based on his optimistic assessment of pre-Great Leap Forward transformation in China, to a considerably more pessimistic and nonutopian view of the immediate future of socialist society, he came to emphasize ever more strongly in his thinking a sense of history uniquely Chinese and radically different from that underlying Marxian thought. The nature of this sense of history and its origins in traditional Chinese thought had been suggested in two lines of a poem penned by Mao in 1956:

Standing at a ford, the Master [Confucius] once said:
"Thus life flows into the past." [22]

Far from a prediction of an end to prehistory at the beginning of the communist stage, Mao's historical sense, combined with his fundamental ontological commitment to the ubiquity and permanence of conflict, led him to a point of view which postulated the transitoriness of the significance of individuals, institutions, and modes of thought of all sorts when seen in the context of several millenia of historical development. He commented in this regard:

Of all things in this world, there are none which are not the products of history. This is point number one. The second point is that everything which is produced by history will be destroyed by history.[23]

These rules of history applied even to Marxism-Leninism, as Mao made clear to Edgar Snow in 1965 when he pointed out that

. . . man's condition on earth was changing with ever-increasing rapidity. A thousand years from now all of us, he said, even Marx, Engels and Lenin, would probably appear rather ridiculous.[24]

Mao's sense of history may be attributable to nothing more profound than the fact that he was a very old man living in a very old society; nevertheless, it became so central a part of his thought in the last decade of his life that one is prevented from conceiving of his political philosophy taken as a whole as having been in any fundamental sense utopian. This point, however, completely escapes Leslie R. Marchant in his book *To Phoenix Seat.* Marchant begins his work, the title of which is drawn from a poem by the 8th-century Chinese poet Tu Fu, with a 27-page prolusion in which he summarizes chiliastic thought as it has developed in both the Chinese and Western traditions from earliest times to the present. He devotes the balance of the book to a chronological discussion of politics and the evolution of political thought in China since Liberation. Our confidence in Professor Marchant's analysis is undermined very early, however, by serious factual errors such as his attribution (p. 50) of Mao's famous comment, "a revolution is not a dinner party," found in his 1927 "Hunan Report," to a "series of poems and songs published in *People's Daily* on 12 October 1966." In the end, Marchant's attempt to cut Mao's political ideas to fit a Procrustean bed of chiliasm contributes more to a distortion than it does to an understanding of Maoist thinking and its implementation in contemporary China.

More useful and reliable is Wolfgang Leonhard's *Three Faces of Marxism.* While the utopian side of Marxism-Leninism is but one of a number of aspects of that ideological tradition explored in the book, it is nevertheless the humanist aspect of Marx and Engels' concept of the future communist order that constitutes the thread which unifies Leonhard's discussion of the transformation of Marxian thought at the

[21] "'Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?' Comment III on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of 14 July 1963," *JMJP*, Sept. 26, 1963, translated in *PR*, Sept. 27, 1963, p. 18.

[22] "Swimming," translated in Jerome Chen, *Mao and the Chinese Revolution*, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 346.

[23] "Speech at an Enlarged Conference of the Political Bureau, 'On Ten Major Relations'," 1956, *Mao Tse-tung szu-hsiang wan-sui*, p. 53, translated in Schram, *Chairman Mao Talks to the People, op. cit.*, p. 75.

[24] Edgar Snow, *The Long Revolution*, New York, NY, Random House, 1972, p. 222.

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hands of Lenin and Stalin, and of the "three faces" which that tradition manifests at the present moment—contemporary Soviet Marxism, Maoism, and the humanist Marxism of the so-called "reform communism" of Eastern Europe. Professor Leonhard, who, because of his education in the Soviet Union in the early 1940's and his four years of work in East Germany in the immediate postwar period, brings particular insight to his work, makes no secret of his own preference for the third of these three faces and his belief that, among the transformations of Marxism in the contemporary world, this one most faithfully carries forward the essence of Marx's own ideas. At the same time, though, he offers a balanced and often insightful account of the other two faces as well. One is left with the feeling that both he and his translator, Ewald Osers, worked rather more rapidly and rather less carefully on the chapter on Maoism than they did on the remainder of the book; but that opinion may be unique to overfastidious Sinologues.

A point of view similar to that of Professor Leonhard informs the collection of articles *Soviet Communism and the Socialist Vision,* edited by Julius Jacobson.[25] In a long and provocative article which helps set the tone of the book, Jacobson himself offers a critique of the work of Isaac Deutscher, the "anatomy," as he terms it, "of an apologist" for Soviet Marxism. The "socialist vision" of the title is that of a humanist interpretation of the work of Marx and Engels, and it is against the standard of that interpretation that contemporary Soviet practice —in law, in the treatment of dissident intellectuals, in economic development, and in the Soviet reaction to the reemergence of a humanist Marxism in Poland and Czechoslovakia—is measured and found wanting.

[25] The essays in the volume appeared originally in the journal *New Politics* (New Brunswick, NJ), which Jacobson edited at the time his book was published.

JEROME GILISON describes Marx aptly as having been a "utopian without a utopia." It is with this ambiguous legacy that Marx's successors have wrestled in theory and in political practice. The Soviet reaction to the problem in recent years has been to abandon Khrushchev's optimism concerning the imminence of the communist utopia, but not to abandon utopianism entirely as a means for mobilizing the Soviet population. Mao's reaction to the ambiguity was to postpone the realization of the utopia into the distant future and to emphasize instead the continuity of conflict itself as a developmental, and thus ultimately beneficial, force. How long it will be possible for Mao's successors to maintain this spartan and in some respects risky theoretical viewpoint without the support of Mao's personal authority and underlying optimism concerning the ultimate outcome of the long-term conflict, remains to be seen. Like that of Marx, Mao's legacy is also ambiguous.

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Geographers Look at China

By Christopher L. Salter

THEODORE SHABAD. *China's Changing Map: National and Regional Development, 1949-1971.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1972.
ANDREW L. MARCH. *The Idea of China: Myth and Theory in Geographic Thought.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1974.

THE UNIVERSE of geographers' approaches to either a problem or a specific place is vast. One practitioner may address himself exclusively to real space, with little note given to the social framework that binds together the locale being described or inventoried. Another geographer may look at the same area and ply his trade by exploration of the ideas and attitudes from and of the place in question. Both fall into the realm of geography—this most broadly based of the already wide-ranging social sciences—and both perspectives serve to enlighten the student of that particular place . . . but not without engendering some frustration.

The two books under review here serve, as perfectly as any pair of volumes dealing with geography could, to illustrate the range of views available on geography and China. The first, *China's Changing Map*, by Theodore Shabad, veteran correspondent and foreign-desk man of *The New York Times*, is a monumental example of the hard-edged, objective tome that can be written to provide one kind of solid view of China.

The second book, or more properly, collection of essays, called *The Idea of China,* by Andrew March of the University of Colorado, contains fewer than five pages of traditional geography, but deals with more than two millenia of myth and theory in the Western world about China. In a strict bibliographic sense, both are studies of the same place, but they touch on little of the same ground.

Shabad's work is a substantial revision of his 1957 volume, also entitled *China's Changing Map.* It, like its predecessor, derives exclusively from English-language materials and serves, in fact, to illustrate the wide spectrum of information on the People's Republic of China available in English. The US government documents, the materials of the Peking Foreign Language Press, the official news releases of the People's Republic, and the secondary sources utilized in this detailed inventory of physical changes in the landscape (and, consequently, the map) of China spell out a Chinese scenario of much economic, administrative, and demographic transformation. Newspaperman Shabad is quite thorough in his pursuit of detail and gives the distinct impression that virtually anything which turned up in his reading of radio broadcasts, press releases, summaries, and other sources has been passed on to the reader.

Occasionally there is the feeling that Mr. Shabad has shared too much with his readers. The seemingly inexhaustible stream of specific commentary on new rail lines, river modification projects, changes in administrative boundaries, and demographic shifts as indicated by flux in the urban status of populated points piles up in the consciousness of the reader, trapping him in a sea of detail. It is true that this particular brand of geography does not appear in any other current text on China, but the reader should be warned that the book must be read in the way one reads the new Britannica—slowly and with repeated rededication to the task.

Mr. Shabad's work is a classic example of detailed place-specific geography. Its concern with minority peoples, minor boundary changes, increments to the rail and canal network, the birth and death of post-1949 industrial centers, and individual histories of urban centers is unparalleled. He has created a factual base for comprehensive awareness of the economic and demographic modification of the Chinese scene. The omission of more commentary on

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the social networks that bind all of these rails, waterways, routes, and edicts together may be excused once one understands the author's overriding belief in the need to have knowledge of these "hardware" elements of the Chinese experience. His own broader concern for political setting, fortunately, is evident in his more recent work on Chinese hydroelectric projects in the Winter 1976 issue of *China Geographer.*

In any case, all students of China must acclaim Mr. Shabad for the extraordinary effort that the research and writing of such a volume as the one under consideration manifests. We do indeed have a better sense of China's changing map because of the two editions of this book.

IT WOULD BE efficient to suggest that the second volume under review here, *The Idea of China,* afforded a complement to the specific detail of *China's Changing Map.* Efficient, yes—but inaccurate.

Professor March in his essays has looked at some themes concerning Chinese society, but the nature of his treatment of the topics moves in a realm that seldom ever touches the real earth of China itself. His concerns are many, and are perhaps best summed up as those of an apologist for China. The burden he carries is that of a friend of China who smarts from the indifference and inaccuracy characterizing much of the traditional Western perception of that nation.

The papers in the volume come from what must have been a most exciting graduate career for Professor March at Columbia University. March—particularly in his papers on Karl Wittfogel (Chapter 4) and the myth of Asia (Chapter 2)—gives evidence of a most ambitious education. Not only does he reference Chinese sources in the original, but he also utilized a host of European languages in marshaling evidence of Western myopia and ethnocentrism. However, in the same way that Shabad's work becomes tedious at times because of over-concern with detail, Professor March's ideas on China become exhausting because of his preoccupation with a single theme.

This is particularly bothersome when one looks at the book as a whole, for in essence March is telling the reader again and again that Westerners have never looked adequately at the information available to see what China or the Chinese are like. To be sure, he is largely correct. As he charges, for centuries we have treated China and Asia as one; we have stressed the West's moderation and diversity while bemoaning China's excess and uniformity; and we have satisfied ourselves with Wittfogel's inaccurate theories on Oriental despotism while misunderstanding Marx's own comments on landscape. But the constant repetition tends to dull the reader's senses.

Moreover, March is sadly guilty of the same sort of shortsightedness which he finds reprehensible in others. This is evidenced in his failure to include geographic comments from men like J. E. Spencer and Rhoads Murphey and in his almost exclusive reliance upon George B. Cressey for examples of geographers' views of China. He draws virtually nothing from the generation of scholars that has sprung up since 1971 (the book was published in 1974), nor does he consider the changes in the posture of the US government among his omnibus examples of Western attitudes toward China.

This shortcoming, however, may be more a function of Professor March's production schedule in the publication of the papers than of his scholarship. His concern for diverse sources of evidence, as well as his articulate affection for the campaigns of the People's Republic of China for change and innovation, is present in much of the work included in *The Idea of China.*

As with any polemic, the reader has to accommodate the special intent of the author in some satisfactory way. The reviewer, as a fellow student of China, chose to consider these papers the uneven but very promising work of a well-trained academic, and he would welcome future works by Professor March.

In conclusion, the reviewer feels that although both books fail to convey an adequate sense of the current social reality and philosophical atmosphere in and around China, Shabad's work does provide an excellent objective framework for analysis, and March's collection leads one to entertain new attitudes toward China. That neither of these volumes conveys the complete essence of China is hardly startling. To date, China has never been adequately encompassed within the leaves of a single volume, or even a pair of volumes. And with the increasing social and economic complexity of the People's Republic, it is even more unlikely that China will be so contained in the near future.

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The Seductions of Marxism

By Ronald Tiersky

JEAN-FRANÇOIS REVEL. *La tentation totalitaire* (The Totalitarian Temptation). Paris, Robert Laffont, 1976.
ROBERT WESSON. *Why Marxism? The Continuing Success of a Failed Theory*. New York, NY, Basic Books, Inc., 1976.

THE PUBLICATION in 1976 of Jean-François Revel's *La tentation totalitaire* was an immediate *succès de controverse,* magnifying the already well-advanced polarization of French opinion for and against the leftwing alliance of Socialists and Communists which hopes to govern France after the next parliamentary elections, in the spring of 1978. Why, in 1976, was it necessary—or desirable—to rewrite *The Opium of the Intellectuals,* Raymond Aron's brilliant polemical essay against the seductions of Marxism first published in 1955? [1] It would be altogether too easy, even though tempting, to say this is simply the second time around, the farce. Rather, one would do better to take the near-simultaneous appearance of *La tentation totalitaire* and Robert Wesson's *Why Marxism?* as an invitation to look past these new polemics themselves and to focus on the circumstances which converge to produce books of such a mode, and then to consider the arguments themselves.

IN ONE SENSE, the two books are first of all the products of circumstances. The most important of these, in the writer's view, are the following:

Most general, *La tentation totalitaire* and *Why Marxism?* can be comprehended as responses to the recent conflicts which ended in an extension or weakening of Communist power and socialist ideas in world politics. At the international level, Communist victories in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, and Communist defeats in Chile and Portugal (albeit on the basis of different strategies—"peaceful transition to socialism" in the former instance and classic Leninism in the latter) have demonstrated unmistakably that a Soviet-American détente which precludes a European or generalized East-West war does not by any means guarantee or even endorse the status quo elsewhere. The Soviet-Cuban adventure in Angola confirmed that, on the contrary, no matter what differences exist among the Communist parties or national liberation movements allied in a given situation, only the most naive observer could assert that the historic conflict between Western and Soviet values has found a stable equilibrium in a US-USSR great-power condominium.

A second element is that the approach of the Italian and French Communist parties to national power in countries vital to that part of Europe which is Western in both geographic and political-cultural terms has raised the level of anxiety among Atlantic political elites in a much more immediate and even directly menacing manner. I am referring here, of course, not only to the French and Italians themselves. The American political class—which, as Richard Ullman noted in October 1976, has in the past few years adopted "trilateralism" as almost a consensus foreign policy[2]—now finds itself threatened by a fundamental shift in its central international alliance. Consequently, the persistent postwar American fears that the US might end up as a "last bastion" have reescalated in accordance with the sense of the momentum of events that certain ardently liberal West European observers such as Raymond Aron voice with increasing intensity.

Yet—the third element to consider—at the same time that

[1] Paris, Calmann-Levy, 1955.

[2] "Trilateralism: 'Partnership' for What?" *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), October 1976, pp. 1-19.

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Western values seem by some indicators to be headed for Armageddon, the Soviet world gives proof not only of a serious internal struggle for power, but, more important in the long run, of a growing disagreement over values and principles which—to the extent it eventually proves to be something other than tactics or wishful thinking—must imply disaggregation of the Soviet empire within the international Communist movement and a consequent release of energies building toward nondictatorial socialism. These schismatic tendencies, both organizational and doctrinal, have been highly visible in the past year, surfacing in both national Communist party congresses and in international Communist meetings. They were especially evident at the European Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in East Berlin in June 1976. At this gathering, autonomist tendencies were so manifest that, beyond marking the now unquestionable and probably unbridgeable doctrinal and program differences, they raised the question (explicitly put by both the French and Italian Communist leaders, Georges Marchais and Enrico Berlinguer) whether such a meeting would ever be held again.

The "Eurocommunist" and "Eurosocialist" criticisms of the Soviet system have not been a solo act, however. On the contrary. Besides the seminal work—*hors catégorie*—of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, books such as those by Hedrick Smith and Robert Kaiser, which document the flourishing black market and the exorbitant stratification of "access" as a national life-style,[3] not to mention George Feifer's melodramatic *Moscow Farewell,* which is—if not much else—a blurred glimpse into the social-sexual distortions of life in "the next higher stage," [4] have deepened Western awareness of the Soviet way of life in the last year or so. In France, one notes the recent appearance of two studies. The first is a strikingly disengaged book by a young leftwing journalist, Emmanuel Todd, called *La chute finale.*[5] It elaborates the proposition that the Soviet empire is disintegrating from within before our eyes, were we only able to "see." The second, *Parti et trafiquants—la corruption en Union sovietique,* is a volume of recollections by Ilya Zemtsov, formerly a professor of sociology at the Lenin Institute in Baku and a party official in Azerbaydzhan.[6] Zemtsov emigrated to Israel in 1973.

The last important circumstance one ought to consider is implied by Robert Wesson's book (although his volume is less directly responsive to contemporary politics than that of Revel): the recent renewal of interest in Marxism and the various neo-Marxisms in American universities and in American intellectual life generally. How is it, Wesson in effect asks, that the demystification of a failed theory is once again necessary? This question, in fact, flows out of a more fundamental concern. Is the present American interest in socialist theory and political "Eurocommunism" an optimistic futurology, an anachronism, an intellectual amusement; or is it, rather, "the desertion of the intellectuals," another manifestation of an ineluctable Western spiritual and moral decline?

In short, then, Atlantic political elites are faced with a changing and increasingly complex political environment in which the old lines of battle no longer seem as clear-cut as they did only a few years ago—an environment, moreover, in which the stakes of the game have risen considerably. The most immediate question marks, obviously, have to do with Italy and France, but in the longer term the uncertainties may extend to a much broader area, perhaps even ultimately transcending Western Europe and embracing Eastern Europe as well. If, for example, the West European Communist parties have "really changed," or are at least in the process of really changing, the possibilities are enormous: a reconstruction of political legitimacy and a revival of progressive policy in Western Europe, a serious weakening of the USSR's international power position, and—most ambiguous yet potentially most significant—the possibility of the development of autonomous trends in Eastern Europe which the Soviets cannot control. But if the West European CP's, after raising massive expectations, finally reject national reconciliation, the result would likely be a disaster of substantial proportions. At worst, it could involve the collapse of one or more West European nations, the disaggregation of the European Community, and dissolution of the Atlantic community of values, and thus lead to the "finlandization" of Western Europe and to the isola-

[3] Hedrick Smith, *The Russians,* New York, NY, Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1976; Robert Kaiser, *Russia: The People and the Power,* New York, NY, Atheneum, 1975.

[4] New York, NY, Viking Press, 1976.

[5] *La chute finale* (The Final Fall), Paris, Robert Laffont, 1976.

[6] *Parti et trafiquants—La corruption en Union soviétique* (The Party and Traffickers—Corruption in the Soviet Union), Paris, Hachette, 1976.

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tion of the United States in world politics.

WHAT IS to be done? Jean-François Revel and Robert Wesson warn us that continuing socialist and communist doctrinairism remains an expression at once of an incredible epistemological naiveté and of an incorrigible political cynicism. The authors conclude that socialism is attractive mainly to the politically stupid, or to those possessed by suicidal impulses.

Both the Revel and Wesson books, as Aron's of two decades ago, are not so much attacks on the Communists or Marxist-Leninists themselves (because they are perceived as hopeless), but rather, to use Aron's term, critiques of the *communisants*—a label that is anything but unambiguous. In the United States, where the Communist Party has only the most marginal importance, the target would be those liberals, progressives, or—in contemporary language—radical-liberals whose passion against inequality makes them susceptible to the doctrine, or at least the mood, of Marxism and leads them to criticize what they regard as America's imperial role, a position which is said to render them "objective" allies of America's adversaries. In Europe, the group concerned might be called, with almost equal vagueness, the "non-communist Left"—socialists of various persuasions (both to the right and to the left of a given CP), Christian progressives, and even certain lay liberal groups that historically have "worn their heart on the left and their wallet on the right." At its most specific, as in Revel's book, the criticism centers today on the French Socialist Party (PS), currently the West European party whose destiny is most closely linked with that of a Communist party. The PS is allied with the French Communist Party (PCF) in a "union of the left" whose joint program —signed in June 1972 and supposed to be the course of policy if the alliance wins power in 1978 —calls for transforming France into a socialist society. This coalition (which also includes the splinter Movement of Leftwing Radicals, an example of the lay liberal sympathizer groups referred to above) poses once again, with the most direct potential consequences, Raymond Aron's question of 20 years ago: Is this but another example of the "inexhaustible naiveté of the socialists, fated to end up in concentration camps under every sort of regime?" [7]

Taking Revel and Wesson as references, one would conclude that psychologism—the attempted reduction of society and politics to subjective motivations—is a feasible, necessary, and for most purposes sufficient methodology for coming up with the answer. However, such a proposition is by no means self-evident.

In *The Open Society and Its Enemies,* for example, Karl Popper argued that the acceptance of Marxism and its millenarian historicism was a mistake on the part of "intelligent people," but an honest mistake based on a defective understanding of scientific method and of epistemology.[8] Aron, writing in the midst of an earlier renewal of French interest in Marxism, changed this empnasis somewhat, maintaining that "the loyalty alternately granted to and withheld from these doctrines by the writers and men of learning of free Europe is due more to the unhappy state of the Western conscience than to reasoning about the concepts of class or dialectics." Thus, Aron, at the end of his book, claimed a certain partial truth for psychological reduction, depicting belief in Marxism as often "a sort of escapism." [9]

Wesson and Revel, on the other hand, take psychological reduction as, more or less, a general theory of an almost clinical pathology. Wesson begins by telling us that Marxism is accepted because its doctrines "fulfill more or less irrational political and psychological needs" (p. vi). And the very title of Revel's book suggets his view that those who play around with Marxism and alliance with the CP are basically intellectual adolescents who cannot surmount the temptation of poisoned candy. Neither writer, it is important to bear in mind, is talking about the rank-and-file voter or party militant, whose outlooks received broadly similar interpretation in Gabriel Almond's *The Appeals of Communism* [10] and Hadley Cantril's *The Politics of Despair.*[11] Nor does either author have "Jean Dupont," the French common man, as his frame of reference. Rather, both are speaking of the political and intellectual leadership of the non-Communist Left in France and, to an increasing extent, elsewhere in Western Europe—including, for example, Willy Brandt, Bruno Kreisky, and Olaf Palme. More-

[7] *Opium of the Intellectuals,* p. 271.
[8] *The Open Society and Its Enemies,* 5th rev. ed., Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, Vol. 2, p. 82.
[9] *Opium of the Intellectuals,* pp. x, 292.
[10] Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1954.
[11] New York, NY, Basic Books, 1958.

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over, Wesson's and Revel's interpretations are not the understandably exaggerated ones of a period of cold war, but are the outgrowth of the present period of détente and disillusion.

AT THE OUTSET, it should be said that both the Wesson and Revel books are absorbing polemics which are sometimes quite brilliant in their exposition, although neither should cause *The Opium of the Intellectuals* to go out of print. Of the two, Revel's *La tentation,* while less methodically organized, is the more successful, simply because, in comparison with the style of this typically Parisian journalist-intellectual-professor, the prose of Robert Wesson reads more like the catalogue of some provincial ready-to-wear house. Moreover, the nature of Revel's personal situation necessarily issues, one would think, in a more powerful and more immediate explosiveness.

Perhaps because of his closer proximity to the history and traditions of Marxist-influenced politics in Europe, Revel is less total in his condemnation of Marx than is Wesson. Professor Wesson, for example, implies that Alfred G. Meyer or even "such a non-Marxist as Zbigniew Brzezinski" has been too loose in certain parsimonious praise of Marx's influence on the development of the social sciences (p. 182). This list might also include Karl Popper—whose critique of Marxism in *The Open Society and Its Enemies* was considered by Isaiah Berlin, as is well known, to be the most devastating of all—for Popper is the probable source [12] of Meyer's often cited statement that in the social sciences "we are all Marxists whether we know it or not . . ." (quoted in Wesson on p. 182).

Wesson feels able to write that "Marx took delight in violence and exhorted his party [sic] to take the lead in 'popular vengeance' " (p. 25), that "it is probably justified to say that 'neither Marx nor Engels was interested in the poor as such' " (p. 33), and that "Marx . . . preferred that children be explcited, in the hope that they would become better revolutionaries" (p. 33). To be sure, in these specific instances Wesson is quoting or paraphrasing others (the first reference derives from Max Nomad, *Apostles of Revolution* [1961]; the second comes from Alexander Gray, *The Socialist Tradition: Moses to Lenin* [1946]; the third is a mistaken inference from Marx's "Critique of the Gotha Program"). But that is symptomatic of one of the central weaknesses in Wesson's essay as a whole: all the footnotes are simple page citations, mainly to secondary sources. In terms of the book's structure, Wesson's argument would seem to be essentially an anthology of quotations and judgments representing a given point of view. There is in the footnotes no nuance or evidence of scholarly agreement, disagreement, or even debate, and only flashes of such in the text itself.

Jean-François Revel has a ready excuse for the same kind of product. In one of his many masks, Revel is a journalist for *L'Express,* and however much pamphleteering may be distasteful to the doctor of philosophy (he is that as well), the convenient French rule of thumb that one must "live one's contradictions" obtains with his present book as it did earlier with *Neither Marx nor Jesus,*[13] his international best-seller of a few years ago. For all this, Revel's book is on the whole more complex and in an important way less condescending in tone than is *Why Marxism?.*

To begin with, Revel is out to devastate the non-Communist Left despite the fact that, or perhaps because, it is his own spiritual stamping ground. Indeed, he himself espouses a vague socialism-for-tomorrow attached to an ardent defense of capitalism today, which he justifies, to paraphrase Churchill, as the worst existing system except all the others.

Revel, as opposed to "pseudo-socialists throughout the world" (p. 355) who are obsessed with redefining a term already buried alive in definitions and who thereby signify they "don't have the intention of putting [any definition] into practice" (p. 11), proposes a socialism which claims to be both an objective forecast and a morally better organization of society. He holds that the world is objectively evolving toward socialism in the sense that "the pattern of world *needs* pleads forcefully in favor of an economy organized on a worldwide scale, by a political institution adapted to this global administration, in the interest of humanity as a whole (a concept which has ceased to be theoretically stupid), and with the greatest possible equality" (p. 17).

In a brilliant insight, or at least a brilliant phrase, Revel argues that "the principal obstacle to socialism is not capitalism but communism" (p. 11). Communism has been historically counterrevolutionary in that it has diverted the liberal capitalist so-

[12] *The Open Society and Its Enemies,* Vol. 2, p. 82.

[13] *Neither Marx nor Jesus,* New York, NY, Dell, 1974.

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cieties from a path which would otherwise have led toward democratic socialism through reform ("one cannot conceive of any other way to democratic socialism than reformist"—p. 360). Therefore, if the authentic socialist forces want to regain the initiative today, they must give up the error of believing that communism is a form of socialism and "get rid of the idea that communism is a part of the Left" (p. 357). There can be no reformist or liberal communism, says Revel, because there is no other form of communism than Stalinism. In fact, in his view,

Stalinism is the essence of communism. That which varies is not the Stalinist system; it is the degree of rigor with which it is applied. One cannot shoot or imprison everyone all the time. (pp. 28-29)

A "non-Stalinist Communist regime has never existed and does not exist" (p. 29).

In the specifically French context, Revel's preoccupation is in effect to persuade the Socialist Party leaders and the supporters of the non-Communist Left in the general public that alliance with the Communist Party is a mistake of historic proportions. Few observers, it is true, including Revel, any longer choose to argue the threat of a Communist "takeover." Rather, the fear is that a leftwing government attempting to implement a doctrinaire strategy for creating socialism would produce first an economic and financial, then quickly a global social and political tragedy which would make the French—as Alexis de Tocqueville put it—once again surprised at what they have done.

CHANGES IN the West European Communist parties are the subject of much ink and paper these days, and rightly so. Less well studied, but also of crucial importance, are developments having to do with those political forces with whom the French, Italian, and Spanish Communists may ally.

Wesson, for instance, discusses the alliances of the non-ruling CP's today in a rather passing and offhand few pages at the end of his book (pp. 246-51). Yet his subtitle indicates a concern with the present, and one wonders why he is in fact not more exercised than he is by real political developments in the last decade.

Revel, though he speaks above all regarding the situation in France, treats the general concern of *Why Marxism?* as well, beginning with the provocative question: "Does there exist in us a desire to be governed in a totalitarian way?" (p. 22). That is, do we have "an unacknowledged desire to live in the Stalinist system" (p. 24)? This, he argues, must be the explanation for the Socialist Party's decision to ally with the Communist Party —not a desire for power (that would, after all, suggest an opposite course) and not any significant changes on the part of the Communists. Regarding the latter point, he says:

. . . nothing in the history of Communist regimes permits us to point to the least beginning of an innate tendency to liberalization, just as one has never seen the Communist parties installed in the pluralist democracies detach themselves from Stalinist methods and organization, to such an extent and for such a length of time, that one could speak of metamorphosis. (p. 51)

The greatest Socialist anxiety, he asserts, is to avoid appearing anti-Communist (and thus anti-revolutionary and anti-socialist, since the Communists are the only "socialists" to have actually made a revolution and transformed a society, even if the result has not been "authentic" socialism). Because of this inferiority complex, the Socialists tend to appease the CP's to the point of an "intellectual deafness" which leads them to "a pure and simple rally to Stalinism, thus the suicide of liberal socialism as such" (p. 84).

Even the Italian Communists, generally considered much more destalinized than the French, are not the source of a shadow of a doubt in Revel's mind: ". . . it is well known [that they] can permit themselves to be more tolerant than, for example, the French, because they are more numerous and their chance of gaining power democratically is a realistic one" (p. 28). In the French case, Revel believes that the Socialists got hoodwinked into important concessions in the negotiations for a joint program—acceptance of a policy of large-scale nationalization, of a non-aligned foreign policy as at least the ultimate goal, and, most generally, of the doctrine that "socialism is a higher stage of history." The French Communists, insists Revel, remain absolutely Stalinist despite anything they have so far said or done, as demonstrated by the lack of success that the Socialists have had in trying to force them to renounce "certain totalitarian methods of discussion and action" while in the opposition (p. 54). How then, he asks, can they

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expect to control the CP once in power, when the efficiency of its organization will be magnified by the capacity to manipulate state power?

THERE ARE two central problems with Revel's argument, and with the sense or tone of the two books in general. First, even though Alvaro Cunhal, the head of the Portuguese Communist Party, may harbor romantic revolutionary illusions, it is hardly imaginable today, for all kinds of reasons, that Communist parties will seek to, or in any case would be able to, "take over" state power in Italy, in France, or even in Spain. The political evolution of these countries is simply unlikely to lead to the kind of showdown which materialized in post-April 1974 Portugal both because of underdevelopment and because of political ineptness by all elements. To be sure, we should not exclude the possibility of the unlikely. Moreover, if all that one could say in favor of a more open-minded yet noncomplaisant attitude toward the West European Communist parties were that, no matter what they are or what they want, it is strategically impossible for them to seize the state, the argument would be significantly less than compelling. However, there is more to be said.

In this writer's view—and in that of too many other observers to begin to mention here (many of whom have written in this journal)—Revel also errs in his blanket denial that the West European (and the Japanese) CP's have evolved at all, that "it is only a matter of variations of weak amplitude, which do not modify in any way the principles of the system" (pp. 51-52). The lack of unity at the June 1976 Conference of European Communist Parties in East Berlin was no surprise to those who have followed developments within the international Communist movement. More than ever before, the disagreements between the Soviet-aligned and the "autonomist" parties regarding strategic, organizational, and even certain political-moral principles revealed the extent of heterogeneity among the CP's. Moscow's extraordinary efforts to put the international house back in order are themselves evidence of the genuineness of the disorder.

When assessing the character of the West European Communist parties, it is essential to avoid straw-man arguments while not at the same time allowing the goal of lucidity to inspire new illusions. Yet Revel relies fundamentally on such an argument. His fabrication of the straw-man is accomplished not so much with a selective use of data as with a bit of rhetorical legerdemain. The Communists, he maintains,

. . . would be inconsistent if they did not seek the next logical stage: after becoming one of the parties in power, to eliminate the other parties. If they did not have this goal, they would have become converted to social democracy. The Communist goal is the taking of power by the Communist Party. (p. 28)

As stated, Revel's argument is tautological: the Communists (Stalinists) cannot be anything but Communists (Stalinists) so long as they are Communists (Stalinists). Otherwise, they would be social democrats. In short, everything is in a name.

This juggling of labels eschews any extended empirical analysis, offering instead a divination of what a Communist party *is* and, by virtue of its "essence," always *must be*. To point up the error, it is useful to bear in mind Karl Popper's teaching that definitions should be read from right to left since the left-hand "label" is but shorthand for the right-side, long-hand description, which is the definition itself. The plain fact is that the right-side, long-hand definition of nonruling Communist parties is today much more complex than it once was. Indeed, it is questionable whether one can any longer speak of "a" definition. This is readily apparent when one analyzes the problem of whether X or Y party is still "Leninist," *i.e.*, of whether the label still fits the garment.

Moreover, an obsessive concern with labels as such can easily send even a serious attempt at empirical analysis off into an essentialist cul-de-sac. To insist that there can be, *in essence*, only one kind of Communist party, or that a revised communism is necessarily social democracy, is both an epistemological and an empirical error. More and more today, there is visible diversity among Communist parties, even though we as yet have no adequate labels for those parties which deviate from traditional lines. ("Eurocommunism," *e.g.*, is inadequate at least in terms of geography, degree of institutionalization, and present alliance tactics). While this lack of a satisfactory label may distress those with an excessive passion for terminological tidiness, it should not obscure the emergence of new phenomena.

Let us be absolutely clear about how tricky the problem of names is. Some observers have argued that it would be of great significance, for example, should the "autonomous" West European CP's

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adopt a new designation for themselves—*e.g.*, "Independent Communist Parties." Yet often these same people would deny that the PCF's recent abandonment of the doctrine of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" has any significance, citing the same action by the unrepentant Portuguese CP in 1974. Is the name then everything or nothing? Obviously, it depends. Other observers have argued that even if the Communists have changed, they are still not social democrats or liberal socialists. This not only may be true but also may constitute an argument against Communist participation in West European national governments. However, it does not answer in any empirico-analytical manner the question of what these parties are today.

The contemporary evolution of politics in Latin Europe is too authentic, too complex, and too liable to catastrophe for the reductionist-essentialist view of Communism and Socialism to continue to find proponents. Those who wish to protect precisely those values which Jean-François Revel and Robert Wesson wish to protect have a vested interest as well as a social-scientific interest in looking a little more closely at the trees and imagining a little less what the forest "must be like." It is obviously impossible to say exactly what extent and what duration of change would allow one to conclude an irreversible metamorphosis in the West European Left. And is it not finally the case that one can learn the answer only *in practice?* This is not to suggest that politicians ought to take stupid risks because "that's the only way to find out"; rather, the point is simply that, while the data remain inconclusive, there is enough evidence now to warrant a hard new look at what is going on. And a noncomplaisant openmindedness would be all the more desirable in that its opposite looks suspiciously like a self-fulfilling prophecy.

One may well regret the history of large doctrinaire-sectarian left-wing movements in liberal democracies. Yet one must also recognize that any liberalism which finds its most convinced expression in polemical dogmatism inevitably nurtures the very social and intellectual conditions in which it is eventually bound to wither.

However powerful the psychological reductionist explanation of the continuing attraction of socialism as an ideal—and there is no disputing its partial validity—it has always been a gross exaggeration as a general theory. Popper's analysis of the epistemological errors of Marxist historicism and Aron's focus on the generalized dissatisfaction with advanced industrial civilization remain, despite the lapse of time, both more accurate and more generous explanations of the persistent appeal of socialism than the Revel-Wesson one of suicidal intellectual ninnyism.

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Socialist Science Policy

By Richard P. Suttmeier

BOEL BERNER. *China's Science Through Visitors' Eyes.* Lund, Sweden, University of Lund Research Policy Program, 1975.
GENEVIEVE C. DEAN. *Science and Technology in the Development of Modern China: An Annotated Bibliography.* London, Mansell, 1974.
MOSE L. HARVEY *et al. Science and Technology as an Instrument of Soviet Policy.* Miami, FL, University of Miami Center for Advanced International Studies, 1972.
DAVID H. KRAUS *et al. National Science Information Systems: A Guide to Science Information Systems in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia.* Cambridge, MA, The M.I.T. Press, 1972.
LINDA L. LUBRANO. *Soviet Sociology of Science.* Columbus, OH, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1976.

A RECENT addition to the list of professional societies in the United States is the Society for Social Studies of Science (4S), founded in August 1975. The establishment of the 4S was an effort to bring the advantages of formal organization to the field of "science studies"—an intellectual movement concerned with the systematic study of the many aspects of modern science and technology. This movement is worldwide and has been an important feature of intellectual life since World War II. Although concern about the relationship between science and society clearly antedates World War II, the number of systematic inquiries into the realm of inquiry itself has since grown markedly as societies have become increasingly self-conscious and reflective about their own intellectual activities and the practical applications of them. In particular, there has been a growing perception of the enormous importance of science and technology for economic and political life in the modern world.

Efforts at understanding this important matter, not surprisingly, have reflected the perspectives of a number of established academic disciplines. Thus, "science studies" has variously encompassed work in the history of science, the philosophy of science, the sociology of science, the area of "science, technology, and public policy," the economics of research and development and of technical innovation, the management of research and innovation, the psychology of creativity, as well as in emerging disciplines such as information science. In short, "science studies" has been a label of convenience—less the name of a field and more a collective term for inquiries with a variety of conceptual and methodological approaches to the many aspects of modern science and technology. If these assorted activities are to constitute a distinct field of "science studies," there must be more integrating concepts and more work that is sensitive to cross-national and cross-cultural variation.

The works under review here—all of them about science in Communist societies—give evidence of the differing approaches to science studies existing today in the West. Of the authors, Boel Berner, Genevieve Dean, and Linda Lubrano appear most aware of the wider possibilities of "science studies" as a distinct field of research.

BERNER'S SHORT study of science in China was done at one of Europe's better-known centers for science studies, the Research Policy Program at Sweden's University of Lund. The work is exploratory in intent and conceptually rooted in sociology and political science.

Berner saw in the increasing number of Western scientists going to China since 1970 a potentially useful source of survey information on Chinese scientific development. He identified 305 professionals in the medical, na-

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tural, and technological sciences who had recently visited China, and sent them a comprehensive questionnaire. The present study reports the data from the 52 percent who responded.

Berner's questionnaire sought information on relations between science and society in China, human and material resources for research, scientific communication, the quality of Chinese research, the future of Chinese science, and the relevance of China as a "model" for other science systems. In an effort to control for biases, he utilized responses to the "China as model" questions to categorize the respondents as "enthusiastics," "critics," "realists," or "indifferents." Analysis of responses to the remaining questions was organized around this typology of respondents.

The information produced by Berner's study is not particularly new. Much of it can be found in trip reports and in primary material from China. Nevertheless, this study does serve to aggregate scattered impressions, and it occasionally sheds new light on ambiguous issues, such as the social status of the Chinese scientist.

The appeal of Berner's work is in the approach taken—the ambitious attempt to track down and query recent visitors—and in the quality of the questions asked. However, there is a problem in this approach, as employed by Berner, namely, his inability to control for the times and places of visits. All the visits took place sometime between spring 1971 and autumn 1974, and while this was a relatively stable period for science, it nevertheless witnessed a number of organizational and political perturbations as China sought to revamp her science system after the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, as reports of visitors indicate, the conduct of research and other science-related activities can vary from place to place in China at any given time. Berner is not sufficiently sensitive to these factors in his analysis.

One would also suggest that Berner refine his survey instrument and make it available to Western scientific visitors *before* they go to China. Then, perhaps, one could expect more consistent reporting and the reduction of some of the ambiguity surrounding Berner's use of the fourfold categorization of respondents. However, even in its present form Berner's study is worthwhile pretrip reading.

DEAN'S BIBLIOGRAPHIC study arose from the activities of another European science studies center, the Science Policy Research Unit of the University of Sussex. Her study was originally prepared for a conference on China's science and technology, held at Sussex in January 1972, and tends to reflect the approaches the Unit takes to issues of science, technology, and development. These are based on beliefs that "an important source of economic growth is the substitution of more efficient for less efficient technologies of production," and that "modern science and the methods of scientific research and experimental development are universally valid sources of new technologies and technological improvements." Much of the bibliography, therefore, is concerned with science, technology, and the economy. However, issues of science policy (and its politics) and the social relations of science are not ignored.

Dean's bibliography is unquestionably the most comprehensive work of its kind. Although it does not cover primary material, except for trip reports, it contains numerous entries from languages other than English, including more than 900 works in Danish, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Spanish, and Swedish. There is also a particularly useful survey of the important Japanese literature on the subject. Unfortunately, in covering these languages, the bibliography provides no guidance as to publishers or places of publication of the entries.

Another strength of this volume is the set of preliminary essays Dean provides at the outset and at the beginning of its main sections on "Technology Policy," "Scientific Activities," and "Technology in China." These serve to introduce China specialists to the concepts of "science, technology, and development." Typically, Dean's essays conclude with excellent questions about the subtopics being introduced. It is a measure of the state of science studies as currently applied to science in China that these generally cannot be answered by the entries which follow.

An unanticipated benefit of the bibliography is the coverage it gives in the appendices to historical materials dealing with modern science in China before 1949 and with traditional Chinese science. One welcomes in particular the comprehensive listing of Joseph Needham's many writings.

Unfortunately, the breadth of the bibliography comes at some expense. One who works with many of the sources listed will recognize that they vary greatly in quality. Understandably, given the original purpose of surveying the field for a "state of the art" report to a conference, the au-

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thor's net was spread wide. For the published version of the work, however, more discrimination as to what should be included—or, alternatively, more critical annotations—would have been desirable.

There is also a problem with the currency of the bibliography. Many of the entries were published in the 1950's and early 1960's, and a number of these were already dated when the bibliography was published in 1974. Moreover, interest in studies of Chinese science has only recently reached a significant level, thus expanding the pitifully small number of individuals (which of course included Ms. Dean) systematically studying Chinese science and technology. And the number of Western science delegations to China is increasing as well. It is not surprising, then, that since 1974 studies with better information and more sophisticated analysis than is found in many of Dean's entries have appeared.[1] This fact notwithstanding, *Science and Technology in the Development of Modern China* remains an important reference tool, one not to be ignored by the serious scholar.

YET ANOTHER approach to science studies is found in *Science and Technology as an Instrument of Soviet Policy*, a work which is two thirds analysis and one third documentary survey. As the title of the book suggests, this study falls generally into the "science, technology, and public policy" genre. The analytical part is divided into sections dealing with the perceptions of Soviet leaders of the role of science and technology in the "struggle between systems," with issues of effectiveness in the performance of research and development, with expenditures on science and technology, with the search for optimization of the organization and administration of research, and with the acquisition and dissemination of information from abroad.

Although the study does not add measurably to our knowledge and impressions of the Soviet science system and of the problems of Soviet science policy, it does summarize these nicely. It also makes available in English many articles and documents reflecting official Soviet thinking on science and technology. These confirm impressions that the Soviet government and Communist Party have a high regard for science and technology, and that their interest stems from the belief that science contributes to military strength and economic growth. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that Soviet leaders have been unhappy with the performance of the science system and have felt that organizational and administrative adjustments could bring the system's performance closer to expectations.

Unfortunately, the analytical part of the book is not as analytical as it might be. The authors discuss and summarize their documents, but do not pose the critical questions that would expand our understanding of Soviet science policy. The result is that, although they part company with the documents from a philosophical standpoint, they are quite in step with them conceptually. For example, both the documents and the authors largely ignore the political and economic constraints on science policy (there must be some), as well as the policy process itself. In addition, they pay insufficient specific attention to the content of policy, particularly its more specific priorities, and to the relationship of these priorities (and changes in them) to organizational change over time. In this regard, the authors' discussion would have benefited from reference to recent science policy problems in other industrialized nations. The documents certainly reflect the fact that Soviet policy-makers and administrators share many problems with their counterparts elsewhere in the industrialized world.

To this student of Chinese science policy, there is a special interest in the discussion of performance versus expectations in the USSR, since so much of China's scientific development has been characterized by political interventions and organizational change aimed at improving performance. Soviet concerns about the performance of research focus on two problems. First, Soviet leaders are dissatisfied with the productivity of Soviet research and believe it is lower than productivity in the US. Second, they perceive the linkages between research and production to be inadequately developed. As a result, expected gains in economic progress from investment in R&D are not realized. The Soviet response, according to au-

[1] See, for instance, Hans Heymann, Jr., "Acquisition and Diffusion of Technology in China," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1975, pp. 678-729; National Academy of Sciences, *Plant Studies in the People's Republic of China: A Trip Report of the American Plant Studies Delegation*, Washington, DC, 1975; US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology, *Science in China and U.S.-China Scientific Exchanges: Assessment and Prospects*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1976.

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thors Mose Harvey *et al.*, is to search for rationalizing solutions to organizational and administrative problems. The authors focus on the strengthening of control over research by primary party organizations (PPO's) after the 24th CPSU Congress as the "ultimate device of control and management." Again, however, the shallowness of the analysis leaves the reader uncertain as to what the actual consequences of this change are. One wonders what kinds of people make up the PPO's, what the details of the managerial tasks are, and whether there is variation in the management as the nature of the work being managed varies. Of greater interest than the discussion of actual reform is the authors' documentation of the rise of Soviet analysis and debate on reform and rationalization (a subject which, as we shall see later, also occupies Lubrano's attention).

Rationalization is likewise a theme of *National Science Information Systems,* written by David Kraus *et al.* Each of the six East European countries studied—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia—views science information systems as necessary for the rationalization of its research and development and of its economy. The science information systems themselves, however, become objects of attempts at rationalization. Interestingly, such rationalization need not mean centralization; in fact, as the authors show, there has been a change in all six countries from centrally controlled and supported systems to ones having more decentralized control and greater local self-sufficiency.

Although much of *National Science Information Systems* is a directory of the names, addresses, and publications of the information centers in each country, it contains an instructive leading essay which summarizes the volume and which provides a comparative analysis of the development of East European information systems. Furthermore, as an introduction to the directory for each country there is an essay on the evolution of the information system of that country. Thus, the work does provide data for the student of science studies, as well as a useful guide for those with more specialized interest in information systems.

WITH LUBRANO's excellent survey of *Soviet Sociology of Science,* we close the circle on our discussion that began with the growth in science studies in the US, looked at various approaches and reference tools for the study of science in China, and identified efforts to rationalize scientific endeavor in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As Harvey *et al.* show, underlying the Soviet efforts at administrative rationalization is a concern for understanding what rationalization entails. A source of such understanding is a group of scholars and administrators in the USSR concerned with science studies. These people and their writings are the objects of Ms. Lubrano's study.

Although the title suggests a somewhat narrow focus, Lubrano skillfully locates sociology of science within the wider context of "*naukovedeniye*," a Russian term roughly comparable to what has been referred to here as "science studies." As with science studies, *naukovedeniye* originated in the history of science, but has become multidisciplinary. The first part of Lubrano's study, then, explores the question of *naukovedeniye* as a field of study and discusses institutions for research on *naukovedeniye* in the Soviet Union.

The second part of the study deals more specifically with sociology of science. It explores the definitions of "science" used in the USSR, Soviet conceptions of science as a social system, the social-psychological aspects of research, the organization and management of research, and Soviet views on the social consequences of modern science and technology. Lubrano, in short, provides an important overview, in the Soviet setting, of the major questions before Western students of science studies.

The commonality of the questions, the familiarity of the concepts to the Western reader, and the generally non-polemical nature of Soviet science studies suggest the possibility of East-West discourse and collaboration in this field. One of Lubrano's purposes was to bring this literature to the attention of the Western, non-Soviet specialist. This she has done admirably.

Why, one might ask, would the Western scholar be interested in the Soviet literature? In the first place, Soviet scholars have seriously studied (and in fact in many cases were inspired by) the works of such Western students of science as J. D. Bernal, Derek de Solla Price, Donald Pelz, and Frank Andrews. More to the point, on the basis of these studies they have criticized many of the conceptual foundations of Western science studies. The Western scholar concerned about the foundations of his own inquiry will want to consider these critiques.

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Second, although Marxist science studies have ambiguities and certain conceptual limitations, they are broad in scope and show more connections among the economy, the polity, and science than most Western formulations. A suitable conceptual integration of science studies in the West will require macro-theoretical formulations which match or surpass the Marxist ones in breadth and logical integration. It is clear from Lubrano's work that Soviet authors have retained such daring macro-formulations in keeping with the Marxist tradition even as they depart from strict Marxism in the content of their studies (for instance, in breaking from narrowly conceived class-based analyses of social structure).

Finally, Soviet science studies deserve the attention of Western scholars because, just as in the West, the studies have an effect on policy-making. Unfortunately, neither the volume written by Harvey *et al.* nor the Lubrano study fully elucidates the extent to which Soviet science studies are linked to policy. Indeed, it may be too much at present to ask that they define the linkage. One suspects, however, that the trend is toward a closer relationship between analysis and policy, just as in the West. What this suggests is that practitioners of science studies must realize that they are both observers of and actors in the science systems they seek to understand. This important issue of reflexivity warrants some consideration in comparative terms.

AT THE START of this review, it was observed that science studies lack a common conceptual framework. A broad formulation of the development of science-society relations might serve as a first step toward establishing that framework. Such a formulation could serve to identify possibilities for integrating the knowledge produced by the kinds of specialized approaches represented in the disparate works under review into a common body of knowledge.

A comparative perspective on science studies suggests that the multiple interactions of science and society in the modern world have occurred in identifiable stages. The first is characterized by a low level of science-society analysis and a high level of centralized mobilization of resources for scientific advances. "Science" takes on ideological significance as the desired direction of cultural evolution. The second stage, while still characterized by high levels of resource mobilization, is an age of analysis, assessment, and organizational adjustment as societies seek to improve the performance of research and cope with the unexpected consequences of the "scientific-technological revolution" (to use a favorite term of the Soviet writers). "Science" has become the dominant cultural value, and technology has expanded the options for action. Thus, the second stage provides both the *raison d'être* of science studies and, eventually, is partially the product of them. Since science and its attendant instrumental values are dominant, the actual process of directing those actions that have become possible as a result of scientific - technological development is confused. Choice tends to be hindered by the multiplicity of options and the dominance of instrumental values. Science studies are then invoked to clarify matters, and the very invocation may serve to enhance the social and political positions of the analyst.

How consistent with this formulation are the perspectives of the works reviewed here? For Harvey and his fellow authors, one suspects the answer is, "Not very." Were their interpretations closer to the above formulation, science and technology would be seen as emerging determinants of Soviet policy, rather than as instruments of it. On the other hand, if one deemphasizes their analysis, which lacks comparative and historical perspectives, and focuses instead on the documents they present, that initial answer seems less troubling. When considered in a wider context, the interesting information they present (which complements Lubrano's more specific study) could be interpreted as symptomatic of the beginning of the transition to the second of the stages which were hypothesized above.

What of China? The two-stage formulation offered here is not incompatible with the organizing concepts of Dean's bibliography. Dean might accept the formulation and simply place China in the first stage. Again, however, failure to ask the right comparative and historical questions may mean that one fails to detect China's passage beyond the first stage. Dean's work, of course, *is* comparative and historical, but her perspectives are from the established "development" literature, a literature conspicuously silent on the problems of science and society in the advanced industrial nations. In contrast, Chinese leaders concerned with issues of science and society do show awareness of science-engendered problems in "second-stage" so-

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cieties. They seem prepared to alter their own course of development accordingly.[2] It would be unfortunate if those engaged in science studies should overlook these important dimensions of the Chinese case.

On a *prima facie* basis then, it does seem possible to achieve some integration of the disparate works reviewed here. These studies all provide useful information, and, through different approaches, give insight into problems of science, technology, and society. They suggest that the coalescence of a field of comparative science studies is both possible and imminent. At the same time, they illustrate that such a field will require more conceptual structure than now exists. Finally, these works indicate that those who would help design that structure will find food for thought both in actual science-related phenomena in socialist systems and in the science studies being conducted there.

[2] For instance, the Chinese have been concerned with the alienation of the ordinary citizen by scientific progress and the alienating effects of technology-inspired division of labor. The encouragement of worker participation in the management of technology, even at the cost of slowing technological progress, can be thought of as an attempt to alter the pattern of development in the first stage to prepare for problems anticipated in the second.

Indo-Soviet Relations in Perspective

By Richard D. Remnek

NIRMALA JOSHI. *Foundations of Indo-Soviet Relations: A Study of Non-Official Attitudes and Contacts, 1917-1947.* New Delhi, Radiant Publishers, 1975.
ROBERT H. DONALDSON. *Soviet Policy Towards India: Ideology and Strategy.* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1974.
G. W. CHOUDHURY. *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent.* New York, NY, The Free Press, 1975.
M. SEBASTIAN STANISLAUS. *Soviet Economic Aid to India.* New Delhi, N. V. Publications, 1975.
MICHAEL KIDRON. *Pakistan's Trade With Eastern Bloc Countries.* New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1972.

IN WHAT MUST BE considered a major setback for Soviet foreign policy, three decades of rule by the Indian National Congress ended abruptly in March 1977, when the electorate in India voted the Janata (People's) coalition party into power. Throughout the period before the election, Moscow had vilified the coalition and its leadership as a "direct tool of extreme reaction, a defender of the interests of landlords, usurers, local and foreign monopolies."[1] The Kremlin was given good reason for concern when the new Prime Minister Morarji Desai, who had been a prime target of the Soviet attack, announced at his first news conference that India would steer a course toward "proper nonalignment," without maintaining special relations with any country—remarks which might have seemed a forewarning of the dissolution of the close Indo-Soviet ties that Moscow had assiduously cultivated for over two decades. While there have been subsequent announcements (*e.g.*, by India's acting President B. D. Jatti) that the new government would honor all commitments of its predecessor and would assure continuity in India's foreign policy, the Soviets must nonetheless be wondering whether the ascendance of what they labeled a right-wing bloc would bring significant changes not only in India's domestic policies but eventually in its foreign policy.

At this potentially momentous juncture, the review of five recent

[1] *Pravda* (Moscow), March 12, 1977, p. 5.

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books dealing with various aspects of Soviet policy toward the Indian subcontinent provides an opportunity to explore some of the basic wellsprings of Indo-Soviet relations as a clue to what may lie ahead.

EVEN THOUGH Indo-Soviet cordiality can properly be considered a post-Stalin phenomenon, the prehistory of this friendship—which is the main subject of Nirmala Joshi's book and is also covered in Robert H. Donaldson's and G. W. Choudhury's works—provides important background against which present relations between the two countries can be better evaluated and understood. In his valuable exegesis of Soviet policy toward India, Donaldson notes that during and after the Indians' long struggle for independence (finally achieved in 1947), the Stalinist attitude with respect to Indian nationalism was to subordinate it to more urgent foreign policy concerns in Europe. Whereas in earlier decades both the Tsars and the Bolsheviks may have viewed India as the "weakest link" in the British imperial chain, Donaldson aptly observes that Stalin lost interest in promoting Asian nationalism after burning his (or rather, the Chinese Communists') fingers in Shanghai as a result of Chiang Kai-shek's treachery.[2] The Soviet attitude had a decidedly adverse impact on the Communist Party of India (CPI): when the CPI was not under orders to pursue self-defeating antinational policies (*e.g.*, to support the British war effort during World War II), it was left to flounder without much needed central direction from Moscow. The influence of external factors also explains why Moscow was unable to recognize the significance of India's independence when it occurred. In line with Stalin's general withdrawal to positions of belligerent isolationism in the late 1940's, the new India government was looked upon with suspicion as a kind of semi-colony, even though there was nothing in Jawaharlal Nehru's foreign policy of nonalignment which could have given offense to Moscow at the time.

Nirmala Joshi's study effectively shows that during the earlier struggle for independence, Indian nationalists such as Nehru never took the "Russian menace to the north" as anything more than a British ploy to preserve British hegemony in India. The Bolshevik Revolution was viewed with much sympathy and interest, though the Soviet image as a bulwark against imperialism began to wear thin after the purges of the 1930's and the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact. However, Nehru continued to discount the USSR as a threat to India and looked toward closer ties after independence.

By contrast, Pakistani leaders, as Choudhury's account of the international politics of the Indian subcontinent shows, were much more distrustful of Soviet intentions. Their pro-Western orientation was revealed in 1949 when Pakistan's first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, used an invitation to visit Moscow as a ploy to gain American attention (Nehru had been invited to visit the United States earlier that year). Given the divergent Indian and Pakistani foreign policy orientations, it could have been anticipated that when the Soviets sought to end their isolation (an effort which actually started well before Stalin's death), their overtures would be more sympathetically received in India than in Pakistan.

WHILE THE Soviet entry into South Asia was heralded by trade and aid agreements, it was Nikita Khrushchev's declaration of support for India's claim to Kashmir in his December 1955 speech in Srinigar which thrust Moscow firmly into the vortex of Indo-Pakistani relations. Although Choudhury is correct in noting that Khrushchev's statement was intended to penalize Pakistan for its alliance with the West, one wonders whether the Soviet Premier's vindictive initiative was prudent or necessary. The fact that there had been no hint of any forthcoming major policy pronouncement prior to Khrushchev's political bombshell at Srinigar, and also the indication that the trip to Kashmir's capital was added to Bulganin and Khrushchev's itinerary while they were already on tour in India, strongly suggest that Khrushchev's commitment was impulsive.[3] It is instructive in this regard to compare Soviet and Chinese behavior. Choudhury relates that China, which had taken the lead in fostering good relations with India in the early 1950's, correctly interpreted Pakistan's entry into the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) as

[2] In March 1927 Chiang Kai-shek colluded with local warlords to massacre his Chinese Communist "allies" in the streets of Shanghai. This was highly embarrassing to Stalin, who had insisted that the Chinese Communists continue to support the Kuomintang long after Chiang Kai-shek had signaled that he would turn against them.

[3] This point is further developed in the reviewer's *Soviet Scholars and Soviet Foreign Policy: A Case Study in Soviet Policy Towards India*, Durham, NC, Carolina Academic Press, 1975, pp. 19-20.

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motivated more by hostility toward India than by anticommunism—and thus acted with far greater circumspection. By adopting a deliberately vague position on the Kashmir issue, Peking achieved a degree of flexibility in its relations with South Asia, facilitating the forging of strong Sino-Pakistani ties in the early 1960's.

The reviewer cannot agree with Donaldson's suggestion that Soviet support for India on the Kashmir issue was intended to undermine American efforts to build an anticommunist phalanx in South Asia. Besides the evidence that Khrushchev's statement was based on a spur-of-the-moment decision, it should be remembered that up until the 1962 Sino-Indian war, the Nehru government consistently made clear that it had no intention of joining any American-sponsored military bloc. In any event, the balance of the evidence suggests that the Soviet commitment on Kashmir constituted a gratuitous bonus for India—one which, while helping to cement Indo-Soviet ties, at the same time overcommitted Moscow to New Delhi's side on an issue which the Soviets later recognized could only be resolved by the parties directly involved and without outside interference. It was left for Khrushchev's successors to extricate Moscow from this imbalance, when the Kremlin sought to stabilize relations in the subcontinent in order to contain Peking.

Thus, one of the early foreign policy shifts of the post-Khrushchev leadership was the recognition of the Kashmir issue as a genuine dispute—a more even-handed approach which constituted a precondition for Moscow's mediation of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani confrontation at Tashkent and paved the way for better Soviet-Pakistani relations. In the highly charged political atmosphere of the subcontinent, however, Moscow had a difficult task convincing both India and Pakistan that it could pursue friendship with each of them without detriment to the other. When the Soviets concluded a limited arms deal with Pakistan in the late 1960's, they sought to assure the Indians that this move represented only an effort to woo Pakistan from China and to reinforce Pakistan's disengagement from the United States, and that it would not upset the military balance in South Asia inasmuch as Moscow was continuing to support India's military buildup. Despite this explanation, the Soviet-Pakistani arms deal created an uproar in India and was obviously an embarrassment to Indira Gandhi (who had become Prime Minister in 1966). She decided, however, not to let the issue lead to a serious rupture with Moscow—a decision which seemed to be signaled by her government's restrained response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

THE BANGLADESH crisis of 1971 subverted Moscow's painstaking efforts to normalize Indo-Pakistani relations. But even before the Yahya Khan government unleashed military repression in East Pakistan, factors both external and internal to the situation on the subcontinent were drawing Moscow closer to New Delhi. As Choudhury documents, the escalation of the Sino-Soviet conflict estranged the Soviet leaders from Yahya Khan, whose government had reinforced ties to Peking,[4] and at the same time upgraded India's strategic value from Moscow's perspective.

The configuration of domestic political events in India and in Pakistan leading up to the Bangladesh crisis also influenced Moscow's "tilt" toward New Delhi. Disturbed by India's mounting instability and rightward drift during the 1960's, the Soviets welcomed the 1969 split in the Congress party as a shift to the left and rendered Mrs. Gandhi's government substantial political support. Her smashing electoral victory in February 1971 seemed to confirm the correctness of this approach. With respect to Pakistan, the Soviets' disenchantment with Yahya Khan caused them to look with favor on the prospect of his displacement by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman; the victory of Mujib's Awami League in the parliamentary election of December 1970 seemed to augur not only an end to military rule but also a more favorable Pakistani foreign policy course. The military repression initiated by Yahya Khan on March 25, 1971, must have come as a bitter disappointment.

It is against this background of events that the sharp Soviet response to the repression, as articulated in President Nikolay Podgornyy's note of April 2, should be judged. While that note revealed where Soviet sympathies lay in the crisis, the reviewer cannot

[4] Choudhury's narration (p. 62) of the following exchange between Soviet Defense Minister Andrey Grechko and Pakistani Foreign Secretary S. M. Yousuf in February 1969 indicates that the tensions of the Sino-Soviet border conflict may have had deleterious repercussions on Moscow's diplomacy in South Asia. Grechko reportedly told Yousuf during his visit that "you cannot have simultaneous friendship with the Soviet Union and China." When Yousuf replied that the Soviet Union had sought friendship with both India and Pakistan, Grechko delivered this rejoinder: "What is permissible for a superpower is not possible for a country like Pakistan."

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agree with Choudhury's view that it represented a major change in Soviet policy toward South Asia. Rather, from the perspective of hindsight it could appear that Soviet support for India during the Bangladesh emergency was dictated by the specific circumstances of the crisis and represented a temporary aberration in Moscow's overarching policy of fostering normalization and stability on the subcontinent.

Choudhury's negative perception of the Soviet role during and after the Bangladesh crisis does not seem to suggest dispassionate scholarly inquiry. Rather, it appears to reflect his own biases as a former high Pakistani government official. Among other views that should be challenged are his assertions—without any supporting evidence—that the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation constituted a "military pact" and that the Soviet Union acted during this crisis out of a "traditional Russian ambition to establish hegemony in the subcontinent and in the Indian Ocean."

With regard to the Indo-Soviet treaty, there is doubt whether it can properly be called a "military pact" from either a legal or a political perspective. While the vague security provisions of the treaty (Article 9 calls only for immediate consultations in the event of an attack) may be designed to create uncertainty regarding the Soviet response in a crisis situation and thereby to maximize their deterrence value, a textual comparison of similar Soviet treaties with Egypt, Iraq, Somalia, Angola, and Mozambique—all of which contain clauses on military cooperation—suggests that the Soviet-Indian treaty is even less of a "military pact" than these others. Furthermore, it must be recalled that the signing of the Soviet-Indian treaty in early August 1971 probably forestalled the outbreak of an Indo-Pakistani war at that juncture. Although the treaty demonstrated that India was not isolated, there is substantial evidence that Moscow continued to press for a political settlement of the dispute until a few weeks before the outbreak of hostilities in December.

With respect to Choudhury's allegations of Russia's "historic ambitions," little support can be found for the view that ever since the reign of the "mad" Tsar Paul I, Moscow has harbored hegemonistic designs on the Indian subcontinent.[5] On the contrary, South Asia —in contrast to such regions of traditional Russian interest as Eastern Europe, Turkey, Persia, and China—seems to have been neglected by Moscow until relatively recently.

Choudhury's claims concerning the expansion of Soviet influence on the subcontinent since the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war are equally unconvincing. An example is his supposition that Moscow must be deriving some concrete benefits for its military aid to India —a statement based solely on personal authority (*e.g.*, "I know from my experience in Pakistan from 1967 through 1970 that the Soviets provide arms . . . only in return for political as well as cash rewards," p. 226). In fact, some of his assertions appear to be contradicted by his own narrative. Whereas on p. 228 he states that as a result of port clearance operations in Bangladesh the Soviet Navy gained an opportunity to extend its influence into the coastal waters of the Indian subcontinent, eight pages later he cites information from an American naval expert that Bangladesh logistically constitutes a very poor stationing area from which to project a naval presence into the Indian Ocean. Overall, Choudhury's assessment of the degree of Soviet influence in the subcontinent since the Bangladesh crisis mirrors the anxieties of Pakistani and Chinese leaders and is at variance with the weight of evidence presented by Donaldson and other scholars (*e.g.*, William Barnds).[6] It can be more persuasively argued that Moscow's support of New Delhi has made India less dependent upon the Soviet Union.

THE LATTER CASE rests not only on Moscow's backing of India dur-

[5] There is one supportive argument that perhaps should be addressed: Reference is sometimes made to a proposal ventured during the 1940 Molotov-Ribbentrop talks for the establishment of a Soviet sphere of influence "in the general direction of the Indian Ocean." Some have cited this proposal without mentioning the fact that it was the Germans, not the Soviets, who advanced the idea, in order to divert Stalin's attention from an area of genuine Russian interest in Eastern Europe to an area of historic neglect—the Indian Ocean basin. Actually, the Soviet negotiators brushed aside the proffered Indian Ocean sphere of influence to press the Germans on the latter's intentions in the Balkans and in Finland.

[6] The problem of Soviet influence in India is directly addressed in William J. Barnds, "Soviet Influence in India: A Search for the Spoils That Go With Victory," in Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Ed., *Soviet and Chinese Influence in The Third World*, New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1975, pp. 23-50. See also the epilogue of the reviewer's *Soviet Scholars and Soviet Foreign Policy*, pp. 297-320. In the period of Indo-Soviet relations since the Bangladesh emergency, there is nothing to discredit the accuracy of Mrs. Gandhi's following reply to C. L. Sulzberger's question of whether India felt obligated to demonstrate its gratitude to the Soviet Union for the latter's support during the crisis: "We are unable to display gratitude in any tangible sense for anything." *The New York Times*, Feb. 17, 1972, p. 14.

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ing the December 1971 war, which left Pakistan dismembered and made India the paramount military power in South Asia, but also on the USSR's two decades of economic collaboration with India—a subject examined in detail in M. Sebastian Stanislaus' study, *Soviet Economic Aid to India.* In reviewing Soviet aid and trade with India up through March 1971, Stanislaus positively appraises these economic relations as a significant contribution to India's economic development. Addressing doubts and criticisms that have arisen concerning Indo-Soviet trade, Stanislaus analyzes unit value indices of the major commodities exchanged to rebut the charge that the Soviet Union sells dear and buys cheap from India.[7] He also denies that the expansion of Indian exports to the USSR represents a diversion from traditional markets or that the Soviet Union has participated in any switch trade of imports from India.

Although Stanislaus has presented a generally solid case for his positive appraisal of Indo-Soviet trade, he seems somewhat insensitive to the problems that could impede the continued expansion of that trade on a bilateral basis. Some of these problems are touched on by Michael Kidron in his study of Soviet-bloc trade with Pakistan (the last volume to be mentioned in this review). In an assessment of future trends, Kidron suggests that the growth in trade between the Soviet bloc and the Third World, which has been evident over the past decade, will taper off once debt repayment subsides and Soviet-bloc countries turn to the West for commodities which they have until now purchased from the developing countries.[8] Stanislaus, on the other hand, expects the Soviet demand for Indian light industrial goods to continue, even though he notes at one point that importation of Indian consumer goods has a low priority in the USSR.

To be sure, Stanislaus' projection of good prospects for Indo-Soviet trade has thus far proven accurate, but this may be due to special circumstances. The considerable expansion of trade since the Bangladesh crisis is largely the result of Soviet efforts to fill the gap left by the abrupt American cessation of vital commodity exports. Moreover, in order to keep pace with the projected 50-100 percent expansion in trade by 1980 targeted during Brezhnev's 1973 trip to India, New Delhi and Moscow have sought to explore new ways of expanding the list of commodities traded, including the organization of collaborative efforts to produce knitwear, textiles, electronics, and nonferrous metallurgy. The two nations' determination to reach their trade expansion goals is evidenced by their recent adoption of a protocol to boost trade in 1977 by 20 percent over last year's record trade turnover, which amounted to US$1 billion. It remains to be seen whether such measures can continue to offset the potential constraints on the expansion of trade inherent in Moscow's bilateral trading mechanism.

As for Soviet economic aid, Stanislaus maintains that Moscow's substantial input has helped make India self-sufficient in many vital sectors of industrial and defense production and has bolstered the country's independence. He neglects to note, however, that the Soviet contribution to India's economic self-sufficiency is no longer based on the idea of promoting economic autarky, which probably inspired Khrushchev's initial aid program of the 1950's. Soviet economists long ago recognized that even in large countries like India, which are capable of engaging in relatively sophisticated and diversified economic development programs, industrialization does not lead to economic autarky but rather results in greater economic interdependence as a consequence of the exchange of industrial goods and raw materials. In fact, the Soviet decision to involve Third World countries in the "international socialist division of labor" (a Soviet variant of the doctrine of comparative advantage),[9] which

[7] Specifically, Stanislaus found that only Soviet copper was priced above world market prices, though unit values of Indian exports to the USSR presented a more mixed picture, with jute exports priced lower but tea and cashews higher than world market prices.

[8] Inasmuch as this review focuses on Indo-Soviet relations, Kidron's excellent work on Soviet-Pakistani trade could be mentioned only briefly in the text. As suggested, however, his analysis has important implications for Soviet trade with other Third World states. One such implication concerns the effect on trade of nonpolitical, systemic factors. In this regard, Kidron notes that even though the Soviets try to buy at world market prices, their agents nevertheless pay prices for Pakistani jute that are usually higher than world market levels simply because they do not have the extensive personal networks of local contacts that enable Western salesmen to "buy with a view"—an observation that might easily apply to other countries besides Pakistan. Kidron suggests that Soviet buyers are also hampered by their own trading organizations, whose rules and performance indicators leave little room for profit-motivated behavior.

[9] This concept was first articulated in L. Zevin, "The Mutual Advantage of Economic Cooperation Between the Socialist and Developing Countries," *Voprosy Ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 2, 1965. Translated in *American Review of Soviet and East European Trade* (White Plains, NY), July-August 1965, pp. 30-50.

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dates back to 1965, signified the formal abandonment of the Soviet policy of fostering economic autarky in Third World countries.

The recent Indo-Soviet ventures into collaborative production are the embodiment of this policy. While it is still much too early to assess whether these projects may eventually have an appreciable effect in forging Indo-Soviet economic interdependence, the fact that most of the production-cooperation agreements were finalized in the post-Bangladesh period is itself indicative of the new level of trust surrounding Indo-Soviet relations since the 1971 war.

The foregoing does not necessarily mean that Moscow has abandoned its encouragement of India's economic independence. The history of the Soviet aid program in India is replete with examples of Moscow's strengthening New Delhi's capacity to resist external pressure and influence. A major instance cited by Stanislaus and others was the Soviet offer of very favorable terms for the construction of the Bhilai steel mill in 1955, a move which probably forced West Germany and Great Britain to make concessions on the terms for their own steel plant projects. In addition, Soviet bloc aid for Indian oil exploration and the construction of oil refineries ended India's exclusive reliance on three Western oil distributors in the 1960's.

By channeling their aid exclusively to India's state sector, the Soviets enabled the Indian government to move toward greater control of the country's economy—a direction which India's former leaders wanted to take but which was not encouraged or supported by the Western countries. In building up India's state sector, the Soviets considered that they were laying the groundwork for a possible Indian transition to a noncapitalist path of development; ironically, they now face the prospect that the post-Gandhi government may permit the Indian business community to take control of many of the state enterprises constructed with their aid.

AT THE SAME time, India's present leadership recognizes that the Soviets have made a major contribution to the country's economic and political independence. Whatever invectives the Soviets have hurled against them in the past, the new leaders know as well as the Kremlin that foreign policy must be based not on personal predilections but on calculations of state interests. Hence, both sides have moved quickly to reaffirm the strength of the "time-tested" Indo-Soviet friendship. The Soviets for their part called a moratorium on public criticism of the new government in the aftermath of the elections; moreover, they fully vented their frustrations over the abuses and errors of the Gandhi government during the two-year period of emergency rule, as part of a post-election autopsy which *inter alia* served to distance them from too close an identification with Mrs. Gandhi in the eyes of her successors. Moscow has also sought to underline the value of the Soviet connection by stepping up trade and proffering aid on more flexible terms than in the past. It is not surprising, therefore, that when Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko visited New Delhi in late April of this year, shortly after the 30th anniversary of the establishment of Indo-Soviet diplomatic relations, the value of the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty was reaffirmed, and both sides lauded the further development of Soviet-Indian friendship.

On the other hand, it seems very possible that the exclusivity that has characterized the Soviet-Indian alignment will tend to dissipate as the new Indian leaders seek to normalize relations with China and upgrade ties with the United States. This process in fact began under Indira Gandhi, and is likely to accelerate with her departure from the scene. While an improvement in US-Indian relations may not create much of a problem for Moscow, since US policy has not directly conflicted with Soviet interests in the Indian subcontinent, a Sino-Indian détente is another matter. The Soviets would certainly object to any Chinese effort to promote Sino-Indian ties at the expense of Moscow's interests, and in this regard, they could invoke the 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty. Given the significant benefits which the Indians have derived from the Soviet connection, it is unlikely they would act without circumspection or without sensitivity toward Soviet interests. But they could—and probably will—seek to negotiate with Peking without antagonizing Moscow. Depending on the responsiveness of the Chinese leaders to the new Indian government, a normalization of relations might be forthcoming. The settlement of conflicting Sino-Indian territorial claims would certainly be easier to achieve than the conciliation of the Sino-Soviet border dispute.[10]

[10] The Soviets could not seriously oppose such a resolution of this border issue. In the first place, the Soviets have never formally endorsed the Indian position on the Sino-Indian border demarcation. Secondly, any such obstruction would be highly inconsistent with Moscow's stated policy of encouraging the resolution of border conflicts without the use of force.

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It is necessary to consider, then, what long-range effect a Sino-Indian rapprochement would have on Soviet policy toward South Asia. While there is a strong consensus among Western observers that Soviet policy has been greatly influenced by the Sino-Soviet conflict, it does not necessarily follow that a Sino-Indian reconciliation would lessen India's importance to the Soviet Union. It seems possible that after two decades Indo-Soviet friendship may have taken on a permanence that would enable it to survive any diminution of India's strategic role as a partner in a putative anti-Chinese alliance. In light of the kaleidoscopic shifts in foreign alignments among Third World states, the stability of this friendship is indeed a remarkable accomplishment, and both Moscow and New Delhi may view it as something worth safeguarding in a world of changing relations.

Moscow and Eastern Europe: A New Look

By Robert W. Dean

J. F. BROWN. *Relations Between the Soviet Union and Its Eastern European Allies: A Survey,* R-1742-PR. Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, November 1975.

GERHARD WETTIG. *Die Sowjetunion, die DDR und die Deutschland-Frage, 1965-1976* (The Soviet Union, the GDR and the German Question, 1965-1976). Stuttgart, Verlag Bonn Aktuell, 1976.

CHARLES GATI, Ed. *The International Politics of Eastern Europe.* New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1976.

ROMAN SZPORLUK, Ed. *The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on the USSR.* New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1975.

THE GENERAL DESIDERATA of the hegemonistic policies pursued by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe are evident. Political, economic, and cultural life in the East European states is to remain the exclusive preserve of the central apparatuses of the Communist parties, as are the information media, the trade unions, and the educational systems. In foreign policy, support for Soviet positions on a host of international issues is obligatory for East European governments, as is their progressive integration into a variety of multilateral organizations in which Moscow has the determining voice. Yet within these demanding tolerances, East European leaderships have exploited ambiguities or indecision in Soviet positions to pursue a variety of domestic and foreign policies guided not by conformity but by the carefully calculated objective of extending essentially national interests.

Over the last decade or so, we have witnessed variations in the success with which individual East European states have charted peculiarly national courses, diversity in the domestic and foreign policies they have pursued, and apparent differences in Soviet tolerances—all of which suggest that the uniformity desired by the CPSU has not been achieved. Between 1969 and his fall from power in 1971, GDR party chief Walter Ulbricht frustrated Soviet policies on German and Berlin settlements. Beginning in 1968, Hungary instituted economic reforms which took leave of accepted practices within the Soviet domain. In Poland since 1970, the leadership of Edward Gierek has pursued domestic and foreign economic policies which have elicited Soviet suspicion. In foreign policy, Romania has long been the most willful of Soviet allies, testing the limits of nonconformity through an almost dialectical process of probe and retreat. Nowhere, however, since Czechoslovakia in 1968, have the

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violations of Soviet norms by an East European party been so egregious as to provoke the use of force.

Moscow's options—the extent of its control over each East European state—vary in accordance with particular national conditions. The USSR's calculus with regard to each of its six allies is based on a number of factors which range from the relative geopolitical importance of the ally to its leadership cohesion, indigenous political-bureaucratic assets, and national temperament. As a consequence, Moscow, despite the existence of a variety of multilateral organizations (of which the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—CMEA—and the Warsaw Pact are the most important), manages and conducts its East European ties on a bilateral basis.

THE COMPLEX Soviet-East European interaction of the last decade, with which each of the present volumes deals in its own way, has taken place in a changing context. An overview of this evolving environment should provide a suitable framework for consideration of the authors' specific contributions.

Important to any assessment of the USSR's relations with East European states since 1968 are the changes which can be discerned in the latter's domestic politics. In most of these states, improvement of the economic welfare of the population has become a surrogate for (as well as the means of progressing toward) political legitimacy, and a precondition for political stability. Social and political tensions have in fact been translated into consumer demands. Where some measure of popular acceptance has been achieved, it appears to be the result in important part of improved living standards. Similarly, failure to sustain consumer-oriented policies can be politically costly, as seen in the public reaction to Poland's June 1976 price increases for basic foodstuffs. That long-delayed decision produced violent protest and subsequent recision of the increases. In Hungary, a cautious leadership introduced similar but more modest price increases only after carefully testing the public mood, and it spread the increases over a period of years, simultaneously providing compensation allowances.

In these and other East European countries the onerous subsidies paid by the state to hold down prices of consumer goods, as well as the increases in social expenditures in the 1970's, indicate the extent to which leaderships perceive increased levels of consumption as a mainstay of political stability. In the case of Poland, a convincing economic argument can be made for slower, more balanced growth. But, politically, slowing consumption to create equilibrium in the domestic economy, or curtailing investment to reduce the foreign deficit, are high-risk policies. The average Pole does not appear willing to accept a policy of delayed consumption. In the longer term in Eastern Europe, if the experience of the last six years provides an accurate guide, the degree of stability—beyond the simple maintenance of internal security controls—will be gauged in terms of the growth of the consumer economy and the realization of increased living standards. There is some reason to believe that even Romania, which unlike its allies has up to now followed a development strategy of consumer austerity and forced industrialization, may have to yield to similar popular expectations.

A second change which distinguishes the more recent period in Eastern Europe is that existing party leaderships—unlike their predecessors of the 1950's and 1960's—are not highly factionalized. This is not to say there are no disagreements over policy or that there are no differences in the political and ideological instincts of individuals. But on the whole no competing centers of power or organization offering alternative national policies appear to exist within the individual party leaderships. Within each party, a leadership group exists which—in contrast to earlier situations—appears relatively consolidated under the leadership of the first secretary.[1]

There are, of course, distinctions to be drawn between the degree of consensus in the Polish party leadership under Gierek, for example, and the more fragmented coalition of the Czechoslovak Politburo. But across Eastern Europe, leaderships exhibit a degree of consolidation (if not unity) and a political pragmatism which reduce the chances that sudden political change will spring from organized leadership conspiracy. This greater leadership stability is reflected in the subordinate apparatuses as well.

[1] This is not because leadership transition has become institutionalized. Nor is such a state of affairs necessarily permanent. The reasons for the stability vary from case to case. In general, however, it reflects the fact that the domestic and foreign policy choices open to any East European leadership have been defined and narrowed by the 1968 Czechoslovak experience, by the exemplary effects of the limitations which the Soviet Union has placed on the Hungarian domestic experiment in the past five years, and by the demonstration effect of the Polish disorders of 1970.

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Yet another change has to do with the socio-political role of intellectuals, who as a group are much less the motor force of change today than in earlier periods. Now it is working-class frustrations, generated by years of economic austerity, to which East European leaderships are most responsive. This constitutes a significant pattern of social change, stemming from growing prosperity and the rising expectations it has stimulated, as well as from the ever more critical importance of labor productivity as a factor in economic growth.

The fact that intellectuals find themselves on the periphery rather than at the vortex of politics has to do also with the irrelevance of any comprehensive blueprint for systematic political-economic change after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. That event provided a far sharper sense of the narrow range of Soviet tolerances, as well as the vastly diminished importance of ideology as a vehicle for articulating, not to mention sustaining, national aspirations.

THE SOVIET LEADERS evidently recognize the explosive potential for Eastern Europe of domestic policies which fail to establish progress in living standards. Therefore, Moscow's options tend to be limited by the same socio-economic problems to which national leaderships have responded. A Soviet strategy seeking cohesion through the standardization of institutions and practices across Eastern Europe is less practicable today. As a result, the Soviet Union has acquiesced in industrial modernization policies in Hungary, Poland, and East Germany which accord consumption an important place, and which also have created particular interests in broader and more permanent economic links with the West. There are, to be sure, limits to the experimentation and departure Moscow will tolerate in East European economic policies, and in the future the USSR may seek to restrict Western technological and economic inputs, which are essential for increasing living standards and effecting industrial modernization. However, prohibition of such policies, even if it were possible, would be imprudent, for it would imperil socioeconomic stability in Eastern Europe.

Although the Soviets have apparently acquiesced in the trend toward "consumerism," it is disturbing to them for a number of reasons. They have criticized it ideologically on grounds that a by-product of consumer prosperity is distortion of social attitudes—*i.e.*, the growth of individual acquisitiveness, and the uneven distribution of wealth in societies which in theory should be progressing toward material egalitarianism. Consumerism is also seen as introducing new social tensions, not only through the generation of rising expectations but also by the engendering of new domestic ideological divisions. All of these have been evident in Hungary and, in incipient form, in Poland. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is determined to prevent a drift toward social democracy in Eastern Europe, which could in the future echo developments in Western Europe should Communist parties there come to play a major role in deciding socio-economic policies.

Until now the growth of the consumer economy has been guided by an abbreviated reformism (unlike the aborted, comprehensive reforms of the 1960's) in which authority has remained firmly in the hands of the party; and in keeping with orthodox norms, secondary political, social, and economic institutions have retained their traditional subordinate and intermediary functions. But the process is one which could gradually favor the devolution of authority or the extension of the private sector, notably in agriculture and services.

IT IS, HOWEVER, over the implications of the aggressive expansion of East European commercial ties with the West that the Soviet Union is probably most concerned. This process has a logic of its own. Rising growth rates in the East have increased demands for Western imports. The long-standing inability of East European states to increase significantly exports of manufactures to the West and the fact that their total exports have not risen as fast as anticipated have, particularly in the context of Western inflation and recession, resulted in an almost geometric expansion of borrowings in the West. As they approach or surpass their borrowing limits, East European planners are obliged to turn more to nontraditional forms of trade, above all to industrial cooperation agreements. Such ties —and this is the significant point—cannot be sustained in a political vacuum. In order to ensure the continued flow of these essential Western economic inputs, the East Europeans will likely seek expanded political ties to underwrite them. As a consequence, the connection with the West, or so the Soviet leaders may see it, appears on the way to becoming more "organic."

The Kremlin is obviously not opposed to Western economic ties per se: such relations are essen-

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tial for development, they ease the strain on Soviet material and technical resources, and they have an economic/technological spill-over which may benefit all East European states and the USSR itself. The question is one of optimum balance—that is, when does the value of growing commercial ties with the West in complementing the economic development of the region become incompatible with the political evolution of Eastern Europe in directions desired by the Soviet Union?

It is difficult to imagine Moscow countenancing policies which mortgage Eastern Europe's future in the West too extensively. National development objectives which in effect hold leaderships hostage to increased consumption and which presuppose growing ties with the West complicate a Soviet strategy aimed at standardizing institutions and practices across Eastern Europe to ensure conformity on Moscow's terms. But at the same time the continuing threat of popular disruptions, above all in Poland, forces Soviet forbearance vis-à-vis policies which, while aimed at raising the standard of living, also deviate from the Soviet norm and raise apprehensions with regard to the gravitational pull of the West.

None of this should suggest that the ultimate intention of Polish or Hungarian policies stressing a rapid increase of trade with the West is to effect a neo-Romanian foreign policy. This is emphatically not the case. However, it is important to point out the potential contradictions in the longer term between the high stakes the Poles and others have placed on the "Western connection" and the requirements of Soviet hegemony and control.

IN ATTEMPTING to cope with these contradictions and to further its goal of conformity through integration, the Soviet Union may have found potential new leverage in the developing world shortages of raw materials and energy—a phenomenon which has tended to intensify the already great dependence of most East European states upon the USSR for these critical inputs to industrial development. In 1975, the USSR increased the prices it charges Eastern Europe for deliveries of such commodities. And while there is no evidence that the Soviet Union has explictly linked continuation and expansion of raw-material deliveries with specific political conditions,[2] the resulting deterioration in bilateral terms of trade puts in question the ability of hard-pressed East European leaderships to maintain their commitment to high growth rates in the consumer economy and expanded economic relations with the West.

To be sure, Moscow cannot be indifferent to the consequences of pressing its new advantage. But the simple ability of the USSR to manipulate the supply of essential energy and raw-material supplies either in price or quantity is likely to make East European leaderships more politically responsive. Moscow will probably avoid forcing radical readjustments on its East European allies in the interests of preserving their domestic growth and stability and preventing undue strain in bilateral relations. But the USSR's leverage is a fact and could be translated into political pressures to the disadvantage of East European maneuverability in foreign and domestic policies.

WITH THESE GENERAL considerations in mind, then, let us turn to the volumes under review. Many of the themes discussed above are analyzed in J. F. Brown's impressive study of the last decade of Soviet-East European relations. His thesis is that for some 25 years Soviet policies toward Eastern Europe have been designed to achieve both *cohesion*—"a general conformity of both domestic and foreign policies, and an identity of the institutions implementing these policies in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe"—and *viability*—"a degree of confidence, credibility, and efficiency in the Eastern European states that would increasingly legitimize Communist rule there and consequently reduce Soviet need for a preventive preoccupation with the region." Balancing cohesion and viability has been difficult, Brown argues, because the two have proven incompatible: in imposing cohesion, the Soviets have deprived the East Europeans of the national autonomy required for viability. At the risk of oversimplifying Brown's careful reasoning, one may say that the Brezhnev leadership has been confronted (as will any subsequent Soviet leadership) with the dilemma of how much autonomy to permit the East Europeans in order that they may achieve greater viability. Chastened by the 1968 Czechoslovak challenge, Brezhnev has answered the question, in Brown's view, by placing overwhelming emphasis on cohesion—that is, on attempting to restore orthodoxy

[2] Clearly, the Soviet price increases—which had varying economic impact on the East European countries—were motivated by legitimate economic considerations, above all by a desire to improve terms of trade to correspond with changes in the world market. At the same time, these increases may have political by-products.

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and restrict the East Europeans' latitude for maneuver through "a comprehensive integrationist policy" that seeks to establish a network of interlocking relationships among the respective political, economic, cultural, ideological, and military systems of the East European states and the USSR.

The argument is provocative, but not wholly convincing. First, equating viability with national autonomy tends to obscure the complexity of the viability issue. For example, to the extent that economic reform and greater Western inputs are incompatible with a more binding membership in CMEA, viability and cohesion are mutually exclusive. Yet viability also depends on the uninterrupted and relatively less expensive flow of Soviet raw materials and energy. Increasing that flow will probably oblige closer ties—as it already has, for example, in the form of direct East European investments in Soviet raw-material and energy projects. Brown's argument is that viability and cohesion are the antipodes of Soviet policy choices, but the new situation may force acceptance in Eastern Europe of the conclusion that the economic future lies in closer cooperation (and greater cohesion) with the Soviet Union.

Second, while it is true that integrationist rhetoric has increased and that the exchange of delegations and the signing of agreements in all spheres have multiplied, Brown offers little evidence that the USSR has been successful in its efforts over the last half-decade to utilize "integration" to institutionalize greater control. Brown's argument may also attribute too much system and purpose to a Soviet policy which in practice has been much more opportunistic. In any case, a closer examination of the network of multilateral agreements, committees, and parleys which have proliferated since 1969 might have yielded additional insights.

These are, however, minor flaws in a study which exhibits a clarity of presentation, a grasp for detail, and an overall thematic cohesion which make it perhaps the most perceptive analysis of Soviet-East European politics to appear in some time.

Gerhard Wettig's detailed and convincing analysis of the Soviet-East German relationship since 1965 is a particularly interesting case study. The period was one of fundamental changes in the international relations of both states—changes which strained their special relationship.

From its founding in 1949, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had moored its political security to an identity of views with Moscow, which on the whole postulated confrontation with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and unrelenting opposition to the chimera of West German "revanchism," as well as to Bonn's efforts to extend its influence in Eastern Europe. By 1969-70, however, the USSR and its allies were generally prepared to normalize relations with the Federal Republic. The GDR stood alone in opposing normalization.

The new divergence was understandable. The USSR views West Germany as the fulcrum of its European strategy; the GDR leadership, more narrowly, sees West Germany as a continuing challenge to the political and social stability, or even (as Wettig argues) the very existence of the East German state. The uncertainties implicit in a reconciliation between Bonn and Warsaw threatened to undermine vital GDR positions, above all its categorical assertions of sovereignty and its claims that West Berlin was part of East German territory.

The implication in Wettig's analysis that East Germany's leaders were driven by a rudimentary concern for preservation of their state's existence, however, probably overstates matters. While their apprehensions were doubtless grave, in this period the GDR (particularly under Erich Honecker, who came to power in May 1971) has been concerned not so much with actual survival as with position and advantage in a new German status quo. In pursuing this goal, East Germany has found itself caught between the imperatives of its close alignment with Moscow as the guarantor of its existence, and a fear that the Soviet Union might trade basic East German interests for improved relations with Bonn.

Wettig argues that while in the short run the GDR may oppose Soviet intentions (as it manifestly did in 1969-71), over the longer term the GDR's only practicable strategy in protecting its own interests is to consolidate its influence in Moscow by elaborating its special relationship and by supporting greater cohesion in the Soviet-East European bloc as a whole. The level of East German dependence, the author concludes, insures that "overall direction of policy is determined by Moscow."

Having looked at the general dynamics of Soviet-East European interaction and at the specifics of USSR-GDR ties, we come to the volume edited by Charles Gati, which undertakes an innovative

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cost/benefit analysis of the relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The question which serves as the theme of the anthology is whether Eastern Europe has become an asset or liability to the Soviet Union. The contributions are uneven, in part because of the artificiality of addressing specific areas of Soviet-East European interaction on the basis of a balance sheet. Some pieces provide an historical recapitulation which sheds little insight in terms of the volume's theme. A number of the studies, however, distinguish the volume as a useful addition to the literature. Vernon Aspaturian's article establishes a realistic framework for the individual studies which follow. Ross Johnson provides a particularly good discussion of sources of friction and change in the much-neglected area of Soviet-East European military relations. Such issues as the Romanian military deviation,[3] Warsaw Pact burden-sharing, doctrinal disputes, and the political significance of the professionalization of the East European officer corps, Johnson concludes, deserve more systematic study. Paul Marer's revealing analysis of Soviet-East European economic relations concludes that on balance that relationship has proven a liability to the USSR. One hopes that Marer's future work will devote attention to the political implications of that conclusion.

[3] For example, Romania's refusal to participate in the Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and its resistance to further integration into the Warsaw Pact.

IT IS A widely-held assumption that the USSR, while obviously needing to react to and control developments in Eastern Europe, itself remains a sanctuary, successfully isolated from or immunized against those developments. The theme of Roman Szporluk's anthology is that the Soviet-East European relationship has not been a one-way street, that influence has been reciprocal. The contributors attempt to assess the effect that Eastern Europe (and, for that matter, the Western portion of the USSR) has had on Soviet political, economic, and cultural behavior, or, more specifically, to explore the question of *how* or *if* experimentation (or deviation) in Eastern Europe has pointed the way for changes within the Soviet Union. The volume offers a number of interesting discussions of the contrasts between the two areas in a variety of fields such as economic reform and literary license. On the whole, the various studies are inconclusive, and the lack of evidence would seem to suggest that Eastern Europe has not exerted a meaningful influence on the Soviet Union.

However, the answer might have been different if the question of influence had been posed in broader terms, *i.e.*, had not been focused primarily on experimentation or nonconformity in Eastern Europe. In areas where cooperation has been politically acceptable and encouraged, where East European developments have not been officially suspect or anathema in the USSR, it is possible that East European influence has been considerable. Thus, while Deming Brown's useful analysis of what might be described as politically avant-garde literary currents in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union concludes that there is no evidence of East European influence on Soviet letters, he says nothing regarding *politically - sanctioned* literature and authors—an area where there has probably been considerable interaction and influence.

* * *

As the present volumes demonstrate, the exercise of Soviet hegemony has grown enormously more complicated in the last decade. Neither these works nor this review give sufficient attention to the convergence of political and economic problems, a distinguishing feature, and one that could profoundly effect the future development of Soviet-East European relations. To what extent might this change recast problems of political legitimacy, integration, cohesion, and stability in Eastern Europe? East European leaderships have certainly entered a period of reassessment. To what degree might their maneuverability be vitiated by the change in economic relationships with Moscow? For Moscow's part, cohesion and stability in Eastern Europe, essential in themselves, have now become a precondition for an activist foreign policy toward the West. Given the importance of meeting popular economic aspirations in Eastern Europe, can the Soviets feasibly define their control in terms of the rigid, orthodox constraints of the past? Such questions are not easily answered, either by the Soviets or by outside observers.

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